Secession and the theory & practice of international relations. by Bishai, Linda Suzanne
SECESSION AND THE THEORY & PRACTICE 
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Linda Suzanne Bishai
A thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations
Summer 1999
London School of Economics & Political Science
UMI Number: U123126
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Disscrrlation Publishing
UMI U123126
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
yscit5
7 '0 S 2 3
Abstract
Secession has been noticeably absent from International Relations theory although its role 
in the creation and recognition of states is clearly relevant. Traditionally, the dominant perspectives 
in IR have not questioned state formation and this has effectively barred secession as a topic since 
it cannot be thoroughly treated without looking across the inside/outside divide of state sovereignty. 
Secession must be placed in its historical context — as a phenomenon only possible in the modem 
era and only perceived as a global threat in this century.
Theorists from other disciphnes who have discussed secession have rehed on a problem­
solving theoretical perspective which has kept them from considering secession as an outcome of 
problematic assumptions about identity and territory in the international system. In contrast, a 
critical theoretical perspective, which aflSrms the constitutive processes of historical discourse allows 
an analysis of secession which exposes the contingency of its basic assumptions.
Historicising the territorial state allows us to recognise the different structures of poUtical 
power through which we have already passed and thus to theorise about different forms for the 
future. The secessicmist imperative narrates the boundaries of a specific people who must be secured 
by a territorial state. Textual analysis of secessionist documents reveals that the narrative strategies 
they employ are exclusionist and historically short-sighted. Recognising identity as a continuous 
and relational process is a necessary step towards a post-territorialist order. If different forms of 
political space are practiced, democracy must also be re-theorised. There is no single model which 
can guarantee peacefijl democratic politics since ambiguity and conflict are inherent in the pohtical 
process itself arid must be encouraged. However, an understanding of the intersubjective processes 
through which we have generated our present day pohtics of territory and identity can open up the 
theoretical space required for alternative politics.
fo r  Mom and Dad 
who kept their doubts to themselves
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INTRODUCTION: METATHEORY
Now, a persan who thinks should not try to persuade others o f his belief; that 
is what puts him on the road to a system; on the lamentable road o f the “man 
o f conviction" ; politicians like to call themselves that; but what is a 
conviction? It is a thought that has come to a stop, that has congealed, and 
the “man o f conviction" is a man restricted; experimental thought seeks not 
to persuade but to inspire; to inspire another thought, to set thought moving.
M ian Kundera, Testaments Betrayed
The nature of the social and pohtical organisation of people might be considered as the 
primary question of the social sciences. But the nature of this question itself  ^whether it is put as 
a question or pondered as an issue, determines to a great extent the path of scholarship which 
deals with it. That is, if the question is asked “what is the nature of human social and pohtical 
organisation?” then the scholar proceeds with all empirical efforts required to muster a logically 
defensible answer. The asking of the question in itself contains the strong suggestion that the 
answer is determinable, is “out there”, if the scholar is brilhant or thorough enough to ascertain 
it. however, the issue is not put as a question but as a statement of a state of being, “humans 
are socially and pohtically organised”, the emphasis shifts from the discovery of a determinable 
nature to the semantics of “social”, “pohtical” and “organisation”. Ironically, the statement 
contains more indeterminacy and interpretive space than the does the question. When we ask 
questions, we presume the existence of an answer, rather than the possibihty that the answers 
are multiple and contextual. It is through the questioning of ontology, the nature of the real, and 
the imphcit assumption that the answers are not singular or final but relational and inconstant, 
that scholars can adapt to change and theorise alternatives. Because theory both reflects and 
shapes our knowledge of reahty, the ontological assumptions of the theorist have tangible 
imphcations for our collective experience. As Robert Cox puts it:
Theory follows reality. It also precedes and shapes reahty. That is to say, there 
is a real historical world in which things happen; and theory is made through 
reflection upon what has happened. The separation of theory from historical 
happenings is, however, only a way of thinking, because theory feeds back into 
the making of history by virtue of the way those who make history (and I am 
thinking about human collectivities, not just about prominent individuals) think 
about what they are doing. Their understanding of what the historical context 
allows them to do, prohibits them from doing, or requires them to do and the 
way they formulate their purposes in acting, is the product of theory.^
Theory then, is not only intertwined with practice, but it is an inseparable part of the pohtical 
culture and thus of the making of pohtical decisions. For International Relations theory, 
concerned as it is with the nature of global pohtical organisation, the need to consider this 
indissoluble hnk between theory and practice is particularly decisive. The instabihty of formerly 
estabhshed patterns is becoming increasingly evident as the breadth and impact of globahzation 
become clearer and International Relations is uniquely positioned as a disciphne to offer 
appropriately multi-faceted perspectives on this flux in the spatial structures of the international.
Secession is one of the richest veins yet to be mined in International Relations, and it is 
especially responsive to an approach which questions ontological certainties. Persistent 
prodding at the assumptions of secessionists and many scholars who have theorised secession 
yields a wealth of mythical historical narrative, anti-pohtical pohtics, ilhberal hberahsm and 
problematic problem-solving. An approach which is comfortable with ontological uncertainties 
readily exposes the contingency and ambiguity of conventional treatments of secession. The 
international (in the truest sense of the term) disruptions caused by secessionist movements are 
constant evidence of the impact of theory upon practice as they strive to perform the 
international legal norms of self-determination and sovereign territorial integrity. As in the quote 
above, their understanding of what the historical context allows them to do has been produced 
by theories of the nation and international order. Having been shaped by the expectations of the 
international legal and pohtical structures of their era, secessionists respond with the pre­
ordained logic of the territorial state. Ah too often it is the habit of theorists to accept the 
practices of states and secessionists as prior to their theorising, as question to be answered, or a 
problem to be solved through careful observation and analysis. But secession as a pohtical 
phenomenon has not always been with us, nor did it abruptly appear as a nationahst fad. 
Secession imphcates a host of historical accomphces related to the development of industrial 
modernity and considerable changes in the nature of sovereignty and the state. By historicising
Robert Cox, “Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order; Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn 
Khaldun,” in Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau and Emst- 
Otto Czertq)iel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 133.
8secession, as I do in this thesis, it becomes possible not only to explain the historical 
transformations which have led to the current confluence of theory and practice, but to better 
question the possibihties and impact of current transformative interactions.
Robert Cox’s discussion of problem-solving versus critical theoretical approaches 
provides a perfect illustration of the difference between the treatment of secession in this thesis 
and the treatment it has generally received in pohtical science and theory (though not, strangely, 
in International Relations). Cox describes theory as belonging either to the problem-solving 
approach or the critical approach, each serving different purposes. The problem-solving purpose 
assumes the permanence of existing structure while the critical purpose explores the possibihties 
of structural transformation: “But whereas problem-solving theory assimilates particular 
situations to general rules, providing a kind of programmed method for dealing with them, 
critical theory seeks out the developmental potential within the particular.”  ^ Analysing secession 
with the problem-solving approach assumes the timelessness of territorial states and national 
identities, thereby foreclosing any discussion about the historical vahdity of these structures and 
the possibihty that they may be imphcated in the phenomenon of secession itself. A critical 
theoretical approach “does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but 
calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might 
be in the process of changing.”  ^ CriticaUy analysing secession, therefore, requires a process of 
problematisation, a r/w-assumption of institutions and relations, which puts the issue in a wider 
(changing) context, reveahng hidden connections and weaknesses in the structures. Thus I seek 
here to historicise and question the concept of secession itself, and the component assumptions 
of territoriality and identity upon which it rests.
This approach to secession is quite unexplored in International Relations hterature and I 
begin in Chapter One, Secession in International Relations Theory, with an explanation of the 
epistemological commitments which precluded IR theorists from analysing phenomena “inside” 
the state. This chapter also contains a discussion of secession’s historical meanings and 
examines two nineteenth century cases commonly assumed to represent secession as we know it 
today. I argue that these cases do not reflect the pohtics of territory and identity which currently 
drive secessionist conflicts. In Chapter Two, Theories o f Secession, I examine the theories of 
secession developed in other disciphnes and reveal the fixed assumptions under which they
Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” in Neorealism and Its 
Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 244.
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proceed to be firmly within a problem-solving theoretical framework which is therefore incapable 
of problematising the constituent elements of secession. By treating secession as a structural 
feature of a stable system, conventional analysis has been unable to open new theoretical spaces 
which can view secession as a contingent rather than institutional phenomenon. Seeking to 
probe the historical conditions of secession’s possibihty, in Chapter Three, Historicising 
Secession/Deconstructing Territory, I undertake a conceptual analysis of territoriahty and the 
changing assumptions of pohtical space which accompanied its development. Distinguishing 
between territory as space and territoriality as the pohtical legitimation of space, I argue that it 
is not until the twentieth century that pohtical space as territoriahty came to be a source of such 
absolute regulation that it could lead to the secessionist imperative. The hnkage between 
territorial affihation and pohtical identity is more institutionahsed now than it has ever been. I 
iUustrate this with a discussion of the concepts of foreign-ness, citizenship and international, 
which converged with the modem state and nation to generate a regime of restrictions and 
control over identity. It is the nature of identity, then, that I problematise next, in Chapter Four, 
Problematising Identity, in which I discuss the concepts of nation and minority, and their 
dependence on boundaries both pohtical and territorial. A discussion of identity in International 
Relations theory reveals that while many steps have been taken, there is some distance to go 
before the constructedness of identity has been fuUy explored as relevant for IR. Using ^\^lham 
ConnoUy’s identity\difiFerence discussion as inspiration, I reiterate the need for the acceptance of 
ambiguity in identity relations and show, through a telhng of the secessionist stories of Québec, 
the dangers of assuming and requiring secured (fixed) identities. Chapter Five, Secessionist 
Performances, carries this discussion further with a fuller analysis of the power of performative 
language in historical narrative. I examine several examples of secessionist hterature, produced 
by the leadership of three movements (in Québec, Northern Italy, and Hawai i). While treating 
them each as separate historical examples within a specific context, the one feature which I find 
these secessionist narratives have in common is the need to estabhsh a historical basis for the 
separateness of their identities and a vahdation thereby of the need for an independent state 
which wiU bound and protect those identities. This chapter concludes with a discussion of 
Nietzsche’s typology of mankind’s three relationships with history, and a plea for the 
encouragement of a critical engagement with history. Finally, in Chapter Six, Possibilities: 
Theory & Practice, I discuss the implications of the previous discussion on (bounded) pohtics of 
democracy. Drawing on Derrida’s concept of ontopology (the ahgnment of identity and territory 
in a social ontology of situated being), I introduce a variety of theorists who make it possible to 
question ontopological pohtics. I conclude, inconclusively, with a call for the practice of IR
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theory in the manner of Nietzsche’s critical history — specifically the practice offorgetting 
historical patterns in order to liberate theoretical space for future alternatives. It is my hope that 
a critical historical engagement with secessionist movements will reveal the constructed natures 
of both the identities and the territories they claim are justifications for sovereign independence. 
This thesis by no means asserts that identities are trivial, or that attachment to territory is 
insignificant, but rather, it intends to demonstrate that the drives which make secession appear 
as the only option for the enactment of inter-national relations are neither founded in primordial 
history nor dictated by pragmatic considerations. The disciphne of International Relations, by 
practicing theory differently, is remarkably well-poised to make a significant contribution to a 
pohtics which will finally make secession a thing of the past.
Chapter 1.
SECESSION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
Secession is one of the few remaining options for the generation of new states in the 
international system; it would thus seem to be a subject of profound importance for the theory 
and study of International Relations. And yet it continues to be largely neglected by 
International Relations scholars both as a subject and as a concept. If the study of International 
Relations can be said to consist of either the examination of relations between states, or of the 
existence of a global system or society among states, or the relations between various state and 
non-state actors in the international system, or a combination of all of the above, then secession 
— as an event which involves and effects all three of these types of relations — must be 
acknowledged as a highly relevant feature of the modem international system. Serious 
secessionist movements, as potential states themselves, affect relations between states by 
presenting all of the states in the system with the dilemma of whether or not to recognise them, 
and thus whether or not to bestow upon them the legal status of sovereignty and thereby 
establish international relations with them. Given the considerable privileges which accompany 
the status of sovereignty, as well as the hkehhood of upsetting relations with the remaining 
parent state, the recognition decision is a weighty one. In fact, the untidy nature of the 
international system reflects this difBculty, with such important non-state players as Taiwan and 
the Palestinian authority.'* The international system itself is also affected by secessionist 
movements since their success or failure indicates the relative balance of the tension between the 
principles of self-determination and territorial integrity. The prevalence of one of the principles
Even if  the Palestinian authority eventually becomes a state, the existence of any non-state entity with international 
presence, even a short-lived one, is an exception to the system rules.
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over the other in the process of state generation has a great impact on the territorial nature of all 
states in the system. The more successfiil the principle of self-determination becomes in 
mandating the legitimacy of independence movements as states, the greater the threat to the 
stabihty and legitimacy of the system as presently constituted. Each successfiil introduction of a 
new state into the system, no matter how peacefiil, swings the pendulum away fi’om territorial 
legitimacy as a concept by drawing attention to the arbitrary nature of all territorial borders. 
However, the collective behaviour of the society of states acts to safeguard its own perpetuation 
by continuing to emphasise territorial integrity as a binding principle, by hmiting the definition 
of self-determination to decolonisation and previously independent entities, and by condoning 
intervention only sparingly. Finally, secession involves nothing if not intense relations between 
state and non-state actors, whether between the secessionist group itself and the resisting state, 
or between the group and international organisations which offer various forms of assistance or 
attention — including United Nations bodies.
Secession is thus imphcated in all of the variations on the theme of International 
Relations studies. On any given day one might find upwards of fifty secessionist movements 
worldwide of varying intensity and duration — but each with the potential to cause tremendous 
rifts in the geopohtical structure, as well as violent conflict in the social and cultural fabric.^ 
Secession not only has great practical relevance in terms of stabihty and conflict, it also raises 
important normative questions for International Relations scholars about the rightness of a 
system in which the players are so arbitrarily fixed and in which the fundamental rules are 
consistently challenged. In a theoretical analysis, secession sits at the juncture of the great 
abstract concepts of history, law, philosophy and pohtical theory; sovereignty, legitimacy, 
territoriahty, and identity. As a great breeder of violence and conflict, secession must be treated 
as a normative conundrum. As a concept on the borderhne between the ideals of self- 
determination and territoriahty, secession demands the most carefiil and rigorous theoretical 
analysis. The reasons for its neglect within International Relations theory are historical and 
epistemological, as the foUowing discussion wiU demonstrate.
The Birth of the Discipline: The Historical Context
The rise of an academic disciphne for the study of international relations was heavily 
contingent upon the perception and understanding of a global environment within which
On a recent visit the Homelands website, ^ hich lists “autonomy, secession, independence and nationalist movements”, 
I counted more than seventy sites dedicated to some form of change in the inter-state structure. See http:/Avww. 
wavefront, com/—homelands/. Accessed 25 June 1999.
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“national” entities operated and interacted. Thus the concept of International Relations itself
depended upon the rise of the state and the development of sovereignty and a sovereign system.
The systemisation of sovereignty and statehood in turn depended upon the secularisation of the
pohtical provided by the enhghtenment and the concept of man as a rational being. In other
words. International Relations both as a concept and as a disciphne could scarcely have arisen
any earher than it did. Unhke the fields of history, law and philosophy upon which it rehes.
International Relations is fimdamentaUy a child of late modernity. The first inkhngs of the
concept of “international” arose in the late eighteenth century when legal philosopher Jeremy
Bentham coined the term in his Introduction to the Principles o f Morals and Legislation.^
What Bentham referred to, however, was not an international system or society, but the
existence of international law. It was indeed through law and legal relations that pohtics came to
be internationalised, for Bentham’s term “international law” reflected the reahsation that the
“law of nations” had come to mean law — and therefore relations —  between nations rather than
law apphcable to all nations or peoples. So the secularisation of pohtics was reflected in the
secularisation of law — from universal natural law principles towards more positivist practices.
As Hedley Bull puts it:
When they came to formulate the rules of coexistence, theorists of this period 
were able to firee themselves of the universafist or sohdarist assumptions 
inherited fi’om mediaeval times, and to take account of the unique characteristics 
of the anarchical society. The term ‘law of nations’, droit des gens,
Volkerrecht, not only drove out the term ‘law of nature’, with which it had 
previously always been coupled; it came quite clearly to mean not law common 
to all nations, but law between nations.^
It was this shift from the universafist to the particularist in European law that enabled the
concept of relations in the international, or “between”, sense to flourish. Previously, the world
had seemed to consist of politics and law internal to the world of Christendom. The non-
Christian world, specifically the Ottoman Turk, was an external Other which did not make up
part of a universal whole and to which European legal and political conduct did not apply.* Even
Hugo Grotius, famous for his juridical writings on the laws of war and peace, acknowledged a
dual layer in which all of humanity was subject to the norms of natural law, and a select circle
Discussed in Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f  Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1977), 36.
7
Ibid., 35-36.
8
See Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, “The Other in European self-definition: an addendum to the hterature on 
international society,” o f International Studies 17 (1991): 327-348.
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within Christian Europe followed the laws of Christ/ Not only does the concept of the
international require secularisation, but also the possibihty of relations between entities within a
global environment which engage under apparently neutral rules. Thus international law as “law
between nations” provided the necessary stepping stone for International Relations.
One further development was also necessary to complete the stage for the modem
system of interacting sovereign states and thus for secession. This was the philosophical
development of the concept of pohtical legitimacy based on consent. The Enhghtenment
provided the momentum with its emphasis on rationahty. Faith in the rationahty of man fiieUed
the growing sense of individual worth and allowed the doctrine of popular sovereignty to
develop. At the same time, the sense of patriotism and national identity which was springing up
in England and France complemented and motivated the pohtical aims of the American and
French Revolutions. These revolutions caused a seminal shift in the European pohtical fabric —
“[a]fter the American and French Revolutions the prevaihng principle of international legitimacy
ceased to be dynastic and became national or popular.” ®^ It was these late eighteenth century
revolutions which coloured the rise of nineteenth century theories of nationahsm as a pohtical
doctrine holding the nation-state out as its ultimate object. Change became possible, and people
who had never been identified with the pohty (or protected by it) became its fiercest defenders
(and creators) in the name of nationahsm.
[T]he French Revolution introduced new possibihties in the use of pohtical 
power, and transformed the ends for which rulers might legitimately work. The 
Revolution meant that if the citizens of a state no longer approved of the 
pohtical arrangements of their society, they had the right and the power to 
replace them by others more satisfactory....Here, then, is one prerequisite 
without which a doctrine such as nationahsm is not conceivable. Such a 
doctrine would want to lay down how best a society should conduct its pohtics, 
and reahze its aims, if need be by radical changes: the French Revolution 
showed, in a resounding manner, that such an enterprise was feasible."
The French Revolution heralded the age of statehood and citizenship for the people. This was an
anthem which would survive a century of imperial conquest and sound fi"om the mouths of
twentieth century statesmen attempting to construct a regime of world peace in the wake of the
First World War.
9
m ± ,  339.
10
Bull, The Anarchical Society, 35.
11
Hie Kedoune, Nationalism, 4th ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 4-5.
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The conjunction of international law, popular sovereignty, and nationalism produced a 
cocktail of circumstances which nurtured the present-day international system of sovereign 
states — the system which made possible the concept and study of International Relations. 
Moreover, the circumstances which made International Relations possible were also the 
conditions of possibihty for the concept of secession. Secession requires a modem theory of the 
state in order to make sense — that is, one which rehes upon international law to guarantee its 
sovereign status as a nominal equal, popular sovereignty to guarantee its internal legitimacy and 
identity, and nationahsm to provide the territorial definition of the state’s “natural” boundaries 
and peoples. It is only when groups of people can self-identity as a nation and use the doctrine 
of popular sovereignty to claim their right to an independent territorial state that secession can 
even be imagined. Contemporary conceptions of identity and territoriahty have such critical 
imphcations for secession that they wih be explored separately in Chapter 3: Historicising 
Secession/Deconstructing Territory and Chapter 4: Problematising Identity. The conclusion to 
be derived from all of this would seem to be that secession, hke International Relations, is a 
twentieth century phenomenon, and this is very nearly the case. However, there are two 
prominent events of the nineteenth century which must first be addressed in order to clarity this 
argument.
The Hungarian Revolution of 1848 and the American Civil Warfi'om 1861-1865 both 
involved fiercely contested movements for territorial independence. Both movements were 
defeated, and both events have been described as secessions. However, I shall argue that while it 
is possible to categorize these events as instances of failed secession attempts, both are 
qualitatively difierent from the secessions of the twentieth century, and therefore they should be 
regarded as âisiinci, proto-secessions, for the purposes of this theoretical analysis. In the case of 
Hungary, the nationahsts wished to gain independence for their once-sovereign territories fi’om 
the Habsburg Empire — which, I shall argue, involves a process different from that of a self- 
determination movement which tries to carve out a piece of a modem territorial state. In the case 
of the American Civil War, the Southern states were actually attempting to separate jfrom what 
they beheved was a loose federation on largely economic grounds and issues of social class — 
the question of Southern nationalism as separate from the American identity did not arise.
Early Separatism and the Nature of the State 
L Hungary
In 1848, Hungary had been incorporated into the Habsburg Empire for nearly two 
hundred years, since the end of the seventeenth century, when it was freed from Ottoman Turk
16
rule. Prior to that it had been a feudal kingdom, and in the early nineteenth century still retained 
certain feudal structures. The territory of Hungary contained many peoples not of Hungarian 
(Magyar) descent, including Germans, Serbs, Romanians, and Croats. Since the mid-eighteenth 
century, Hungary had been granted the status of a separate kingdom of which the Habsburg's 
were monarchs. But while nominally ruled through the national assembly, the final authority in 
Hungary came fi'om Vierma. Despite the many non-Hungarian members of the society, a strong 
national movement of Hungarian language speakers began in the late eighteenth century in 
response to a decree by Joseph II that German become the language of administration in 
Hungary. The uproar among the noble classes caused the decree to be withdrawn and the official 
language reverted to Latin. As the Hungarian economy, population, and culture prospered, a 
desire to use the Hungarian language (the language of less than half of the people in the broader 
Hungarian territory) in pubhc hfe became more insistent. Although the ruhng classes were 
largely conservative and the peasantry were ignorant of the ideals of the French Revolution, there 
were a number of lesser nobles and intelhgentsia who had monitored the events in France and 
developed a close sympathy with the French (and Napoleonic) cause. Two strains of pro- 
Hungarian sentiment developed. Hungarian revolutionaries wished to begin an inexorable 
process of Magyarisation in the quickest manner possible, while moderates felt only that 
Hungarian should be the official language and other languages could continue in private and 
educational use. Although they included social reforms beneficial for the peasantry, the radical 
pohcies, promoted most powerfiiUy by Lajos Kossuth, a landless noble and a lawyer, began to 
alarm the non-Hungarian segments of the population, who considered their allegiance to be to 
the emperor.
When the tempestuous events of 1848 had begun in Paris and Vienna, the Hungarian 
Parhament took its cue and enacted a series of laws, the “April Laws”, deahng with the taxation 
of noblemen, extension of the franchise (for Hungarian speaking men), abohtion of peasant 
obhgations to landowners, and the development of voluntary troops, among other issues. The 
central government in Vienna, deahng with its own local uprisings, placated the Hungarian 
leadership (Kossuth) by accepting the “April Laws” while also encouraging Croat fears of 
Hungarian domination. Finally, in September, the Croat Governor led a force, with the backing 
of the Emperor, into Hungary. The new Hungarian volunteer mihtia successfiilly resisted the 
Austrian/Croat forces. In April, 1849, Kossuth declared that the Crown was now forfeit, 
appointed himself as Regent — a royal rather than a repubhcan term — and declared the
12
Zoltàn Halasz, A Short History o f  Hungary, trans. Csaba Szabo (Budapest: Corvina Press, 1975), 133.
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independence of Hungary. But by this time, the new Habsburg Emperor, Francis Joseph, had 
obtained a promise of help from Tsar Nicholas I of Russia, and in July the new Hungarian state 
was surrounded by Austro-Croatian and Russian troops. They were defeated on August 9th, 
Kossuth fled and spent the remainder of his hfe in exile. The “April Laws” were revoked and 
Hungarian nationahsts were imprisoned and executed. Although later the Compromise of 1867 
led to a system of dual monarchy with Austria, Hungarian independence would remain a dream 
until the next century.
The most important point to make about the Hungarian Revolution is that it took place 
within a pohtical context (the Austrian Empire) which differed from the pohtical context within 
which the disciphne of International Relations grew up, that is the post-Great War pohtical 
society. So whether it is caUed a secessionist movement, a nationahst movement, a revolution — 
or all three — it is crucial to historicise the event, to try to gain insight into how it was 
understood at the time. Only by doing this can we understand the pecuharities of the 
relationship between secession and the development of International Relations theory. In taking 
this approach, I exphcitly refrain from defining secession to include or exclude specific historical 
examples. As Nietzsche explained, “only something which has no history can be defined.”^^  By 
this he means not that we are unable to insert definitions into our discourse for the sake of 
understanding and clarity, but that such definitions will always be the product of their historical 
contexts. Social and pohtical concepts such as secession, nationahsm, revolution, the nation­
state, and so on — which certainly do have a history — must therefore be understood as signs or 
containers for social understandings which are in continuous flux. We must consider, in other 
words, “that anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted 
anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose...in the process of which 
their former ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’ must necessarily be obscured or completely obhterated.’’^^* 
It is therefore crucial for the International Relations theorist who is deahng with such concepts to 
understand that the same terms have been endowed with meaning over time by people whose 
hves and understandings were profoundly different from our own.
Given this introduction, what can be understood of these early separatist movements?
In the case of the Habsburg Empire, it is crucial to remember that although the French 
Revolution had already unleashed the ideals of popular sovereignty into the continent, its major
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ejBfects were still chiefly confined to France. The rest of Europe continued to operate under the
assumptions of traditional monarchy, even if there were nominal parhamentary bodies working
alongside the crown. This was even more so for Austria — which comprised a large unwieldy
realm of multiple languages, races and rehgions all connected by an inefficient bureaucracy and
an allegiance to the person of the Emperor. The majority of the population were peasantry hving
under a feudal system of dues, including both compulsory labour and a tithe of the crop paid to
the lord. Nonetheless, there was widespread support and affection for the monarch among the
peasants and common people as befitted the paternal image of the ruler for his “children”. Even
the severely handicapped Ferdinand I, who was epileptic and mentally retarded, was known by
his loyal subjects as “Ferdy the Loony”. The integrity and sovereignty of the Habsburg Empire
was lodged in the person of the Emperor, unhke that of post-World War H states which enforce
their integrity by making their boundaries absolute. Rather than being defined by its outside
boundaries, the Habsburg Empire was defined by the unity of control which could be exerted
over disparate peoples.
In the Habsburg Empire and Prussia the monarchy was essential above all as a 
unifying force. In each case a state which was the result of the haphazard 
accumulation over generations of territories with no common interest or 
common history was held together by the dynasty, and by the army and 
bureaucracy which that dynasty had built up around itself...The emperor was 
not merely the symbol of unity but its active guardian and the only effective 
guarantee of its continuance.^^
Not only did the monarch hold together disparate peoples, but his person was still considered to
be sacred. The awesome totahty of the French Revolution caused many shudders amidst the
cheers, and if many could sympathise with republican ideals, few could wholeheartedly endorse
the execution of the monarch — heretofore the body of the state. Thus Edmund Burke could
write:
They have seen the French rebel against a mild and lawful monarch, with more 
fiiry, outrage, and insult, than ever any people has been known to rise against 
the most illegal usurper, or the most sanguinary tyrant. Their resistance was 
made to concession; their revolt was fi’om protection; their blow was aimed at 
an hand holding out graces, favours, and immunities. This was unnatural.
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In comparison with France, the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 was of a very different order. The 
radicals sought more control over their own affairs, but did not seek independence from the 
crown at first. Nor, given the demography of nineteenth century Hungary, could the radicals 
have led an overtly nationahst revolution. Although the aims of the Hungarian leadership 
included greater pohtical freedoms and benefits for the common man, the leaders themselves 
were of the nobihty. The Hungarian leaders were hardly repubhcans and they were not 
subversive of the Habsburg monarchy; they claimed that it was Mettemich, and the government 
ministers who were at fault. In a sense, the leaders of the Revolution in Hungary were 
conservatives, since their chief goal was to restore the Hungarian Constitution which had been 
subverted by Mettemich. Therefore, the claims made throughout the course of the revolution 
had a basis in the April laws which had been agreed upon by the king. They felt that their 
revolution was “lawful” since it was based on these laws which had received royal approval (and 
thus royal legitimacy). However, when the Hungarian leadership insisted on increasing its 
control over mifitary and financial affairs, going so far as to raise their own mihtary forces and 
print their own currency, the monarch withdrew his assent. In the eyes of the Hungarians it was 
this act by the king which destroyed the old order, not their wish for greater autonomy.
Certainly, there can be no thought that the Hungarian Revolution was a secession in the late 
twentieth century sense. Even if there were issues of nationahsm at stake, the entire pohtical 
menu differed. There was no question of carving out and estabhshing the legal boundaries of the 
new Hungarian state based on what could be mihtarily defended or who wanted to be included. 
Nor was there a question of legitimating the aristocratic Hungarian leadership who had a feudal 
entitlement. Although the French had introduced the idea of popular sovereignty, most 
Europeans (including Hungarians) had not removed the mantle of divinity from their monarchs, 
and continued to beheve that hereditary princes offered a benevolent and even beneficiaUy 
disinterested influence to counter the cormption of government officials. As the Archduke 
Albert explained:
In a polyglot Empire inhabited by so many races and peoples the dynasty must
not allow itself to be assigned exclusively to one of these. Just as a good
mother, it must show equal love for all its children and remain foreign to none.
In this hes the justification for its existence.
In this sense, the Hungarian Revolution can be seen as more akin to a family quarrel than the 
separation and formation of a completely new seff-determined political entity as are 
contemporary secessionist movements. It would be another seventy years before Woodrow
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Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” would explicitly mention the right of “the peoples of Austria- 
Hungary” to a secured place among the autonomous nations of the world, thus giving voice to 
the principle of self-determination which would come to dominate the century.
IL The American Civil War
The American Civil War was an event in marked contrast to the troubles on the 
continent. The United States was a wobbly new country trying to steady itself against a 
common nationality based on individual freedom — as opposed to the Habsburg’s ancient 
amalgam of disparate peoples subject to feudal obhgation under a pre-modem sovereign. The 
tensions which finally snapped in 1860 had been brewing for some time. As the country’s 
territorial waistline swelled with the Louisiana Purchase, the annexation of Texas, and the 
settlement of the West, the southern states voiced ample concerns over the status of slavery in 
these areas. At stake was not simply the socio-economic culture of the new nation, but the legal 
option of southern plantation owners to move and settle westward with their slaves in tow. As 
the western territories were increasingly being settled by those with abolitionist or free-state 
sympathies and the number of free-states in the Union began to rise correspondingly, feehngs in 
the South began to crystalhse around hostility and paranoia against the North. In 1854, when 
Nebraska and Kansas were applying for statehood, Congress could not agree on whether the 
Missouri Compromise of 1820 (which permitted no slavery above the 36th latitude) should 
continue to be applied. In enacting the Kansas-Nebraska Act which left the choice to the 
respective territories. Congress repealed the Missouri Compromise which had held the Union 
together for 30 years. Nebraska was clearly declared a free state by its inhabitants, but Kansas 
was the subject of hot dispute. Northern abolitionists raised money to finance free-voting 
settlers while thousands of pro-slavery men from Missouri crossed into the state to vote illegally 
for a legislature which would approve slavery. Open fighting broke out and leaders on both 
sides were arrested and killed in a melee which lasted until 1858 and cost 200 hves. Meanwhile, 
the newly-formed Repubhcan Party was gaining strength with a platform which favoured 
banning slavery in the new territories, and by the time of the presidential elections of I860, the
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party was poised to put a man in the White House. South Carolina declared that it would secede
if a Repubhcan candidate were elected.^ ®
Although many historians have concluded that a majority of Southern voters was
actually pro-union (due to poor turnout in the state election polls), James McPherson argues that
this idea mistakes the nature of each sides’ concept of union. In an eery echo of the Hungarian
revolutionaries’ anti-Mettemich, pro-monarch sentiments, the Southern Unionists felt betrayed
by the election of an anti-slavery president:
As a Mississippi “unionist” explained after Lincoln’s election, he was no longer 
“a Union man in the sense in which the North is Union.” His unionism was 
conditional; the North had violated the condition by electing Lincoln.
Cooperationists in Alabama who voted against secession cautioned outsiders 
not to “misconstrue” their action. “We scorn the Black Repubhcans,” they 
declared. “The State of Alabama cannot and will not submit to the 
administration of Lincoln.”^^
After the election results confirmed the election of Abraham Lincoln, six southern states seceded.
The war began in April 1861 when troops organised by the Confederacy fired upon and captured
a Federal garrison at Fort Sumter in South Carohna. The war would last for four years, be led by
veterans of the Mexican War who had fought side by side, pit brother against brother, cost
620,000 hves and be one of the bloodiest wars in human history up to that point.^^
One of the critical questions of the American Civil War was the nature of the bond
between the states. The Federal Union had never been fixUy challenged on the point of whether
any one of the states had the right of separation. Until the Southern secession was successfuUy
put down, the Union was regarded instrumentally as a usefiil means of protecting the
revolutionary ideals of individual freedom and pohtical equahty. With its boundaries shape-
shifting on a constant basis, and its internal composition continuously affected by immigration,
the United States did not have a clear sense of its common identity in terms of a pohtical union.
The people cahed themselves American, but pohticahy they hailed from different states. This
was obvious to the visitor Alexis de TocqueviUe, who wrote in the 1830s:
The Union is a vast body, which presents no definite object to patriotic feehng.
[The state] is identified with the soil; with the right of property and the
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domestic affections; with the recollections of the past, the labors of the present, 
and the hopes of the future. Patriotism, then, which is frequently a mere 
extension of individual selfishness, is still directed to the state and has not 
passed over to the Union. Thus the tendency of the interests, the habits, and the 
feelings of the people is to center pohtical activity in the states in preference to 
the Union.^
Until the end of the Civil War it was normal to refer to the United States in plural rather than 
singular form. In fact, secession had already been threatened by the New England states over the 
War of 1812, but the issue faded when the War ended and the United States resumed good 
relations with Great Britain. Despite this tendency towards pohtical regionahsm, there was also 
a noticeable assimilation towards a common society based on a general identification with the 
ideals of the Declaration of Independence. Again, TocqueviUe provides a useful outsider’s 
perspective:
The observer who examines what is passing in the United States...wiU readily 
discover that their inhabitants, th o u ^  divided into twenty-four distinct 
sovereignties, stiU constitute a single people; and he may perhaps be led to think 
that the Anglo-American Union is more truly a united society than some 
nations of Europe which hve under the same legislation and the same 
prince. . .From Maine to the Floridas, and from the Mssouri to the Atlantic 
Ocean, the people are held to be the source of aU legitimate power. The same 
notions are entertained respecting hberty and equality, the hberty of the press, 
the right of association, the jury, and the responsibihty of the agents of 
government.^''
So there was certainly a recognition of being a common people with shared pohtical values and 
institutions. Nevertheless, the ease with which secession was raised as a pohcy option for the 
states suggests that at that time they took the Union to be a federation of convenience, not an 
entity to which they owed national aUegiance. In fact, until 1865 “it was unclear what the 
relationship between the many and the one in E Pluribus Unum should be, and entirely possible 
that the United States would disintegrate into several American nations.” ’^ In other words, the 
issue of whether self- government was a right vested in the states or in the federal government 
had not been settled. This was precisely the issue that the Confederate States were testing when 
they argued that their right to self-government included the right to slavery as a way of hfe. Yet, 
unhke the separatist movements of the twentieth century which would be based on the wih and
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declared rights of national groups to be free of oppression by the central state, the Confederacy
remains a pohtical oddity: a movement which seceded in order to withhold the freedom of much
of its population, the slaves, whom the central government was attempting (in its commitment to
a union based on principles of equahty) to set free. Southerners argued that their freedom to
have self-government was being denied by the Union, but Lincoln’s response declared that the
American protection of self-government was an individual not a coUective one: “When the white
man governs himself... that is self-government; but when he governs himself and also governs
another man, that is more than self-government — that is despotism.” ®^ The issue of individual
pohtical freedom was not at stake for residents of the Southern states. As Liah Greenfeld notes.
It would be wrong to see the secession as in any way a result of Southern 
nationahsm (namely the development of a specifically Southern identity, loyalty, 
and consciousness). Southern nationahsm and secession were both responses 
to the unbearable inconsistency between American national ideals and slavery.
In the framework of individuahstic nationahsm, secession was possible without 
the preceding development of a separate identity, as was so clearly 
demonstrated by the American Revolution itself.^^
These American national ideals were what the North fought to apply to the whole Union, and
neither slavery nor secession could be tolerated if the glorious American model of freedom and
equahty were to remain intact. In actuahty, the North and the South were fighting to determine
which image of American identity should survive — the one in which the ideal of equahty was a
unique model held out for the world to marvel, or the one in which there was thriving economic
prosperity for the equals, but it was based on the exploitation of those who were not even
pohtically visible, let alone equal. One of Lincoln’s strongest arguments, and one which
motivated even those who were ambivalent about abohtion, was that America was a great
pohtical experiment which would be deemed a failure if slavery were ahowed to continue. Phihp
Abbott points out that this was crucial for the Northern conception of American nationhood: “In
essence, Lincoln was creating an argument that contended not only that slavery challenged
American identity but that the fate of the nation had a world significance, that America’s
struggle with slavery constituted an even broader struggle, the outcome of which was of
immense importance to mankind.” *^ The fascinating aspect of this struggle over the defining
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characteristics of the national identity is that it was a struggle which did not rest on a conception 
of a sovereign territorial whole. Rather, it was a struggle over the final definition of the 
American people — including those hving in territories which were not yet part of the union. If 
the Southern states had succeeded in maintaining the Confederacy, they would have continued to 
be Americans — but their very existence as slave-owning Americans would have profoundly 
threatened the identity of the Northern states who wished the world to see America as the 
exceptional country based on principles of fi^eedom.
This clash of ideals within a people makes the American Civil War unique among 
separatist clashes. The closest contemporary analogy would be the kind of polarisation which 
occurs over a pohtical issue such as abortion — in which both sides are absolutely convinced 
that the other side must be made to see the issue in a specific way. In these cases compromise is 
failure. Indeed the rhetoric which surrounded the slavery issue was as vitriohc as what now 
passes for dialogue in the abortion context. Like abortion, the issue of slavery could not be 
settled by negotiation because its very existence was moral anathema to many in the fi-ee states, 
and the very threat of its demise was social, economic, and pohtical anathema to those in the 
South. Thus, even though for many Northerners abohshing slavery was not as important as 
keeping the Union, the issue was too important to the South for any kind of compromise. 
Technically, the central government had done nothing to curtail the rights of those in the South 
to own slaves. There were even strict fugitive slave laws in place to force the return of escaped 
slaves as “property”. What the South could not countenance was the confinement of slavery to 
its geographical area and the loss of balance in national representation. In the end, the Civil War 
did more to clarify the American sense of unified identity formed at the national level than any 
event before. In this effect it is most clearly unhke any twentieth century secessionist conflict.
Historicising Secession: Now and Then
The above discussion of nineteenth century secessionist conflicts illustrates that whether 
or not the term secession can be used to describe these events, it must be noted that they were 
understood very differently at the time fi’om what we would recognise as secessionist conflict 
today, in the era of self-determination and the nation-state. This is relevant for an understanding 
of International Relations theory and the world it set out to describe. There are two separate 
points to be made in this section. First, it will be estabhshed that secession has a changing 
meaning which rests on our conceptions of the state and the international system, both of which 
have been influenced tremendously by the ideals of nationahsm, democracy and self- 
determination in the last century or so. Just as the nature of the state and the international
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system must be understood in historical context, so too secession cannot be taken as a timeless 
concept or possibility. The second point is that International Relations, as a twentieth century 
discipline, arose in response to an international system which had undergone profound change 
from the turn of the century onward, and thus the extent to which the disciphne could account 
for secession depended upon its account of this radically altered context. Furthermore, the 
concept of secession as a pohtical act, unhke the concept of the state itself, actuahy has a 
reasonably fixed starting point of comparatively recent origin. The word “secession” can be 
dated from the seventeenth century according to The Oxford English Dictionary?^ However, it 
was not used then in a pohtical sense, but meant, “The action or an act of going away from one’s 
accustomed neighbourhood, or of retiring from pubhc view.” The verb to secede was defined by 
Dr. Johnson in 1755 as “To withdraw from feUowship in any affair.” Although the term was 
also used specifically to indicate withdrawal from a rehgious organisation, as in the secession of 
the “Church, King and Kingdom of England from the Papacy” described by Coke in 1660, the 
first use of the noun secession in the pohtical separatist context appears to have been in 
connection with the American Civil War. Ironically — for a pohtical scientist — pohtical usage 
of the verb secede is stiU described in the OED etymology as “rare”. The original root of the 
word is Latin — secedere: to withdraw.
The unfamihar history of the usage of this word in the Enghsh language should not be 
surprising once one reahses the extent to which “pohtical withdrawal” depends upon certain 
preconditions. For one thing, the origins of the root presuppose that the action is done 
unilaterally by the self— se-ceder or “self-cession”. One withdraws from a group; one does not 
cause withdrawal. For this action to be translated into the pohtical sphere, there must first exist 
the concept of a pohtical collective from which a unit may withdraw, and there must also exist 
the concept of a pohtical “self’ within this coUective which may effect the withdrawal. It is 
therefore understandable that the term does not enter pohtical usage any earher than the 
nineteenth century — it is practically dependent upon the concepts of the repubhc and popular 
sovereignty — and of course territoriahty. In the age of princes and empires the state was 
indivisible because it was co-extensive with the body of the sovereign and only vaguely 
associated with a dehneated geography.This is best iUustrated by Louis XIV’s famous phrase, 
“L’etat, c’est moi.” The sovereign body was the source of the symbohc power of the execution
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of the king for the French revolutionaries. Only when the body of the sovereign had been 
(hterally) destroyed could the people as a collective become (figuratively) sovereign. It is also, 
then, no accident that the term secession was first used extensively in the United States — a 
country in which the collective and the divisible notion of the people as sovereign had already 
been firmly estabhshed. One might even say that before there can be a concept of secession, or 
withdrawal fi’om the whole, there must first exist the concept of the whole — which is made up 
not only of state-parts, but fi'om the Union of all citizens. It was actually this latter definition of 
Union upon which the Northern states chose to insist in refiising the right of the South to 
withdraw.
The Conditions of Possibility
Having estabhshed a historical starting point for secession as a concept does not mean 
that we have estabhshed any kind of fixed understanding of the term. If anything, the concept of 
secession has, until very recently, been inexphcable within International Relations theory due to 
the modernism of the disciphne’s dominant theoretical structures. This is reflected in the very 
fact that the conditions of possibihty for the disciphne of International Relations itself are the 
conditions of the twentieth century.International Relations as a disciphne requires both a 
concept of the international (in the global and not simply European sense) and of relations 
between units within an international sphere which is markedly separate fi'om the domestic one. 
These concepts depend upon the historical mix of popular sovereignty with nationahsm and 
territoriahty to create the perception of an international system of sovereign nation states, with 
clear boundaries between inside and outside concerns, upon which most International Relations 
work is based. This mix did not set until the end of World War I when the balance of continental 
empire-states seemed to have reached the end of its viabihty as a system. This was due in no 
smah part to the acceptance of the idea of popular sovereignty and its translation into the 
principle of national self-determination.
Popular sovereignty, as advanced by the American and French Revolutions, was offered 
as a universal principle of pohtical legitimacy. It was this universahty which was the source of 
the idea’s appeal. However, there was a difference between advancing the idea in theory and 
reahsing it in practice. The ancien regime was so long estabhshed that the “abohtion of the 
conceptual legitimacy of ah privilege, first in theory and then in reahty, was a momentous
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historical development, the final results of which are even now not fully determined.”^^
Although popular sovereignty may be considered as a theory based on universal individual 
rights, it cannot be apphed universally. James May all explains “that although the sovereignty of 
the people, and the conception of individual rights on which it is based, are essentially universal, 
i.e., they apply to all human beings or to none, the pohtical claims to which they give rise are 
always and necessarily advanced by, or on behalf of^  a particular group of people. Thus the 
appHcation of popular sovereignty requires particularisation of both the people and the state. 
Enter nationahsm and the concept of the nation-state. The shift in the basis of legitimate 
sovereignty fi'om the prince to the people required a fimdamental reconsideration of the nature of 
the state. If sovereignty stemmed from the people, how were they to be dehneated? National 
identity provided the seemingly obvious answer, and translated the eighteenth century idea of 
popular sovereignty into the twentieth century principle of self-determination. Or rather, as 
Mayall puts it, “an accommodation was reached between the prescriptive principle of 
sovereignty and the popular principle of national self-determination... the one expresses a 
timeless pohtical principle, the other the only historically relevant basis on which it should be 
exercised.” '^* It is this combination of principles which provided the basis for the twentieth 
century international order; but it was the logic of this order — taken to its extreme —  which 
undermined itself in the form of repeated secessionist challenges to the estabhshed nation states.
It should be noted that the triumph of nation-states over empires was by no means 
assured until the outcome of the First World War and the fall of the continental empires left a 
vacuum and an opportunity. It was the American president, Woodrow Wilson, who did more 
than any other individual at the time to make the nation-state become the acceptable pohtical 
model. Although Wilson failed in his vision for the League of Nations, the formulation of 
autonomy for national groups speUed out in his “Fourteen Points” speech to Congress in January 
of 1918 was very important “in consohdating conceptions of national sovereignty as the 
‘natural’ pohtical condition of humankind, via a particular interpretation of the sovereignty- 
citizenship-nationahsm relation. This was the most significant effect of the ‘new system of law
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and justice’ among states that Wilson wanted to achieve.”^^  Another effect of Wilson’s 
legitimation of the nation-state and the creation of the League of Nations was a newly globalized 
international system. It was no longer simply Europe which made up the system of sovereign 
states. The Unity of Christendom and the Peace of Westphaha had to give way to the League of 
Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice, as well as many more international 
organisations to follow. The impact on Europe was compounded by the sudden emphasis on 
autonomy for colonial peoples, the fifth of Wilson’s fourteen points. Although World War I and 
the Treaty of Versailles are often cited as the pohtical turning point into the current modem 
system, it must be emphasised that such events only serve as convenient markers for historical 
trends. The world did not change overnight in 1918 any more than the Soviet Union went fi'om 
strength to pieces suddenly in 1992. And the nationahties which were to find their new 
international voices were crudely formed and ill-suited to the pohtical task of providing sensible 
boundaries for the state.
The Birth of the Discipline: ' Ain't gonna study war no more”
In the foUowing sections I wiU present a very simple overview of the development of the 
disciphne of International Relations. It is necessary to teU the story of the birth of the disciphne 
in order to understand how secession was not simply overlooked but made irrelevant through an 
epistemological framework which precluded it as a proper subject. The seeds of IR’s early 
“Utopian” theories were planted decades earher by classical hberahsm. Although pohtical 
hberahsm had developed significantly in the nineteenth century by drawing on the writings of 
John Stuart MU and the correlating economic theories of Adam Smith, theories of government 
and pohtics were stiU considered the prerogatives of philosophy and diplomacy. However,
World War I — the Great War — caused both the pubhc and statesmen in Europe and North 
America to beheve that never again could diplomacy be left to the diplomats and war to the 
‘professionals’. There was then a perceived need to study relations between states in order to 
avoid another such a catastrophe. The horror of the casualties and the min provoked a profound 
questioning within Europe of the great modem project of the rational man. Christopher Coker 
explains;
The Great War was the first historical event of significance to confront modem 
man with a question whose imphcations were particularly grave: was it any 
longer possible to see progress in terms of a long historical trajectory, and could 
progress itself any longer be considered necessarily redeeming? Europe, of 
course, had known many earher wars and catastrophes but by comparison even
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with the Thirty Years’ War, the ‘kiUing ground’ of the Western Front seemed 
irredeemable. The carnage was absolute, the madness total. For a few, the 
catastrophe of trench warfare destroyed all possibihty of behef in the future.
The feehng of hopelessness was compounded by its juxtaposition against the expectations of
modernisation and industriahsation. Europe had seen many great wars before — but none had
merited that exphcit title. Men had died and lands had been ravaged, but this war left a different
taste. What had gone wrong? One thing which was markedly different was the degree to which
men were wilhng to die in the name of a cause. It was still an age of certainty and purpose, in
which time moved forward and humankind was on a steady course of progress. Men beheved in,
and fought for, the notion of modem progress. Paul Fussell’s study of hterary narratives of the
war describes it thus:
[T]he Great War was perhaps the last to be conceived as taking place within a 
seamless, purposeful “history” involving a coherent stream of time running 
from past through present to future. The shrewd recruiting poster depicting a 
worried father of the future being asked by his children, “Daddy, what didyoM 
do in the Great War?” assumes a future whose moral and social pressures are 
identical with those of the past. Today, when each day’s experience seems 
notably ad hoc, no such appeal would shame the most stupid to the recruiting 
office. But the Great War took place in what was, compared with ours, a static 
world, where the values appeared stable and where the meanings of abstractions 
seemed permanent and reliable. Everyone knew what Glory was, and what 
Honor meant.
In glaring contrast to the certainties of honour and glory at the time of the Great War, the recent 
Gulf War is the first armed conflict in which no U.S. Congressional Medal of Honor was 
awarded to any of the servicemen who participated.^* As war becomes more mechanised, even 
virtual, the possibihties for heroic action have greatly decreased. Modernity was supposed to be 
the age of humanity’s self-salvation — and instead, the Great War’s aftermath reeked of an age 
of self-destruction. Yet the Salvationist element was still evident in President Wilson’s last 
public speech.
Why, my fellow citizens, should they [mothers who lost their sons in France] 
pray God to bless me?...I consented to their sons being put in the most difficult 
parts of the battle line, where death was certain. . . Why should they weep upon 
my hand and call down the blessings of God upon me? Because they beheve 
that their boys died for something that vastly transcends any of the immediate
36
Chnstopher Coker, War and the 20th Century: The Impact o f War on the Modern Consciousness (London: Brassey’s, 
1994), 126.
37
Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 21.
38
Medal of Honor information is available from http://members.aol.com/veterans/moh.htm Accessed 25 June 1999.
30
and palpable objects of the war. They beheve, and they rightly beheve, that 
their sons saved the hberty of the world. They beheve that wrapped up with the 
hberty of the world is the continuous protection of that hberty by the concerted 
powers of ah civihzed people.^^
Ironically, the very fact that the war was fought under a moral banner was the source of the
difficulty in finding a justification for its horror. How could the causes of such an immoral war
have been moral? As Michael Walzer puts it, democratic ideahsm is objectionable because it
declares goals which are impossible to reach, and this is a moral issue if soldiers are asked to die
for these goals. “Their most heroic efforts, after all, can only bring a particular war to an end;
they cannot end war. They can save democracy from a particular threat, but they cannot make
the world safe for d e m o c ra c y .B u t  ending war was exactly the goal western pohtical thinkers
began to aim for. Surely, they concluded, the ultimate moral act would be to keep war from
happening in the first place. And so the Great War became the “War to end all wars”.
Despair over the failure of moral pohtics and diplomacy which led to the war ironically
gave way to a modernist desire to approach war as a scientific problem which could be rationally
analysed and solved. The war had occurred, they theorised, because of an improper
understanding of the facts which cause war. Pohtical thinkers looked at peace as a goal
obtainable through rational analysis, based on “the assumption that the world is thoroughly
accessible to science and reason and that it contains in itself all the elements necessary for the
harmonious co-operation of all mankind.”'*^ Thus even while European society was feehng
collective nausea at the horror and futihty of the modem age as revealed by the Great War,
theorists were responding from a perspective fuUy within the modernist framework, with fiirther
attempts to advance the cause of Enhghtenment rationahty. In keeping with this project was the
League of Nations System championed so vahantly by Woodrow Wilson, in the behef that states
would act rationally in their own interests in a voluntary self-pohcing system. Another famous
“ideahst” of the tum-of-the-century was Sir Norman AngeU, who became infamous in 1908 by
arguing that war was both irrational and economically unsound. In the inter-war period, AngeU
sided with those who wished to make — in the League of Nations — something which would
supplant the anarchy of the international system and make war not only irrational, but
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fimctionally illegal. In a sharply-titled volume. The Intelligent M an’s Way to Prevent War,
edited by Leonard Woolf, the common approach of the ideahsts was spelled out. After stating
that civilization cannot survive another “world war”, Woolf vahantly asserted
War is not a “natural” catastrophe hke a tidal wave or an earthquake. It is not 
inevitable; it is preventable in Europe hke cannibahsm, cholera, or witch- 
burning, ah of which, though once common in this continent, have been 
abohshed by civihzation....Any intelhgent man can with a httle trouble 
understand the problem of preventing war. Though it is not a simple problem, 
it is not nearly so comphcated as that of making a six-cyhnder engine for a 
motor-car, and it is child’s play compared with the intricate mass of problems 
which have been solved to make modem broadcasting possible.'*^
While the bulk of ideahst authors were not quite so simphstic, they were united in the behef that
war was an effect whose cause could be studied and altered. It is also clear from Woolf s use of
terms hke “civihsation” and war being preventable “in Europe”, that the early concept of
International Relations was more Euro-centric than it is today. In some sense, these European
writers stiU viewed the League of Nations as another multi-lateral great power security
arrangement hke the Concert of Europe. Peace was something which could only come to those
states where democracy had taken hold. While the ideahsts clearly hoped that the spread of
democracy could work its magic on the rest of the globe in time, the term international was stiU
apt to refer only to the “civihsed world”. And the “world war” which the ideahsts were trying to
fend off, was envisioned as another war with its centre in the European continent.
The naïveté of the ideahsts, if not of their intentions, is encapsulated in the words of
philanthropist Andrew Carnegie’s bequest estabhshing the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. Carnegie instructed that “when the estabhshment of universal peace is
attained, the donor provides that the revenue shah be devoted to the banishment of the next most
degrading evil or evils, the suppression of which would most advance the progress, elevation and
happiness of man.”"^  Given the optimism of the disciphne’s formative years, it is no surprise
that a discussion of secession as a problem was left out of the laundry hst of serious issues. In
accordance with the methodology of rationahsm, the question of secession might have been
perceived as something which was contrary to national interest and which could, therefore, be
avoided with studiousness and care. The days of the Peace Conference following the Great War
were spent in serious consideration of the most effective national boundaries for the states
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arising out of the newly splintered empires of Europe. Once the frontiers were set in 1919, they
were meant to be permanent. Article X of the League Covenant required that State members
respect the territorial integrity of frontiers. However;
...if that peace was to mean anything else than licence to commit acts of tyranny 
with impunity — if it was to be a true peace and not a mere fastening of 
shackles upon the defeated States — it was absolutely necessary that the 
minorities should be ensured such treatment as would take away from them all 
vahd excuse for disaffection and irredentism.^
So the problem of nationalist sentiment and state boundaries was recognised but the remedy was
the enactment of a system of minority protection treaties. In cases where the frontiers settled at
the Peace Conference were simply unworkable, the appropriate procedure was deemed to be
negotiation at the League Assembly — not that this procedure was observed in practice, but
reworking the frontiers was considered an issue which could be raised. In short, the ideahst
approach was one which insisted on the maintenance of law and order in the international realm
and which maintained that problems such as separatist movements could be dealt with
peacefully because this was the way which made the most rational sense.
From the Ideal to the Real: IR’s Coming of Age
If Ideahsm was a perspective in which the harsh facts of real hfe were to be subjugated 
to reason, then the Reahsm which followed was a perspective in which reason was to be 
subjugated to the harsh facts of reahty. In his discussion of the genesis of International Relations 
as a disciphne, E.H. Carr quoted Engels as saying “If society has a technical need...it serves as a 
greater spur to the progress of science than do ten universities”. Carr then concluded that the 
“[djesire to cure the sicknesses of the body pohtic has given its impulse and its inspiration to 
pohtical science.”'’^  In responding to what he considered to be the misguided faith of 
Utopianism, Carr wrote what could be cahed a dialectical critique of the new discipline.''^ Carr 
differentiates the Utopian/Ideahst approach to solving the problems of international pohtics (the 
inchnation to ignore what was and what is in contemplation of what should be) from the Reahst 
approach (the inchnation to deduce what should be from what was and what is), and insists that
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they are both part of a continuing and necessary equihbrium. Carr is often cited as the chief
destroyer of the Utopian school of theory during the interwar period, and as the father of
Reahsm. But his work was more subtle than that, and he obviously did not intend to discredit
the creativity and normative emphasis of the ideahst.^^ Carr understood the need for the
normative, and also the fact that normative issues and pohtics are inseparable since “[ejvery
pohtical judgment helps to modify the facts on which it is passed. Pohtical thought is itself a
form of pohtical action.”'** Carr actuahy located and defended the value of Utopian theory even
while skilfuhy critiquing its primary faults. Although he advocated a healthy equihbrium of the
two approaches, his feehngs about the existence of international society were somewhat
pessimistic since he focused on the structural inequahties which would always subvert any
attempt at moral order.'*^
Another chronicler of the Reahst genre, Hans Morgenthau, was far less patient with
what he cahed “scientific utopianism”;
The “scientific” era of international relations resulted in the substitution of 
supposedly scientific standards for genuine pohtical evaluations; in some cases 
this went so far as to impede, if not entirely destroy, the abihty to make any 
intelhgent pohtical decisions at ah. Power, however hmited and quahfied, is the
value which international pohtics recognizes as supreme The question of the
international “scientist” [ideahst] is different. Since for him the history of 
international affairs amounts to a succession of scientific problems, correctly or 
incorrectly handled by informed or misinformed officials, the supreme value is 
not power but truth. The quest for and the defense of power then become 
aberrations from the scientific attitude, which looks for causes and remedies.^®
For Morgenthau, the neglect of power as a primary force in international pohtics was
irresponsible and misguided. Although as a Reahst, he shared the rationahst view of the
Ideahsts that society is governed by natural laws which may be ascertained through reason,
Morgenthau’s fundamental principle for the international system — and the one which became
the cornerstone of International Relations theory — was that it was based on “interest defined in
terms of power”. According to Stanley Hoffinann, it was the missionary impulse of Morgenthau,
47
Carr can even be read in support of the normative claims of critical theory. See Andrew Linldater, “The Transformation 
of Political Community: E.H. Carr, Critical Theory and International Relations,” Review o f  International Studies 23 
(1997): 321-338.
48
Carr, Twenty Years ’ Crisis, 5.
49
Dunne, Inventing International Society, 35.
50
Morgenlhau, Politics Among Nations, 48.
34
his air of conviction and certainty, which helped to estabhsh the discipline of International 
Relations in the United States. “Steeped in a scholarly tradition that stressed the difference 
between social sciences and natural sciences, he was determined both to erect an empirical 
science opposed to the utopias of the international lawyer and the pohtical ideologues, and to 
affirm the unity of empirical research and of philosophical inquiry into the right kind of social 
order.”^^  hi his attempt to describe the “real” and to make the social science of International 
Relations pohcy practical as well as pohcy relevant, Morgenthau mapped a field which took 
states and power as the actors and the interests, and considered the balance of power to be a 
fundamental natural law of the system. Almost as Carr predicted in his simphfied model of 
reahsm, the Reahst school of IR became focused on the deduction of what should be firom the 
nature of what was and is. Thus Reahsts tended to take the international system as they found it 
and to theorise about states and power as if the system had always existed and would continue to 
do so in an unproblematic manner. Needless to say, this theoretical gaze was one which found 
secession to be an issue beneath its notice.
Although it began in the 1930s as a response to the Utopian nature of Ideahsm, the 
Reahst school became weU-estabhshed after the Second World War, in the era of confirmed 
cynicism and the beginning of the American-Soviet nuclear standoff. The structurahst 
assumptions of the basic Reahst stance have resulted in scarcely a glance cast at matters which 
involve sub-state entities. Even Hedley BuU, a scholar with great knowledge of pohtical and 
legal history, felt that the task of International Relations was restricted to the analysis of relations 
between states. He emphaticahy declared: “The starting point of international relations is the 
existence of states. W i t h  the field so strictly circumscribed, it is hardly surprising that Reahst 
theory (in response to the positivist methodological chahenge) became rarefied and formahsed, 
focusing strictly on state power and interests. This theoretical perspective reached its apex with 
Kenneth Waltz’s Theory o f International Politics. The formahsed Neo-Reahst world is 
carefiiUy defined by the sovereignty divide of inside/outside, domestic/international. Given this 
definition of the space of international pohtics, social movements such as national separatist 
groups are problems for pubhc administration or sociology, but should not concern the scholars 
of International Relations until such movements become responsible for state actions beyond 
internal borders. The Neo-Liberal chahenge to this form of Reahsm, articulated by Robert
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Keohane, did not serve to increase the scope for International Relations theory. The main 
differences between the two perspectives can be distilled to a general shift in focus by the Neo- 
Liberals to forms of state cooperation, regimes and pohtical economy. The Neo-Liberal view 
encompasses intensions and perceptions and the role of institutions in mitigating anarchy in 
contrast to a more hard-hne Neo-Reahst insistence on relative gains, security and anarchy as 
driving forces behind state behav iour.In  ontological terms, however, the two perspectives are 
merely variations on a Reahst theme, neither of which questions the existence and formation of 
states.
Reahst ontology, with its assumption of the reahty of states, cannot account for the 
making and breaking of states, and for the complexity that arises when the status of a state is 
cahed into question, as it is by secession. Because states simply exist as part of the “real world” 
for Reahst theorists, they do not theorise how states come into being and what the nature of that 
being is. In Reahsm’s defence, it can be argued that ah academic disciphnes must theorise from 
some starting point, thus taking certain things for granted, and that International Relations has 
clearly from its inception been about the relations between estabhshed states. However, when 
the ontological boundaries of the disciphne bhnd it to pohtical events which take place just 
beyond its theoretical gateways, there is a pressing need for reassessment. Reahst International 
Relations theory describes a world so narrowly circumscribed that it cannot correspond to 
observable events. International Relations has been so concerned with iniei-state relations that 
it cannot comprehend inteT-national relations and all of their imphcations for pohtics at every 
level. Critical theorists, those for whom the reahty of the world “out there” is one constituted 
and continuaUy changed by human knowledge, do not assume the reahty of states. Rather, 
critical International Relations theory must question the formation of states and the very nature 
of their existence. Secession, then, is a phenomenon which is an integral part of a critical 
theoretical approach to International Relations.
Reahsm continues to be the dominant ontological perspective within International 
Relations, although it has gone through several permutations, and power pohtics has continued 
to serve as the dominant theoretical justification for state pohcy. Certainly, there have been 
significant challenges and it can be argued that International Relations in its “inter-paradigm” 
stage is now “the site of a hundred (theoretical) flowers blooming”, but there is also much reason
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to believe that this is an overly optimistic view.^ There has been a traditional unwillingness
within International Relations theory to grapple with certain philosophical questions as other
social sciences have.
[T]he questions and issues of ontology and epistemology — of the way we 
think and act in the world and understand reahty — have either been ignored in 
International Relations or rendered marginal and barely relevant by a 
disciphnary orthodoxy that has interpreted the Western historical and 
philosophical story in a narrow, exclusionary, and inadequate manner.^^
This unwillingness has resulted in an extensive disciphnary practice of dichotomising the
relationship between facts and theory. This dichotomised approach has remained prominent
even though in recent years International Relations has seen a fanning out of the field into areas
well beyond the tradition of state-centred approaches. Texts designed to introduce students to
the disciphne must now include perspectives and topics as widespread as feminism,
environmental issues, security studies, foreign pohcy, post-coloniahsm, post-structurahst and
critical social theory, and culture and identity, to name a few.
Naturahy, the disciphne has become a much more interesting inteUectual space as a
result, with various texts questioning the nature of sovereignty, the state, and transnational
interaction. But while the Reahst ontological view (of a world beyond our reach) persists there
are serious epistemological consequences. A perspective in which states and regimes are “real”
leads to a system of knowledge which assumes that there is no human influence over them. This
is the most profound imphcation of the theory/fact dichotomy discussed by Jim George.
Although International Relations theorists are beginning to look beyond the state, as it becomes
clear that the sphere of the global is much more complex than simple inter-state relations, there is
StiU a pervasive tendency to practice social science as a deductive exercise. Theory which
maintains its distance from practice also maintains silence on the foundational questions of
modernist understanding. Questions of culture and identity cannot be adequately treated. The
contingency of history and human existence must remain irrelevant.
These silences are nowhere more obvious than in a very recent attempt to take up
secession as an International Relations subject, in response to its increased visibility in post-cold
war international dynamics.^^ The author of this work. Viva Ona Bartkus, compares a great
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many examples of secession and separatism and applies a framework of cost/benefit analysis in 
order to quantify the factors which go into the decision to secede. This treatment, while useful 
and welcome, remains limited by its traditional theoretical perspective which envisions secession 
as an event susceptible to causal analysis and secessionist groups as fixed and unitary actors.
The attempt to describe the causes of secession is comprehensive but silent on the crucial 
question of the formation and maintenance of social group identity. By accepting group 
identities and perceptions as “facts” which may be interpreted by the “theory” of an objective 
observer, this text cannot engage with the concepts of identity, difference, territoriahty and 
sovereignty which — as mutually constitutive and contested concepts — must inform our 
understanding of secession. While these crucial issues remain unexplored our understanding of 
secession will remain truncated and out of context. Thus the features of international pohtics 
which make secession a possibihty, and one which affects ah of us, cannot be analysed from 
Bartkus’s perspective, and remain entirely outside of its theoretical reach.
The fact/theory dichotomy reflects one of the most important developments in the 
evolution of International Relations as a disciphne. That is, there is now an irreconcilable 
division between two meta-theoretical perspectives; Steve Smith cahs them “constitutive” and 
“explanatory” theories. The divide is “between those theories that seek to offer explanatory 
accounts of international relations, and those that see theory as constitutive of that reahty. At 
base this boils down to a difference over what the social world is hke; is it to be seen as scientists 
think of the ‘natural’ world, that is to say as something outside of our theories, or is the social 
world what we make it?” ’^ The constitutive theoretical perspective, imported from philosophy 
and social theory, has only recently taken hold in International Relations and has yet to achieve 
anything hke parity with traditional explanatory theoretical approaches in the disciphne. Even 
within each meta-theoretical approach there are widespread conflicts over various theoretical 
commitments. But the goal which the constitutive theory schools have in common is to adopt an 
^proach which “reformulates basic questions of modernist understanding in emphasizing not 
the sovereign subject (e.g., author/independent state) or the object (e.g., independent world/text) 
but instead the historical, cultural, and hnguistic practices in which subjects and objects (and 
theory and practice, facts and values) are constructed.” *^ It is this recent development which has 
freed up the theoretical space for a look at secession which does not assume the objective 
presence of states and ethno-national identities. The point of all this theoretical space, as George
57
Smith, “The Self-Images of a Discipline,” 26-27.
58
George, Discourses, 192 (emphasis in original).
38
points out, is not to establish a newly dominant “paradigm”, but to disrupt discursive certainties; 
it is not to dismiss dominant readings in the disciphne, but the show that they are actually 
contextual readings of reahty rather than reahty itself.
This complex ancestral chart, only briefly described here, goes a long way towards 
explaining why International Relations theorists have traditionaUy failed to address the problem 
of secession in any meaningful way.®” The hold which Reahsm has maintained over the many 
theoretical perspectives which have emerged in the last few decades has hmited the ways in 
which the world can be viewed. Indeed, the very term international has been hmited by the 
perception that this is a realm made up of states and organizations of states. So not only do 
Reahst (explanatory) perspectives fail to adequately address the impact of sub-state separatist 
movements on the international system, but they cannot account for the diverse quahties of 
present-day states. Secession, as a concept that challenges the very underpinnings of 
sovereignty, statehood and territoriahty can only be treated as an effect with determinable causes 
rather than as an integral part of the current (historically contingent) system. Thus any avenues 
for creatively thinking beyond the territorial state and secessionist self-determination are 
blocked. It is only through a constitutive theoretical approach, which does not accept 
international structures as given or unproblematic, that secession and all of the pohtical 
difficulties it encompasses can be (re)solved.
While International Relations theorists have only rarely looked past the nature of the 
system as unquestionably based on states, there have been writers in others disciphnes for whom 
the sub-state nature of secession has not posed a problem. These fields include pohtical 
philosophy, pohtical science/government, sociology and law. When secession is handled by 
these theorists, it is examined either in terms of moral justification for certain cases, or in terms 
of causal analysis. Such treatments have provided interesting if narrow discussions, but they 
have not problematised the nature of the state or the formation of pohtical identities. That is, 
they have remained explanatory (or justificatory) rather than constitutive and thus there 
continues to be a pressing need for a “theory as fact” analysis of secession as a concept. In the 
next chapter, I wifi examine the body of hterature on secession which has been built up fi'om
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other disciplines and discuss the implications of these works in terms of the new theoretical 
spaces opened up by constitutive International Relations theory.
Chapter 2.
THEORIES OF SECESSION
While International Relations literature has given only the barest nod in the direction of 
secession (it is an inconvenient failure of statehood best left to human rights lawyers and conflict 
researchers), there has been no lack of interesting discussion and analysis of the subject. Two 
distinct categories of the conceptual treatment of secession have developed. Political 
philosophers in the liberal tradition have provided ample argumentation for the nature of 
secession as a political right which may be justified in certain circumstances. They tend to deal 
in abstract models and are concerned with legitimate consent and representative democracy. 
Secession in this fi*amework is seen as given — an inevitable part of the international system, so 
analysis is required for when it is justified. Causal analysts, on the other hand, consider 
secession in terms of its causes and in terms of dispute resolution. Secession in this fi-amework 
is seen as causing conflict and disorder, but also as a possible resolution to conflict, and so its 
causes must be understood in order to yield useful policy results. While many researchers in the 
latter category are political scientists, they rarely supply a theoretical framework which is based 
on International Relations theory.^^ Their work tends to fall into sub-disciplinary categories such 
as conflict resolution or peace research. Thus, there is plenty of evidence that secession has been 
neglected by International Relations as a discipline.
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The point to be made in this chapter, however, is that the approaches taken by non-IR 
scholars are also unsatisfactory. In a sense both categories of analysis deal with secession only 
in part, and both analytic categories remain firmly within the explanatory theoretical fi-amework. 
Thus many of the constructed elements of secession as a phenomenon are taken for granted.
This theoretical perspective imposes strong hmitadons on how secession may be perceived and 
dealt with. Pohtical theory (moral analysis) tends to sanitise secession by making all of its 
arguments based on assumptions about the rights of individuals. Causal analysis tends to 
simphfy secession by making all of its arguments based on assumptions about group behaviour 
and the conditions of conflict. Neither approach considers secession to be the by-product of 
problematic assumptions about international relations and the nature of statehood and national 
identity. Rather, secession is seen as a problem which can be solved, a patient who can be 
cured, if only the appropriate model can be developed. This chapter grapples with representative 
samples of the existing hterature on secession and demonstrates that the problems with it are 
two-fold.®  ^ First, on its own terms, the aims of these two tendencies in the hterature are 
unattainable since the rights of ah individuals to be protected within a territoriahst self- 
determination fi-amework can never be guaranteed, nor can a scheme or model be devised in 
which the decisions of national groups wiU be consistently predictable. Second, because this 
hterature regards secession as a “problem”susceptible to a solution, it can never go beyond the 
creation of models and pohcy suggestions which continue to operate within the same parameters 
of an antiquated international system. Firmly grounded in Reahst-style explanatory theory, and 
modernist epistemology, these models reproduce old assumptions about the nature of the 
international system which are hmited both in terms of descriptive accuracy and in terms of 
abihty to respond to international normative concerns. Ironicahy, although International 
Relations has long neglected this issue, the secession nut can best be cracked by an approach 
which criticahy (and constitutively) examines the meanings of both international and relations. 
That is, secession is most productively theorised in terms of an approach which sees theory as 
constitutive of reahty and which assumes that the social world is not only socially constructed 
but is sociahy (and thus diversely) perceived, and so it cannot be objectively theorised through 
scientific deduction of the “laws” of international relations. A constitutive approach requires a 
problematisation, a questioning, of the primary assumptions upon which secession rests. These
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assumptions go to the heart of statehood itself: the territoriahty and sovereignty assumption, and 
the construction of identity on both the individual and collective levels. The theoretical 
approaches hitherto apphed to secession have not dealt with the imphcations of these questions, 
as this chapter will iUustrate.
The Political Philosophy of Secession
Few states can unabashedly claim to be composed of a single ethnic group. Yet the 
evolution of the modem pohtical state has produced a system in which legitimacy derives from 
sovereign control over bounded territory even though the citizens who reside within may feel 
multiple forms of aUegiance, which not only transcend cartography but which change in 
response to internal and external events. These multiple identities create enormous problems for 
modem pohtical philosophy. The “people” who confer legitimacy upon the state may be defined 
as those who hve within the fixed territorial boundaries of the state. But reading those “people” 
as members of a “nation”, assuming that they feel both civic and cultural loyalty to each other, is 
a doubtful conclusion which endlessly cahs into question the very concept of “nation-state”. 
Self-determination has taken a strong grip on the pohtical imagination as a means of solving this 
legitimacy dilemma. However, problems of interpretation have divided theorists into those who 
would hmit self-determination to decolonisation—i.e., a “one shot” framework—and those who 
beheve that self-determination must logicahy include a right of secession for people who define 
themselves as oppressed or ahenated by their current government. Since the intemational 
system bulges with such oppressive regimes, and since national separatist movements are so 
often fought with bloody ferocity, ahowing for the right of secession seems the only way to solve 
the problem. After all — theorists argue — the best way to stop a fight is to spht up the 
antagonists. When couples fight irreconcilably, they are ahowed a divorce. But the solution 
promised by secession is iUusory. Pohtical separation caimot be as clean and effective as a 
marital one. In fact, it is worth noting that perhaps the marital metaphor is apt in a way its 
proponents never intended since marital breakups are notorious for causing exploitation and pain 
to the involved parties, even when the laws are as hberal as possible. The problem is that these 
concepts of separation as a right or as a means of conflict resolution do not account for the fact 
that human beings become attached to each other in many different ways, and these bonds (not 
ah of them necessarily ones of affection) cannot be broken by the “simple” process of separation. 
These social ties transcend time and space and efforts to essentiahse them; they cannot be locked 
in or out by borders and wahs. Secession merely continues to draw new boundaries around 
timeless patterns of shifting populations and evolving identities.
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It is necessary at the start to properly define secession for the scope of this discussion. I 
use the term here to denote “self-cession”—the unilateral withdrawal of territory and people fi'om 
a state for the creation of a new and separate state. The assumption therefore will be that 
secession is always disputed by the parent state as illegitimate. Undisputed separations, such as 
that of Sweden and Norway, or the Czech Repubhc and Slovakia, are not secessions for the 
purposes of this discussion; rather, they are peaceful pohtical agreements for constitutional 
separation — deemed legitimate by both sides. I suggest this limitation in meaning, because to 
do otherwise is to obscure the very serious theoretical difficulty which secession presents for 
pohtical theory of any sort — that is, the impasse between self-determination, territorial 
sovereignty, and pohtical rights. One further quahfication will help sharpen the analysis: I do 
not consider colonial independence movements to be true cases of secession within this 
discussion. Colonies contain populations which lack the benefits of full membership in the 
parent state to begin with, they are territories without a history of statehood in the modem 
intemational sense and therefore a colonial independence movement is closer to the creation of a 
state de novo than it is to the unilateral “withdrawal” of territory and population fi'om a bounded 
state proper .While  these quahfications may appear restrictive, they are meant to clarify the 
debate. And a definition which regards secession as inherently confiictual more tmly mirrors the 
nature of the debate which surrounds the concept.
Secession is an idea antithetical to the modem state. It is opposed by pohtical leaders 
almost without exception because it involves a loss of territory — the hfeblood and defining 
characteristic of the state. While the precise nature of the boundaries, population, government 
and capacity of a state may all be called into question, there is no exception to the mle that a 
state must have control of some territory (however small) in order to be recognised as a state.^ 
Territorial withdrawal by a disaffected group not only risks weakening a state economically and 
pohtically, but it also redefines the very identity of the state in question. The state which 
remains after secessionists have withdrawn must redefine itself as a state with a population 
which no longer contains that group or territory. Although the name of the state may remain 
identical, it is no longer identical with its pre-secession population, borders and sovereignty.
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Thus its national identity must change in response to these differences. In addition to the basic
foundation of the right to self-determination, theorists often rationahse a right to secession in
terms of the rights of groups to protect their cultural identity or economic welfare. But tiieories
which justify certain types of secession often fail to adequately account both for the rights of
ffapped minorities (on both sides of the new borders) and for the fiitihty of matching territorial
boundaries to the many variations on human pohtical affihation. Secession can only be a
temporary and incomplete solution to problems of pohtical consent. Its fatal flaw is that it
perpetuates a framework in which territorial sovereignty is the only means of protection for
disaffected groups. Separatists feel that fuUy-fledged statehood is the only satisfactory option.
While statehood may appear to be the best option for members of the primary secessionist
group, it creates new types of minority groups, within the seceding territory, or within the
territory of the parent state, thus recreating the original problems inherent in state structure.
Not only does secession create difficulties as a long-term stable solution, but it poses
strong normative problems because it ultimately sanctions segregation rather than co-operation
and participation. Secession allows and encourages an increased number of boundaries between
different groups of human beings — reinforcing the idea that exclusion is essential to the nature
of territorial control and the maintenance of social identity. Even if separation is the best means
of stopping two individuals from fighting, it is no guarantee that they will not fight again when
next they meet. The immediate violence may be halted, but the confiictual nature of the
relationship has not been resolved. Separation is simply a sweep of identity conflict dirt under
the territorial rug. A state border between two groups is no guarantee of co-operation and peace,
nor is it a guarantee that the majority identities will be secured and settled. John McGarry notes:
Discontent in new states created by secession is not Hmited to ethnic minorities 
who want their own state, to be part of another state, or substantial pohtical 
accommodation with the new state. In addition, there are those members of the 
majority group who have dual identities and who, while accepting the new 
state, regret the passing of the old.®^
Calhng it a “right” for secessionists to build the barriers of modem statehood between
themselves and those in the remaining state represents an approach to pohtical problems which
condones the deepest intolerance. It is in fact a sanctioned form of ethnic cleansing because it is
always based on the assumption of difference between two groups and therefore the assumption
that separation is a right. Territorial boundaries do not guarantee freedom; and freedom does not
require boundaries to be regarded and protected as a pohtical right.
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Justification Theories: When is There a Right to Secede?
Among liberal democratic theorists who analyse secession in terms of moral rights, the 
marriage and divorce metaphor appears most compelhng. This is rooted in a theoretical 
framework which places maximum emphasis on freedom of individual choice in the pohtical 
sphere. This emphasis on the voluntary nature of pohtical relationships underpins the analysis 
of M en Buchanan, a prohfic theoretician of secession, who states in his seminal book on the 
subject that pohtical association is hke marriage in the sense that it is an artificial institution 
designed to meet the needs of those subject to it.^  ^ Buchanan’s marriage analogy, with its 
emphasis on the voluntary nature of pohtical relationships, frees him to find a rationale for 
secession much broader than the commonplace one of oppressive government. Although in his 
book he exhaustively covers no fewer than twelve possible reasons for pohtical “divorce”, 
Buchanan later refines the argument by dividing normative theories of secession into two types: 
primary rights and remedial rights.®  ^ Primary right theories are based on the principle that any 
group which decides through a plebiscite should be entitled to secede. There are variations on 
whether the group may be based on national identity or not, but primary right theories are 
basically supportive of a general right to secession based on choice. Remedial right theories are 
based on the idea that secession is a quahfied right, one which must be restricted to special 
cases. Again, there are variations on what the quahfications actually are, but, as Buchanan puts 
it, “What all Remedial Right Only theories have in common is the thesis that there is no 
(general) right to secede from a just state.” *^ Buchanan, himself a firm advocate of remedial right 
theories, argues that secession should be permissible in two particular cases: 1) actual physical 
safety of a group is threatened, or other grave violations of human rights, or 2) a group’s 
territory was unjustly taken. In considering secession as a remedial right rather than a general 
one, Buchanan confirms the present intemational legal order which continues to hold state 
territorial integrity sacrosanct. Since territorial integrity actually benefits citizens by maintaining 
a stable intemational legal order and creates incentives for cooperation and investment in 
legitimate pohtical processes, Buchanan argues, “States, so far as their authority rests on their
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ability to serve the basic interests of individuals, have an obligatory interest in maintaining 
territorial i n t e g r i t y . H e  is not alone in this approach. Anthony Birch also finds that any 
justification for breaking up an existing state must be serious and persistent.’®
Birch’s framework, not unhke Buchanan’s, starts from the assumption that secession 
should not be encouraged, but should be available as a last option in certain troubhng cases. The 
justifications Birch finds most persuasive are: 1) continuous refusal on the part of a people to 
give consent to membership in a union; 2) failure of the government to protect the basic rights of 
certain citizens; 3) failure to safeguard pohtical and economic interests of a region; and 4) failure 
to keep a bargain made to preserve the interests of a region which would be outvoted 
nationally.’  ^ Though differently worded, the justifications presented by these two theorists are 
very similar. Birch’s first justification, refusal to consent, can be viewed as the primary element 
of Buchanan’s unjust taking of territory argument — since a territorial taking would only be 
considered unjust if the resident population continuously and vociferously protested. Protection 
of basic human rights is a straightforward justification for both writers and is certainly intended 
to address the persecution of minorities in various forms. Birch’s third and fourth justifications, 
failure to protect interests and failure to keep a pohtical bargain are variations on the possible 
quahfications of the remedial right theory category. The similarities evident between two hberal 
writers on secession indicate the hmitations of hberahsm as a framework for analysing the 
problems of secession. With its emphasis on the rights of the individual, hberal theory can only 
address secession as a necessary evil; one which should be controUed but which cannot be 
banished. Any approach which provides “guidehnes” for justifiable secession wiU be subject to 
broad disagreement about the apphcabihty and practicahty of those criteria, especiahy when the 
rights of non-secessionists are added to the equation.
Even the most morahy appeahng justification, that of protection of general human 
rights, StiU yields contradictions when placed within the remedial right theoretical framework.
For example, in the case of Kosovo compelhng human rights violations suffered by the Kosovar 
Albanians are countered by the Serb claim that Kosovo is a land which was unjustly “taken” 
from them and settled by Albanians when Serbia did not have control over it. Which argument 
is more compelling? Obviously, threats to the physical safety of civihan people can never be
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justified, but which group has the right to the land? One might continue to apply the marriage 
analogy and hken a repressive state to an abusive spouse. A battered spouse certainly has a right 
to a divorce, and in comparison, the spectre of brutal massacres in ethnically divided states 
compels a drastic solution. But the analogy caimot really be apphed so neatly. The rights and 
obhgations which regulate relations between two individuals do not translate into pohtical 
relations among large groups of people. Separating even the hves of a single divorced couple is 
difficult; how can it be possible to cleanly separate groups of people who have been hving 
amongst each other on the same territory for generations? While there is certainly a general 
human right to personal physical integrity, it is not clear that secession would be an outcome of 
that right. Buchanan compares the situation to the right of self-defence against lethal threat. But 
secession is not hke self-defence in that it is not a defence open to everyone. It can be claimed 
only by groups privileged enough to be concentrated within a definable territory, and even then 
they must be powerfiil enough to withstand a mihtary campaign by the state against secession. 
What about the self-defence of groups which are spread throughout the territory of a state? They 
are left exposed and defenceless by this “right”. It is also interesting to note that neither 
Buchanan nor Birch seriously discuss the obhgation of other states to intervene in cases of 
genocide or severe human rights abuses.Further,  neither writer addresses the question of why 
the creation of a new state would serve as protection of general human rights. Territory cannot 
itself serve as protection — it must be defended. Even states with control over large land masses 
have no “security” without peace treaties, co-operative agreements, and mihtary strength. A 
pohtical regime (or private group) bent on a campaign of ethnic eradication would not cease 
because its victims declared their independence. Such activities are not stopped by the 
declaration of a state border, they are stopped by force — or rather, by the enforcement of law 
and order. The sad example of Bosnia, where “ethnic cleansing” began in response to secession 
rather than being forestahed by it, serves to iUustrate that secession can help to create a chmate 
of fear and difference rather than a protective barrier between threatened and threatening 
groups.^^
Also attractive as a justification for secession is the rectification of unjust takings of 
territory argument. Buchanan defines this as the previous incorporation of the seceding area
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directly by annexation into the existing state and gives the example of the Baltic Repubhcs and 
the Soviet Union. Birch considers the Cathohc counties of Ireland, and also the diflBcult cases of 
indigenous peoples in lands conquered by settlers. The power of the argument stems from its 
analogous hnk to stolen property. But again the analogy is not secure because it does not make 
sense in the collective form. Finding a right of secession for annexed groups is substantially 
more problematic than finding that these people have the right to remain in the land where their 
ancestors hved. A right of secession in this case depends not only on a firm commitment to the 
concept of collective ownership of territory, but on the means to legally organise and ratify such 
ownership. This position is fraught with practical pitfalls, and is difficult to support legally. For 
example, decisions about when such ownership becomes vested, when it lapses, and which 
persons are to be considered members of the “ownership group” would require the difficult 
foundation of an intemational recorder-of-deeds. Even Buchanan admits that “the history of 
existing states is so replete with immoral, coercive, and fraudulent takings that it may be hard for 
most states to estabhsh the legitimacy of their current or past borders.”’"* Allowing a right to 
secession in this case ignores the evolving and locomotive nature of group identities. It would 
allow groups to claim that a right to territory legally attached and remained fixed at some 
indefinable point in time despite subsequent processes of immigration and nation-building which 
may have gone on since. This analysis is not meant to condone conquest and land-grabbing, as, 
for example, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. The point is that by the time a territory has become 
fiilly integrated so that its inhabitants are citizens with the full complement of civil rights, then 
secession becomes extremely problematic. Groups from the parent state who have moved into 
the territory and consider it home also have rights which should be protected. This is the case in 
Northern Ireland, and also in the Baltic Repubhcs, where the rights of ethnic Russians are 
proving a difficult issue. When this occurs, the “rights” of two or more groups come into direct 
conflict and the creation (or “reinstatement”) of a new state is no longer a pristine solution. As 
Birch admits in his discussion of the Indians of North America, “[t]here is undoubtedly a sense 
in which these indigenous peoples have suffered cruelly from the white man’s invasion, but it 
would be romantic to suggest that secession is now an appropriate answer to their problems.”’^
A right of secession in these cases only encourages groups to remain isolated and separate and 
works against beneficial co-operation and pohtical integration. The question then should not be
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whether or not a group has “title” to territory, but whether the rights of the group as citizens and 
human beings are being protected by the existing pohtical machinery.
Finally, there is the justification of discriminatory redistribution. This occurs, according 
to both Birch and Buchanan, when a pohtical system sanctions deprivation, or ignores the 
crucial interests of a region. The interesting aspect of this type of unfair situation is that it can 
occur even in states which observe hberal democratic principles if they implement schemes 
which arbitrarily advantage some groups and disadvantage others. Both writers illustrate their 
concerns with examples fi*om the U.S. Civil War. Buchanan mentions the fact that 
discriminatory tarifis were enacted against the Southern states through proper congressional 
procedures, causing Southern leaders to feel that their interests could never be protected in the 
Union. Birch discusses the fact that Congress broke the negotiated agreement that new states 
admitted to the Union would alternate between slave state and fi^ ee state. Southern leaders felt 
that this move threatened their economic interests. Birch concludes that “[i]n terms of the hberal 
principles here proposed, this attempted secession was probably justifiable.”’® Amazingly, Birch 
does not discuss the moral imperative of slavery in this case. Nor does it seem to matter to his 
calculation that the inhabitants of the western territories which were being admitted to the Union 
as new states largely did not depend on slave labour and did not wish to enter as designated slave 
states. How were their rights as fi*ee citizens being protected in this fi'amework? What this 
viewpoint fails to address is exactly why discriminatory redistribution translates into a good 
argument for secession. If a democratic state commits a serious injustice against the interests of 
a group or region within its jurisdiction, why should a newly-seceded democratic state not turn 
around and reproduce similar unfair schemes on its own populace? There is no certainty that re­
partitioning territory will result in an equitable distribution of assets, either for those seceding or 
for those remaining behind.”  In fact, hberal democracy has never been about the right to equal 
distribution — it is only about the right to an equal opportunity to participate in the pohtical 
process. The voice — not the result — is all that democracy guarantees.’* Why should 
secession be the answer to that pohtical problem?
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The discriminatory redistribution argument requires the assumption that governmental 
legitimacy depends upon nonexploitation of its citizens. That is, although “the state’s 
distributive pohcies are to be allowed to affect different groups differently, there must be some 
sound moral justification for the differences.’”  ^ What moral justifications would be considered 
acceptable for such differences? To whom must the arguments be presented? The argument 
imphes that failure on the part of the state to justify its distributive pohcies effectively voids its 
claim to the territory in which those who are discriminated against reside. This seems a harsh 
solution for a problem which must be perceived and argued subjectively. Patterns of economic 
distribution are notoriously difficult to interpret normatively in the absence of the kind of 
discrimination or mismanagement which results in widespread physical suffering.*®
Additionally, there is the factor of time — discriminatory redistribution will cease to be 
profitable to the exploiting parties if^  for example, the resources become hopelessly depleted or 
pohtical fortunes change. As Buchanan acknowledges, it is part of the nature of pohtical 
association and the construction of the state that the wealth of certain areas wiU be redistributed 
for the benefit of certain other areas.*  ^ Accurate determination of the point at which this activity 
ceases to be co-operation and becomes exploitation or neglect would prove prohibitively 
difficult. Since economists can scarcely agree on how best to stimulate and manage wealth, it 
seems exaggerated to find that a state has lost its legitimate claim to territory because wealth has 
been unfairly redistributed. This justification for secession begins to sound increasingly hke a 
right to wise and good governance — a desirable but elusive thing in this world. Of course, 
some governments include discriminatory redistribution in a laundry hst of oppressive and 
autocratic acts of state. These are serious issues. But secession is not a plaster which can patch 
up broken or harmfiil states. It only allows concentrated groups of people to redraw their 
pohtical boundaries. The act of secession is bhnd to the problems of discrimination and the 
designations of “otherness” which occur every time a piece of territory is dehneated.
While Birch and Buchanan approach secession as a remedial right, one which should 
only kick in when wrongs have been manifested, Harry Beran approaches it fi*om the opposite
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side of the fence as a primary moral right from which there should be a presumption that 
secession is just.^ Beran also compares his theory of secession to marriage and divorce, 
illustrating his point with three types of legal divorce; 1) cases in which it is only allowed on 
specific moral grounds such as adultery or cruelty; 2) cases in which the parties are so 
incompatible that they both wish to be apart; and 3) cases in which the marriage ends even at the 
wish of only one of the parties. Beran prefers the last case as a model for his theory of secession 
because it provides the greatest scope for satisfying parties in unhappy marriages. Ultimately, 
Beran argues, “hberal pohtical philosophy requires that secession be permitted if it is effectively 
desired by a territoriahy concentrated group within a state and is moraUy and practicaUy 
possible.”*^
From the starting point of democratic consent theory, Beran argues that the closer adult 
decisions are, in a contemporary democracy, to being voluntary, the closer such a society comes 
to matching the ideal hberal model. Citizens in a hberal state may work and hve and marry as 
they choose, and governments are voted in and out of office by their choice. Under this scheme, 
according to Beran, no state can be indissoluble since that would hmit the freedom of choice to 
the generation which formed the state in question. In other words, a group’s right of self- 
determination is “the right to freely determine its pohtical status.”^  There are two flaws in this 
argument. First, it is not so easy to determine which individuals belong to the group with this 
right; and second, it is based on the assumption that “pohtical status” must mean the 
determination of a state with borders. Beran’s reply to the problem of calculation of group 
members is quite simple: the reiterated apphcation of the majority principle. In other words, 
Beran’s theory holds that the determination of groups by continued referenda on the issue of 
secession is the only solution that is consistent with democratic principles. The elegance of this 
solution is chimerical. People wiU not be so cleanly divided into groups on the issues of identity 
and territory. They have plural identities, not majority/minority ones. Additionally, the 
language of any proposed referendum wiU itself largely dictate the outcome. Depending on how 
the secession issue is stated, different groups wiU find their interests represented, and the end 
result will not necessarily protect the pohtical choice of all the parties. Forcing non-secessionists
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to choose a political identity under these circumstances may actually offer them none of their 
preferences. For example, what protects the freedom of individuals within a seceding group who 
do not wish to leave? Their only means of remaining within the parent state is to move—hardly 
a protection for these involuntary victims whose actual choice is to remain within the original 
(whole) state. Also, reiterated referenda do not affect the problem of dispersed or integrated 
minorities; they are people whose interests can never be addressed territorially.
The second flaw is the assumption that the right to determine “pohtical status” must 
mean the right to create new state borders. Pohtical organisation has existed in many forms 
throughout history and it is a narrow interpretation indeed that restricts its manifestation to the 
modem state. Territorial states as they are now, with strict border dehneation and control, are a 
modem outgrowth of the nineteenth century.*® There is no preordained requirement that our 
conception of pohtical organisation be fixed to a territorial entity. Our understanding of what is 
meant by “the state” has already undergone alteration and continues to do so, especially in the 
face of increasingly private control of economics and finance. Within this context, hberal theory 
provides a restricted vision of pohtical freedom. For many ethnic or national groups, the 
“freedom” of a territorial state is more responsibihty than they have the resources to handle. For 
these groups, the notion of the state as the only manifestation of pohtical freedom is actually a 
burden which hmits them by presenting them with an all-or-nothing choice. Freedom can only 
be tmly protected by flexible conceptuahsations of pohtical organisation, conceptuahsations 
which recognise that pohtical free choice can be directed at group membership rather than state 
citizenship.*’
Beran further elaborates that his democratic theory of self-determination is meant to 
produce rightful borders, not necessarily good ones.** This statement assumes both that the right 
of secession is a moral right, and that stable and peaceful borders are not necessarily morahy 
justified ones. In fact, Beran criticises Birch and Buchanan for faihng to account for “the
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compatibility of such a highly qualified right of secession with the fundamental principles of 
democracy.”*^  But Beran then confiises the issue by allowing for hmitations to the right of 
secession on practical grounds, and even for the suppression of secession by force where there is 
a “moral justification”. Making a distinction between “ideal world” and “real world” theoiy, 
Beran concedes that in the “real world”, secessionists may be resisted if they refuse to allow joint 
control of mihtarily essential territories, or if they refuse to share the benefits of scarce natural 
resources with the rump state, or if they will oppress minorities in their midst. He even 
hypothesises the case of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, saying that “if the Slovenes 
thought that the disintegration of Yugoslavia would in turn lead to a catastrophic war in Europe 
and the loss of milhons of lives, they ought not to have exercised their right of secession at the 
time.” °^ By conceding that the right of secession can be hmited by certain expediencies such as 
territorial viabihty, monopoly of resources, oppression of minorities and the potential for 
catastrophic war, Beran confiâtes a moral/normative analysis of secession with a Utihtarian 
analysis, based on practicahty and maximised interests. If the right of self-determination is tied 
to the individual right of fi’ee pohtical association, how can the use of force to suppress secession 
ever be justified? A true moral right cannot be hmited by the potential unhappiness it may 
cause. It is the concept of balancing benefits which ultimately weakens Beran’s thesis. Once he 
allows for practical hmitations on the “permissive” right, it becomes difficult to differentiate his 
outcomes fi*om those of Birch and Buchanan. Beran’s starting point of secession as a moral 
right which should be fi-eely allowed ends in an intricate pattern of situations in which secession 
should be discouraged and even actively fought. The argument ends on a much less radical note 
than the one on which it opened.
The final writer to be examined under this approach is legal philosopher. Lea Brilmayer, 
whose “territorial interpretation” also seeks to overturn the standard account of secession and the 
right of self-determination.^^ Brilmayer seeks to reconcile the contradiction between the 
principles of self-determination and territorial integrity which arise in the secessionist context by 
making the argument that secessionist claims are actually much more about territory than they 
are about a distinct people. The current emphasis on self-determination, according to Brilmayer,
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obscures the debate rather than clarifies it, since the real normative force of a bid for secession
comes fi*om a claim to territorial legitimacy and not fi-om that argument that the group constitutes
a distinct people. By making this argument, one can clarify the confusion which reigns over
contemporary international law about how the right of self-determination can be meaningfiil
without necessarily supporting indefinite subdivisions of states. Brilmayer supports this
hmitation of the right of self-determination by attacking the understanding of consent as the key
to legitimacy in hberal democratic theory. Although interestingly Brilmayer does not mention
Beran, she tackles his arguments head on. Liberal theorists, she argues, have never intended for
consent to be actual in the sense that refiisal exempts the individual from state authority. Liberal
democratic consent is, in fact, tacit and encompassed in the right to participate.
Government by the consent of the governed does not necessarily encompass a 
right to opt out. It only requires that within the existing pohtical unit a right to 
participate through electoral processes be available. Moreover, participatory 
rights do not entail a right to secede. On the contrary, they suggest that the 
appropriate solution for dissatisfied groups rests in their full inclusion in the 
pohty, with fiill participation in its decision-making processes.^
As Brilmayer rightly points out, then, self-determination need not be considered as the necessary
basis of secessionist claims since it does not encompass the right to “opt out” of state processes.
She also raises the classical critique — where is the “self’ in self-determination? Since the
identification of peoples is notoriously arbitrary, Brilmayer argues that basing secession on
territorial claims instead self-determination ones provides a more hberal and more consensual
means of determining the right. After all, “[o]ne’s geographical location is more nearly voluntary
than one’s ethnic id e n t i t y .W h a t  Brilmayer neglects however, is the possibihty that ethnic
identify and territorial association go hand in hand. Her point that every secessionist claim must
include a justification of territorial taking is correct. Obviously there are many national groups
which may not make a claim to a discrete piece of territory given their level of assimilation
within the area of the entire state. Thus Brilmayer’s shifted emphasis forces us to reahse the
problematic nature of current understandings of nations and peoples as territorially defined.
Shifting the basis of the right of secession to territory, she seems to think, will make the
assessment of the legitimacy of claims much fairer and simpler. But such a result is far fi-om
clear. Why should it be easier to assess the legitimacy of claims to territory than of claims to
independent nationhood?
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Brilmayer does provide two categories of argument which might indicate the superior 
legitimacy of one party against another over territory. First is the case of conquest or annexation 
in which the wrongdoer is the current state. The second argument involves the action of a third 
party (imperial power) which improperly fixed the borders but is no longer involved in the 
current conflict. Brilmayer illustrates the annexation argument with the example of the Baltic 
Repubhcs and the Soviet Union, and the colonial case with the example of East and West 
Pakistan and Great Britain. She asserts that a territorial fi'amework allows for a proper focus on 
the history of such disputes rather than the simplistic “rights of nations” analysis. It is the 
history of these claims that gives them the normative strength to attain legitimacy. Otherwise, 
all claims are dealt with equally on the basis of whether or not the seceding group constitutes a 
vahd people. If United Nations principles of self-determination are taken hterally, Brilmayer 
asserts, “then Turkish guest workers in Germany have claims on par with black Afiicans 
fighting colonial powers. So static a view of the division of a society into peoples cannot fully 
cq)ture an important normative feature of separatists’ demands, namely that the asserted 
historical grievance confers on it the right to a particular territory.” '^* What Brilmayer does not 
provide is any kind of consistent guidehne for prioritising normative rights. For example, why 
should black Africans fighting colonial powers have greater normative priority than Turkish 
“guest workers” who have been in Germany for several generations and yet continue to be 
refused basic citizenship rights? Presumably Brilmayer’s reply would be that the historical 
association of the black Afiicans to their native soil creates a much stronger claim to territory 
than that of the Turks in Germany. This suggests that normative claims to territory can be 
quantifiable; for example a claim might be “created” if a certain number of years were spent by a 
group on a territory. But if we wished to establish such quantifiable standards for territorial 
benefits, how would we estabhsh a fair international standard? Brilmayer seems to advocate an 
international legal principle of adverse possession for territorial claims. She recognises this 
problem and explicitly provides several factors which should help determine whether the status 
quo or the historical claim has more validity, including 1) length of time since the historical 
grievance occurred, 2) the extent to which the separatist group could keep the controversy ahve, 
3) the extent to which the population in the territory consists of members of the dominant group, 
and 4) the “degree of wrongfulness” of the original grievance itself. These factors are as 
susceptible to difficulties as those of the political philosophers described above. None of them 
would clarify the difficult territorial conflicts in Northern Ireland or Palestine, for example.
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Furthermore, there are two issues which Brilmayer does not discuss which are crucial to an 
understanding of territorial claims. The first is that claims to territory are much more about 
power than they are about rights. It is only because control of territory is the prerequisite for the 
powers of sovereign statehood that groups fight so viciously for control of it. And it is only 
groups which are affihated with statehood that gain recognition in the international sphere. 
Otherwise, why would groups which hve in democratic states where the rights of citizenship 
give them protection and the tools of cultural maintenance nevertheless maintain such tenacious 
separatist struggles? The second issue, glaring by its absence, is the question of the extent to 
which a people is created and identified by its affihation with some territory whether it is 
sovereign or not. Brilmayer writes as if a group’s claims to be a people and its claims over a 
territory can be conceived of separately. In fact, the only groups for which this is true are 
nomadic ones, and they are rarely impUcated in the problems surrounding separatist conflicts.^^
It is a serious oversight to neglect the extent to which national identities are territorially based. 
The relationship between territory and ethnic identity is not simply, as Brilmayer supposes, the 
purpose of keeping the historical grievance ahve year after year, but it is also a constitutive one.
It is precisely because territory provides a basis for identity that such fierce battles are fought 
over it — the same piece of territory may give meaning and identity to more than one group.
Thus the “conquerors” come to feel hke the “natives”, and the aggrieved group may seem 
aggressive in turn, when it attempts to regain control of its homeland. These sentiments are not 
adequately captured by Brilmayer’s use of the technical term “adverse possession”, which 
imphes that one might occupy the territory of a state as a business venture.
Brilmayer admits that her territorial interpretation does not provide easy answers, but 
she claims that it does force us to examine the crucial questions: “When a group seeks to secede, 
it is claiming a right to a particular piece of land, and one must necessarily inquire into why it is 
entitled to that particular piece of land, as opposed to some other piece of land—or to no land at 
aji ”96 jhese are indeed crucial questions, however, a “territorial interpretation” goes very httle 
way in answering them.
Causal Analysis: How Do We Fix the Secession Problem?
The pohtical theorists discussed above share similar approaches to secession in that they 
are concerned with rights under hberal democratic theory and ah ultimately find that secession
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must be permitted under certain circumstances in order to protect these rights. Writers in the
causal analysis category have a shghdy different focus. Their concern is with decreasing the
level of separatist conflict and they therefore tend to see secession both pragmatically, as a
necessary evil, and as a problem which may be solved through careful study. Causal analysts
may also discuss the rights of separatist groups, but their chief concern is with international
poHcy not pohtical theory. While hberal theorists look past the nature of national group identity
to analyse individual rights, causal analysts are more hkely to perceive national identities as an
intransigent stumbling block to confhct resolution. Rather than speaking in terms of marriage
and divorce (a metaphor premised on hberal individuahst assumptions), causal analysts speak in
terms of power relations and violence:
Bloodshed, chaos and suffering tend to accompany the birth of the secessionist 
child. It is hkely to be iUegitimate, spawned in conspiracy and the result of 
rape. The mother country must be dismembered. Maimed fractions must now 
become healthy wholes. Territory is lost, and with it, tenacious memories, 
people and vitahty. Prolonged struggle demorahses ah sections in the confhct 
equahy, polarises and demorahses nearly ah members, creates a garrison 
mentahty, cripples democratic institutions, breeds fanaticism and helplessly 
accepts a distorted existence as normal and inevitable.. .The right to secede is as 
vahd as the capabihty of forcibly wresting territory and people from another 
state.®’
These analysts are drawn to study secession as a phenomenon not because of a concern with 
moral rights but because secession poses a significant problem for pohtics and pohcy in both the 
international and the national spheres. The first instinct for these scholars, then, is to identify 
recurring variables in secessionist cases (the usual suspects are national identity, territory, and 
sometimes economic benefit) and deduce processes which wih ensure the smoothest possible 
resolution and transition to peace. These theorised processes involve judgements of some kind 
by the international community or a speciahy designated United Nations body. Other writers 
have concluded that secession only begets further conflict and that the best chance for a stable 
international order is one in which there is inter-ethnic cooperation and non-state forms of 
pohtical representation.®*
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One of the first writers to discuss secession as a relevant concept on its own was Lee 
Buchheit.Com ing fi’om a legal background, Buchheit sees secession as an integral part of the 
concept of self-determination. Refusing either to state that self-determination is limited to 
arbitrary categories such as decolonisation, or to leave the vahdation of secession to the fixture 
while focusing on nonintervention and use of force norms, Buchheit offers a third approach — a 
balancing test for determining which claims of secession are legitimate and should be allowed to 
proceed. Starting fi^ om the premise that secessionist movements are unhkely to decrease in 
number, Buchheit beheves that setting international standards for the types of secessionist 
claims which can be considered legitimate will moderate both the reactions of external states and 
the tenor of the claims made by separatist groups. His starting assumption is based on a sort 
of state-centred utihtarianism, which requires that “the institution of the existing State will be 
respected, unless to do so would contribute to more international disharmony than would result 
fi’om legitimating the separation of a component group.” ®^^ Buchheit finds that the factors of 
viabihty and “self’-ness for the separatists, and the increased balance of harmony for the world 
community, are not capable of being measured by absolute standards. Since each separatist 
case will contain a different blend of these elements, Buchheit suggests a balancing analysis 
between the interests of international peace and the strength of the separatists’ claim. Although 
he discusses the nature of legitimacy and the possibihties for greater harmony in further detail, 
Buchheit never fully identifies what he means by the concept of world community. This is a fatal 
theoretical weakness for his argument. The attempt to ascertain whether an act will increase 
world harmony will surely fail if the “world community” remains undefined. Hence the 
expectation that this world community should perform the balancing analysis must also fail.
Buchheit’s scheme depends on two factors which are both incapable of determination. 
Neither the subject nor the method is specified in his case by case approach. While Buchheit 
wishes to avoid the problems of theoretical rigidity, his suggestion for determining legitimacy is 
so vague as to distil into a single obvious maxim — that the international community should act 
towards secessionist groups in ways that resolve the situation peacefully and most beneficially 
for all concerned. The normative strength of this argument seems to be based on the premise
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that only those groups which are attempting to secede under conditions which are favourable for
the rest of the international communily will actually have a right to do so. Not only is this
unhelpfiil as a solution to secessionist conflict, but it is of dubious moral value. Furthermore,
Buchheit’s “balancing test” approach seems wildly out of context in the international
community. It is a term borrowed fi’om American constitutional legal analysis, which requires
both a body of law and a body of judges to make adequate use of its principles. Unless there is a
designated body of individuals whose capabihties are recognised and trusted to carry out this
balancing test, it remains a paper solution.
While Buchheit stopped short of proposing a more specific term than “international
community”, another legal scholar, Lawrence Frankel, takes his analysis further. Agreeing
with Buchheit that cases of secession must be decided by a neutral body on an individual basis,
Frankel proposes a UN. Commission which will be triggered as an automatic mechanism by the
petition of organised secessionist groups. The Commission would apply a set of generally
^pHcable standards which should be determined by international consensus:
What is critical...is for there to be clearly enunciated, estabhshed standards for 
when secession should or should not be encouraged. Fortunately, there is 
reason to beheve that principled, legitimate, workable guidelines for evaluating 
secessionist claims can be formulated.
Frankel thus remedies the vagueness of Buchheit’s balancing test, but falls prey to problems of
his own. Asserting that both moral legitimacy and practical politics should be considered in the
determinations of the Commission, Frankel suggests six standards which might find
international consensus. They are a combination of human rights concerns with the
practicalities of territorial control and economic feasibihty. However, what Frankel does not
provide is a reahstic assessment of why the reports from his Commission will carry any more
weight than those of the current Human Rights Commission, which is influential but hardly
capable of resolving major conflicts. Frankel asserts that the recommendations will carry great
moral force through the effects of “world opinion” since “[t]he hypocrisy of states voting against
an impartial, carefiilly justified recommendation would be uncomfortably apparent.” ®^^ Although
he concedes that further UN. action might be necessary if individual states refuse to take action.
102
Lawrence M. Frankel, “International Law of Secession: New Rules for a New Era,” Houston Journal o f  International 
Law 14 (1992): 521-564.
103
Ibid., 548.
104
Ibid., 560 note 116.
60
While Frankel goes some way towards specifying the kind of system to which Buchheit alludes, 
his framework remains httle more than a variation on the international diplomatic means 
currently existing. Frankel rehes upon the moral coercion of an estabhshed regime put in place 
by an international consensus. But in the absence of any serious treatment of the estabhshment 
of international norms, he fails to provide evidence that such a consensus on secession might 
ever be reached (especially given the tendency of states to see it as a vital threat to their interests) 
or that states might heed the recommendations of such a commission.
The writer who perhaps best exemphfies the approach to secession as “a necessary evil” 
is Alexis Herachdes. While writing from within the Western hberal perspective, he is far less 
concerned with whether secession is a right than with confronting the reahties of separatist 
movements in the international system. Herachdes examines three possibihties for a 
normative approach to secession and discards two of them. First, he considers the “Pandora 
Box” option — which permits unilateral secession for those capable of achieving it and which 
ahows outside states to become involved as they see fit. The logic of this approach is something 
akin to a pohtical version of the survival of the fittest, but with the additional coroUary that “the 
unfit won’t try”. Not surprisingly, Herachdes finds this prospect destabihsing and bhnd to the 
merits of each prospective case, “rewarding mihtary prowess and diplomatic adroitness as if 
‘might’ could be ‘right’. N e x t ,  Herachdes examines the “Window of Opportunify” approach, 
which basically describes the post-war hmited-permission regime in which separation was 
possible only through partition or by mutual agreement. Herachdes beheves this framework 
actually lasted until 1990 and the break-up of the Eastern Bloc. The “Window of Opportunity” 
tradition, Herachdes suggests, could be updated by adding an emphasis on minority protections 
and various forms of federation. Herachdes maintains that this scheme is unjust on the basis of 
unequal treatment of certain groups, since the idea cannot be maintained “that an arbitrarily 
carved colony or a unit of a federation which does not suffer inequahty should have more of a 
right to independence than an ethnic or regional group which suffers systematic and flagrant 
discrimination...with no reahstic prospect of change.” ®^’ Lronicahy, Herachdes’ distaste for this 
type of discrimination cannot be cured by any framework regarding the disposition of state 
territory, since the historical legitimacy of claims to territory can be disputed indefinitely.
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Heraclides’ final plan is the one which he advocates — that of allowing secession in 
specified cases. He retains the emphasis on the protection of distinct cultures and suggests, in 
addition, a method for ascertaining the legitimacy of unilateral independence. Herachdes also 
recognises a variety of interesting possibihties for minority self-rule without the need for 
secession, calhng them “ethnosocial contracts”. Such possibihties include an agreement on the 
part of a minority group to remain loyal to the state, or a non-secessionist oath, in exchange for 
mutual acceptance and accommodation. An ethnosocial contract, according to Herachdes, might 
also provide for non-secessionist autonomy or for some type of communal federation for the 
minority group. Ultimately, Herachdes sees the need for a specific fi'amework which would 
identify justifiable cases of secession. His criteria sound famihar. Justifiable cases must be those 
where there is ahen domination. Specific circumstances which would justify a unilateral 
secession must include 1) the existence of a sizeable compact community strongly in favour of 
statehood; 2) a pattern of exploitation on the part of the state against this group; 3) cultural 
rejection or attempts to forcibly assimilate this group on the part of the state; 4) the refusal of the 
state to consider any form of internal autonomy for the group. Although Herachdes’ step-by- 
step analysis for legitimating secession attempts to consider the needs of all parties, it stiU fails to 
account for the poverty of secession itself as a solution to pohtical problems, and it leaves some 
confusion about its apphcation.
If a state neglects the needs of a minority group within its borders, does that group have 
the right to secede? What exactly would constitute “neglect” in such a case? Since secession is 
widely considered to be disruptive, is it really a desirable approach in such a case — especially 
recaUing Brilmayer’s discussion of the tacit nature of pohtical consent and the right of exit?
Most glaringly, is it fair to grant the right of secession to aggrieved minority groups within a 
state simply because they have the good fortune to reside in concentrated numbers on dehneated 
areas of territory? What a right of secession actuahy amounts to in this case is a right to a group 
identity and a state fi'ozen at the moment of the vesting of that right. But cultural groups and 
their interaction with territory cannot be fixed in this way. Populations have been moving and 
mixing over the surface of the globe since time began. Now that travel has become faster, safer, 
easier, and cheaper, it seems hopeless to assume that the only means of pohtical organisation 
available is one in which territoriahy bounded sovereign states must mirror the location of 
cultural and national groups as they adapt and change. Pohtical fi*eedom can be manifested and 
protected in other ways.
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The writer who best epitomizes the causal analysis approach is pohtical scientist,
Donald Horowitz.^®® Horowitz’s concern, with the causes of ethnic confhct in general, covers a 
much broader category of pohtical and social relations, yet he does provide a fairly focused 
analysis of secessionist confhct. From the very preface of his substantial volume, Horowitz 
espouses a positivist empirical methodology — that is, he works on the assumption that tiiere 
are objective patterns of ethnic confhct which are discoverable. Once having discovered these 
patterns, he aims to provide an analysis of methods of reducing confhct and their effectiveness. 
To that end, Horowitz asks the classic causal questions: “What accounts for the emergence of 
secession? What kinds of groups attempt to secede and under what circumstances? What 
accounts for the success of such movements, and what effects does success have, both in the 
secessionist state and in the rump state?”“ ® Given his aspiration to ascertain the natural 
patterns of ethnic confhct, Horowitz’s procedure seems somewhat arbitrary. While obviously 
weU-versed in many different histories and cultures, and able to provide numerous examples of 
separatist movements and secession attempts, Horowitz does not provide relevant data to back 
up his stated categories. Quoting from Immanuel Wallerstein’s comments on the hkehhood of 
relative wealth strengthening a secessionist attempt, as it did in Katanga, Horowitz borrows the 
hnk between ethnic claims and the economic characteristics of the regions involved in order to 
create a matrix indicative of potential secessionist groups.
Noticing that many wealthy regions made no effort to secede, while many poorer regions 
did, Horowitz tries to expand Wallerstein’s remark into a more explanatory framework. His 
matrix therefore counter poses “backward” and “advanced” regions against “backward” and 
“advanced” groups. Within Horowitz’s analysis, “backward” groups are those with lower 
average education and per capita income, and “advanced” groups are ones which have generally 
higher education and higher levels of “non-agricultural employment”. Regions can be 
characterised, in this analysis, by the relative economies measured by per capita regional income. 
These data are in fact, according to Horowitz himself, difficult to come by, especially for regions 
in Africa and Asia. Nonetheless, Horowitz insists that “identification of backward and advanced 
regions is not difficult.”“  ^ Even if one wiUingly accepts that the determination of backward (as 
opposed to advanced) groups and regions is straightforward without precise assessment data, it
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would still be difficult to understand how Horowitz selects his “groups”. His matrix includes 
twenty-one potential secessionist groups in four different categories, depending upon whether 
the groups are backward or advanced, and whether their regional economies are backward or 
advanced. Interestingly, Horowitz does not explain how he selected these groups from the 
myriads of cases he discusses throughout the book. He also includes six examples which are 
problematic both in terms of being distinct groups, and because they have never had a strong 
secessionist movement. If they have not had a strong secessionist movement, why should these 
groups be categorized within a matrix of potential secessionist groups? If the lack of a 
secessionist movement is no barrier to the analysis, then Horowitz might as well have included 
every territorially discrete group he could legitimately label as “ethnic” for the sake of 
comprehensive analysis. Notwithstanding the richness of the empirical observations throughout 
the book, there are notable lapses in his categorization of secessionist groups, specifically in 
examples from Western Europe and the Americas. The Québécois, for example, are missing 
from the matrix, as are the Catalans — although Basques are mentioned, as an advanced group 
within an advanced region. Additionally, many groups are included which have severe internal 
differences and/or divergent goals which makes them problematic for consideration as single 
distinct separatist groups. These include the Southern Sudanese and the Kurds in Iraq.
Horov/itz readily admits that his framework overlooks certain difficulties for the sake of 
simpUfication. He states, for example, that deciding upon regional categories on the basis of per 
capita income excludes relevant information on varying levels of development between rural 
areas and urban centres. He also acknowledges that he does not account for the various 
differences within ethnic groups concerning choices about secession, but will rather deal “with 
central tendencies or merely with the outcomes of such debates.”^^ What remains unclear is 
how this simphfied categorization can lead to the proposed goal of determining the causes of 
secession and the indicators of its probable success. Horowitz states that “[t]he interplay of 
relative group position and relative regional position determines the emergence of separatism” 
but he also wishes to “reject direct causal relationships between regional economic disparity and 
ethnic secession.”"^ This confijsing formulation obscures the question of whether or not 
Horowitz can make any predictive or prescriptive claims on the basis of his matrix. He seems to 
want a foothold in both camps, claiming that regional position is a causal element in 
secessionism, but that it does not predict secessionism directly, rather it “conditions the claims
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ethnie groups make and their response to the rejection of those claims/'"'* What, then, can one 
conclude from the juxtaposition of these ethnic group variables?
Horowitz summarizes his claims in a second matrix, showing that the “backward” and 
“advanced” group and regional categories reveal tendencies in terms of types of pohtical claims 
they make, the events (précipitants) which will most hkely indicate rejection of group claims, the 
calculations each group tends to make, and the timing and relative frequency of actual 
secessionist claims. Thus the most hkely secessionist groups are “backward groups in backward 
regions”, while the least hkely to secede are groups (both backward and advanced) in “advanced 
regions”. There are no calculations provided of how many groups were considered in total, and 
which ones were placed in which categories. Horowitz simply presents his summary, conceding 
that every category has negative cases. Given the methods with which the matrices have been 
constructed, one concludes that their main purpose is descriptive rather than predictive. Despite 
a detailed discussion of the nature of ethnicity elsewhere in the book, Horowitz is forced to 
organise his analysis of secession in ways which take ethnic groups for granted as stable, 
unproblematic, and self-evident. Because of his chosen causal aims and methodology, Horowitz 
must ignore the very features of ethnic groups and secessionism which make them difficult to 
understand and predict in the first place. Classifications based on empirical methods always 
involve a cost in detail and abstraction, and these hmitations are acknowledged. But Horowitz 
attempts to derive a causal explanation from a categorization, and this is where he fails. These 
methods yield a framework which is not effective in explaining a number of secessionist cases 
very well if at all. It also fails to account for the rarity of successfiil secessionist attempts in 
general. Horowitz argues that it is not the international principle of territorial integrity and the 
legitimacy of boundaries which has stood in the way of successful secession attempts. Rather, 
he concludes, it is the fact that intervening states provide inadequate support for secessionist 
groups, central governments exert great efforts to defeat them, and that the groups themselves 
suffer from internal problems. But it is precisely the strength of the territorial principle which 
moderates the aid of intervening parties, and increases the efforts of central governments to put 
down secessionist attempts. Also, it is international recognition of the legitimacy of a 
secessionist movement which will result in the creation of a legitimate state — or not. Thus the 
international community and the principle of territorial integrity play crucial — actually 
constitutive —  roles in the success and failure of secessionist movements. A framework which
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does not consider them (and which ignores the contingency of group identity and group 
decision-making) has hmited explanatory value.
Conclusion: Re-Placing Politics
The pohtical philosophy approach which focuses on the rights of secession is essentially 
an outgrowth of the philosophical search for a good life and the hberal assumption that 
individuals must be free to determine (and consent to) the good hfe for themselves. Secession, 
however, assumes that a sizeable group of individuals agrees that a certain precise type of state 
(territory, population, structure, etc.) is necessary to preserve their abihty to hve the good life. 
Given the fact that such decisions are extremely difficult to reach precise agreement on, and that 
the result of imprecision is the denial of similar rights to those who disagree with separatism, it 
is far from obvious that secession really provides an assurance of the hberal right of free pohtical 
association. The main source of inconsistency of the frameworks put forward by secession’s 
apologists is the lack of protection for the rights of the groups which become trapped either 
within the seceding territory or which remain behind in the parent state. Such groups are the 
“children” of the metaphorical pohtical divorce espoused by these theorists, and their best 
interests are as difficult to protect as those of the children of real broken marriages. Rights 
analysis which gives no consideration to the contingent and constructed nature of identities wih 
never be able to fully account for the plurahty of individual needs and preferences. Such “rights” 
then, require that those who claim them essentiahse and privilege parts of their identities to the 
exclusion of others. This injustice is not accounted for in moral rights analysis. The arguments 
of pohtical philosophers regarding the rights of secession are therefore internally inconsistent. 
Moreover, they do not take into account the practical weakness of secession in that it does not 
provide a long-term solution to confhct. Secession does not “solve” problems of group confhct, 
it merely redraws the boundaries around them.
The causal analysis approach to secession also yields confiision. Regarding secession as 
an objective problem which must be studied and thereby minimized or “solved” results in 
methods which can at best yield a case-by-case approach. Because causal analysis can not 
account for the contingency of ethnic or group identities, and because it must necessarily reduce 
the difficulties of identity and group decision-making into the simphstic model of unitary actor 
behaviour, it provides only shallow descriptive accounts. The identities of actors in secessionist 
conflicts are too intertextual and constructed to be captured completely within the presumption 
of state boundaries and pohtical freedom upon which secession is premised. Presenting 
independent statehood as the sole legitimate pohtical form for separatist groups only perpetuates
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the conditions which allow nationalism to flourish in its most virulent forms. Once this is
recognised, secession becomes illusory, both as a solution to intra-state conflict and as a means
of protecting political freedom.
The problem which both of the theoretical approaches examined here share is what
Bonnie Honig calls “the displacement of pohtics.” Honig argues that pohtical theorists of all
persuasions have long attempted to remove conflict and contingency — the pohtical — from
pohtical theory. Pohtical theorists
converge in their assumption that success hes in the ehmination from a regime 
of dissonance, resistance, conflict, or struggle. They confine pohtics 
(conceptually and territoriahy) to the juridical, administrative, or regulative 
tasks of stabihzing moral and pohtical subjects, building consensus, 
maintaining agreements, or consohdating communities and identities. They 
assume that the task of pohtical theory is to resolve institutional questions, to 
get pohtics right, over, and done with, to free modem subjects and their sets of 
arrangements of pohtical conflict and instabihty ."^
By assuming the need for stable subjects and institutions, by depohticising their theories of
secession, many of the pohtical theorists discussed above must take for granted the very
contestations and constructions which make secession what it is. That is, they assume the
stabihty of the minority and majority identity relationships in question, they assume the value
and need of historical justification of claims, and they assume that territorial boundaries
necessarily protect and secure the identities of national groups. By making these assumptions,
pohtical theorists shut out the very contingencies which are most at stake in secession. The
failure to recognise or account for the ongoing unstable nature of identity formations results in
theories which effectively lock identities in place, perpetuating a different kind of violence to the
multiphcity of the self and faihng to provide for the remainders caused by “the self s perpetual
ill-fittedness” to estabhshed ident i t ies.Engaging with Nietzsche, Honig suggests that the
contestations of pohtics are necessary in order to continuously call into question the
sedimentation of moral concepts. In Nietzsche’s terms, resistance to such sedimentation is the
equivalent of the battle between hfe and death.
To attribute particular features, quahties, or moods to the world is to attempt to 
fix and order a world characterized above ah by an impulse to change, although 
moving in no particular direction, an impulse Nietzsche identifies with hfe itself, 
sometimes calhng it wih to power.
God, virtue, the ego, and the subject are not given; they are interpretive 
creations, fictions. To insist on their givenness (or rightness or expressiveness)
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is necessarily to conceal their varied, violent, haphazard, and tenuously 
constructed origins.
Secession, as the embodiment of conflict, must not be ordered into stable categories, nor should 
it be seen as the product of given forces such as identity, history and territoriality. All of these 
forces are the contingent and unstable outcomes of the impulse to change. The most productive 
way to analyse secession, then, is to call its assumptions into question, to loosen its 
sedimentation in order to free the creative powers brought forth by an awareness of politics and 
the will to power. The rest of this thesis will attempt to do just that, by unsetthng the settled and 
resisting the will to order.
This chapter has examined and demonstrated the difficulties of current secession 
literature both in justifying secession as a right and in attempting to solve it as a problem of 
ethnic conflict. These approaches cannot achieve their aims because they continue to view 
secession as an established feature of international politics. It may be good or bad or neither, but 
it exists and must be examined almost as a structure. Such treatment, by institutionalising 
secession, creates a theoretically closed space within which to analyse it. By questioning the 
roots of territoriality as a concept, and by analysing the conditions for secession’s possibility, 
one can view secession more consfructively — not as a self-evident feature of international 
politics, but as an outcome of contemporary international impulses. Attempting to analyse 
secession without taking this step is a Sisyphean endeavour, not only fruitless but bhnd to the 
conditions of generation and thus of possible change. Secession, then, should be regarded as a 
troubhng symptom of the international system which should induce us to make a wider analysis 
of the process of its construction. In the next chapter, I will penetrate the roots of the concept of 
secession through a conceptual history of terri tori ahty and the rise of the modem(ist) state.
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HISTORICISING SECESSION/DECONSTRUCTING TERRITORY
Political scientists have long recognised that the term “nation-state” is only marginally 
accurate as a description of contemporary pohtical structures. While closely entwined in 
modernity, the concepts of the state and the nation were not bom together. However, both can 
be represented as subjective contexts for pohtical identity — constmctions of the modem world. 
Modem individuals are embedded in interrelated and identity possibihties endlessly engaged in 
the process of becoming different; and regardless of which definition of nation is operative, 
individuals may identify with or feel sympathy for a number of various identities either 
simultaneously or consecutively. R.B. J. Walker describes modem pohtical identities as 
“fractured and dispersed among a multiphcity of sites, a condition sometimes attributed to a 
specifically post-modem experience but one that has been a famihar, though selectively 
forgotten, characteristic of modem pohtical hfe for several c e n t u r i e s . I t  is ironic, then, that 
the intemational pohtical system is based upon a presumption which privileges identities that are 
fixed arbitrarily and extemally by territory and residence, thus limiting national identities to a 
concept of the state which apparently defines the outer hmits of pohtical possibihty. National 
identities are too contingent and too infinite to be confined by the arbitrary and finite boundaries 
of the state. Onora O’Neill concludes that “[t]he concepts by which people define who they are 
— in which they articulate their sense of identity — are ah of them concepts without sharp 
borders, and hence cannot provide a basis for sharp demarcations such as pohtical boundaries
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between states.””  ^ Thus while boundaries may make sense for practical administrative 
purposes, there is a strong disjunction between the strictly controlled territorial border and the 
boundless receptivity of human identities to the impulses of change.
Political theorists forge the link between national identity and territory with the concept 
of sovereignty. As the defining characteristic of statehood, sovereignty has become the focal 
point of the nation/state/identity nexus. This definition is problematic because identities cannot 
be constrained to finite categories without dangerously overlooking, and thus de-legitimating, 
certain diverse categories. These overlooked categories are the “remainders” which become focal 
points for contestation (often violent) of the categories themselves. Furthermore, the tenuous 
identity/territory hnk rehes upon the concept of sovereignty as territorial control. It is critical, 
then, to recaU that neither states, nations nor sovereignty are fixed historical entities. According 
to Walker:
The patterns of inclusion and exclusion we now take for granted are historical 
innovations. The principle of state sovereignty is the classic expression of those 
patterns, an expression that encourages us to beheve that either those patterns 
are permanent or that they must be erased in favour of some kind of global 
cosmopohs ...Its fixing of unity and diversity...or inside and outside, or space 
and time is not natural. Nor is it inevitable. It is a crucial part of the practices 
of all modem states, but they are not natural or inevitable either.
Just as many state boundaries were determined incidentally by mihtary battle hnes rather than by
agreement, so the concepts of “state”, “territory” and “sovereignty” themselves are historically
contingent. These basic pohtical concepts, which we so freely use, have developed and changed
in response to human patterns of domination and organisation. From feudal princes, to the
enhghtenment principle of popular sovereignty as manifested in the French and American
Revolutions, to the 20th century incarnation of nationahy self-determined states, each age has
understood the meanings of these terms in its own contextual way.
Successive manifestations of sovereignty and statehood have produced and have been
produced by changing pohtical identities in a dynamic inter-relationship. For example, an early
20th century shift from popular sovereignty to national sovereignty as the basis of state
legitimacy mirrors an emphasis on the concept of the coUective as opposed to the individual self
as the basis for pohtical identity. As James Mayah points out, there are no naturahy given
national boundaries for the coUective self and thus: “the nation is ultimately a group whose
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identity is forged by a particular interpretation of its own h i s t o r y / ' T h e  boundaries of such a 
nation, then, are hmited only by the collective imaginations of its members. The boundless 
vitahly of the collectively imagined nation puts it on a coUision course with the intrinsically 
hmited nature of the modem conception of the territorial state. Contemporary notions of 
statehood and nationhood are incapable of producing a perfect fit. This is not to suggest that 
states cannot be formed with nations in mind and vice versa, or that there are no possibihties for 
the growth of a “civic” national identity within the boundaries of the state. The problem arises 
with the introduction of the conception of sovereignty itself as territorial. Sovereignty over 
territory has come to symbohse privilege and superiority in the pohtics of the intemational such 
that “it is almost impossible for a people to feel equal to others if it does not enjoy the privileges 
of sovereign statehood.... [ A] s long as state sovereignty ahows for the subjugation of peoples, it 
wih continue to be sought by those who fear its use against them.”^^ Because territorial 
sovereignty has become a badge of intemational legitimacy and a symbol of power, it aggravates 
the disjunction between nations and states. Secessionist movements are the inevitable result. 
Territory has not always been, and does not have to be, the source of sovereign legitimacy. 
Likewise, territory has not always been, and does not have to be, the foundation and security of 
national identities.
The failure to account for the dynamic of the interaction between territorial sovereignty, 
national identities and secessionist movements within the hberal framework is a theoreticahy 
fatal flaw. How can hberal theory claim to justify secession when its analysis is founded on the 
rights of the individual? Furthermore, how can hberal theory form a coherent framework when 
the identities of individuals are taken as fixed? Not only does this approach fail to address the 
plurahty of group identities available to individuals, but it assumes that individuals wih remain 
within groups and thus that group characteristics wih not alter. Otherwise, why would 
secession be worth justifying for any group, given the violent tendencies involved? In fact, since 
identities continue to change, territorial solutions — such as secession — cannot provide long­
term peace or guarantee rights. The focus must shift to strategies of social accommodation 
which ahow forms of pohtical control to be sociahy rather than territoriahy determined. Before 
this can happen, we must problematise the concept of territory and the many meanings with 
which it has been endowed in order to free ourselves from the discursive restraints of late
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twentieth century understandings. It is only with this intellectual liberation, or temporary 
forgetting, that we can be open to creative thinking about the problems of secession.
Understanding Territory
The very term “territory” comes loaded with a myriad of contextual understandings and 
historical associations. What do we really mean when we refer to the territorial state? Or to 
territorial sovereignty? Understanding this concept is much more complex than it would first 
appear. As Nietzsche wisely counselled, nothing which has a history can be defined. All 
definitions are products of their time and space. Just as forms of sovereignty and statehood have 
undergone numerous metamorphoses, it is obvious that territory has played different roles 
throughout the course of human history — its meaning is highly contextual. Territory, then, 
may be examined in a similar fashion as sovereignty — through conceptual history. Concepts 
reveal historical experience and thus close analysis of conceptual terminology leads to an 
understanding of contextual meaning. Jens Bartelson compares sovereignty, as a concept, to 
fire — a substance which has never been scientifically defined but whose effects are both 
devastating and Hfe-giving. Bartelson proposes an analysis of how sovereignty is spoken of 
rather than a questioning of what it is.^ '^* hnphcit in this approach is a problematisation of any 
foundational assumptions about the concept. If we are to understand territory through analysing 
the manner in which it has been discussed, we are revealing an epistemological commitment to 
ambiguity. Ironically, then, we can only gain clearer understanding of modem concepts through 
a procedure which is antithetical to modernity.
The examination of texts which reveal historical concepts appears to be a logical and 
simple procedure; it is not. Unhke sovereignty and fire, territory may be touched, walked on, 
measured, quantified and captured in numerous physical ways. Like all physical objects, it is 
both an abstract and a concrete noun — a signifier and a signified. Unhke sovereignty and fire, 
territory is intricately bound up — as space — with the very existence of each human being. No 
one can fail to occupy some of it. But this does not make territory either ahistorical or 
primordial. Some have argued that since human history has been written in terms of 
civihzations which occupy and defend specific territories, this must indicate the enduring, pre-
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social, nature of territoriality. This perspective assumes that because certain groups of people 
have always occupied a certain place their concept of that space (their concept of territory) has 
remained constant. Such an assertion confuses the idea that all people must occupy a space (and 
thus have a high hkehhood of forming attachments to that space) with the notion that the 
relationship people maintain with a designated space can be some kind of objective constant.
To assert that territoriahty as a source of pohtical legitimacy is primordial is to assert that ah the 
things which are imphcated by territoriahty — human social and pohtical relationships — are 
also somehow primordial or t imeless.Certainly,  they are not.
How then are territory and space related? What is the question of territoriahty? The 
“secret” of territoriahty, in Bartelson’s phrase, is the transformation of space from something 
which must be occupied to something which must be controUed. In other words, the question of 
territory depends upon the question of how space became pohticized, transformed into the 
prerequisite for pohtical legitimacy (in the form of the state). There is no history of this 
transformation, and we are left with a chicken and egg conundrum trying to determine which 
came first: society or territorial pohty. In other words, did structured pohtical entities arise before 
they came to be associated with specific territorial parcels or did territorially specific societies 
evolve into structured pohties? How did space become pohticized? As Bartelson points out 
“what comes first in this rather elhptical chain of development seems theoretically undecidable, 
unless we quite uncriticaUy assume some exogenous shock in the dawn of statehood, hfting 
European man up from some primitive form of hfe to a more developed stage of spatial 
p o h t i c s . T h u s  any attempt for complete mapping of the concept of territory must be thwarted 
for lack of a discernible origin for the very concept itself. It is perhaps the better part of 
inteUectual valour to focus instead on the discernible effects of this conceptual transformation of 
space. Even if we accept that the physical nature of territory as an object gives it certain lasting 
characteristics, the fact that territory has been perceived differently (pohticahy, rehgiously, 
materially, etc.) by various societies at various times gives it a social (constructed) meaning 
which is as abstract as any philosophical concept.
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The etymology of territory, unsurprisingly, turns out to be both unsettled and 
fascinating.^^* It has possible origins both in the Latin terratorium meaning earth {terra), and 
terrere meaning to frighten (suggesting territorium as a place from which people are warned 
off).^^ Early references to territory as an administrative unit occurred in the fifteenth century 
when it was used both to refer to the land surrounding a town which is under its jurisdiction, and 
to the lands of a ruler. In the seventeenth century, the term’s usage also included references to 
regions with undefined boundaries. And by the eighteenth century, the term was occurring in 
legal documents regarding jurisdiction and the state. The United States Constitution, ratified in 
1789, gave Congress the power to make all necessary Rules “respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States.”^^® Ironically, contemporary usage of the term includes 
both the land which makes up a sovereign state’s territory and a non-sovereign entity, non-self- 
governing territory, which is administratively subject to another state. The meaning which 
partially emerges from these various examples of territory is one of ancient and widespread use. 
Territory has generally referred to a specific type of space — a particular area of earth/land 
{terra) which has been categorized or mapped in some fashion so that it can no longer be 
considered unknown {terra incognita). The act of mapping and categorizing is, of course, a 
means of exerting control over such space. Hence territory is a place where one is “warned oft”, 
it is a place surrounding a town which has local jurisdiction, it is a piece of land which has been 
mapped and settled but which is not a state, and it is also the extent of the land which is 
controlled by a state’s “internal” jurisdiction and which thus defines the borders of its 
sovereignty and of its citizens. Territory means all of these things. All of these things mean 
some form of control over land.
These understandings do not seem to contradict the thesis that territoriahty is a 
primordial social form. But there is a crucial distinction to make. A simple shift to the derivative 
word form yields profound semantic consequences. Territory is a word with a basic meaning 
which probably pre-dates written human history. It refers to the very condition of physical 
existence — that is to the habitation of a particular space. Because every human being must 
occupy space, and because humans are social beings who tend to occupy space in groups, the
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concept of mapping space is one which may be considered to be of very cognitive and linguistic 
ancient origin. It is important to note here that nothing in the meaning of territory itself requires 
the existence of either concrete physical borders or ownership. Territory as mapped or controlled 
land is not even inconsistent with nomadic social patterns since nomads do not continually roam 
in unknown places but instead form distinctive and repetitive cycles. The profound difference in 
meaning occurs with the simple addition of an ending meaning “of or pertaining to”. The simple 
grammatical process of going from noun to adjective creates a very different meaning. While 
territory can be as simple as mapping and categorizing a piece of land, activity which is 
territorial presumes some kind of behaviour which is already based on territory. Territorial 
behaviour — territoriality — is one step removed from territory and already contains 
assumptions about territory. It describes not the simple designation of space, but the behaviour 
patterns which emerge from the pohtical use (the occupation) of territory. Territoriality thus 
requires territory to be definitively bounded rather than loosely so, and thereby creates the 
conditions for the physical exclusivity of people. PoUtics may take place within a territory and 
yet be non-territorial pohtics. Such politics may be based on personality, on class, kinship, or 
other form, and while territory is necessary as the ground on which such pohtics occur, it is not 
the fundamental basis of the system. Territorial politics, on the other hand, are those which 
require the control of territory as the very basis of legitimacy. In this case, territory is not simply 
a location — it is a prize and a prerequisite. It is territoriality, which cannot be considered to be 
of ancient origin. Terri tori ahty assumes that pohtics depends upon the control of a dehneated 
space. It is no accident that the term does not enter common usage until the nineteenth century.
The clearest iUustration of the modem manifestation of pohticized space as territoriahty 
is through the legal definition of statehood. According to customary international law a state 
must include a territory, population and government. This territory must be weU-defined since 
“[t]he legal competence of states and the rules for their protection depend on and assume the 
existence of a stable, physicaUy dehmited, homeland.”^^  ^ Indeed, State leaders themselves 
codified the criteria in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States which 
declared that a state should possess a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, 
and the capacity to enter relations with other states. These criteria are accepted as generally 
indicating the customary international standard for the requirements of statehood. Since 
recognition of statehood is a domestic matter and tends to be highly pohtical, the apphcation of 
these criteria have been tried in several respects. The matter of a defined territory has already
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been called into question. However, even in finding that a state may be recognized with its
borders under dispute, the international community accepted the deeply rooted assumption that
the entire state system rests upon the foundation of territorial legitimacy. In the debate over
whether or not to admit Israel to the United Nations in 1948, the following argument was made:
The reason for the rule that one of the necessary attributes of a State is that it 
shall possess territory is that one cannot contemplate a State as a kind of 
disembodied spirit.... [TJhere must be some portion of the earth’s surface which 
its people inhabit and over which its Government exercises authority.
The assumption of the necessity of territory for the existence of a state, as revealed in this
argument, indicates the operation of an extremely strong conception of territoriality — or the
complete territorialization of politics. The statement above asserts, with an interesting and
recurring metaphor, that the idea of a “disembodied” state cannot even enter the imagination.
And yet it was not always the case. The “body” of the State was not always seen in such
concrete and territorial terms. While social entities such as tribes, kingdoms, empires, and states
have always, of necessity, occupied territory, the derivation of pohtical legitimacy fi'om territorial
control is a relatively recent matter. In the next section I will analyse the concepts of territory
and territoriahty in historical context, with an eye to the clearer understanding of the former and
the modem development of the latter.
States Taking Place: History and the Territorialization of Politics
One of the difficulties of conceptual historical method is the struggle against 
“presentism” in the interpretation of terms which have remained static while the meanings 
attached to them have changed. Thus words such as state, people and territory occur in the 
Renaissance texts of writers such as Machiavelh, More and Hobbes, whose existence and 
circumstances bore httle resemblance to contemporary conditions. What did they mean when 
they used these terms? More importantly, what impact did these meanings have on political 
patterns? While the concept of the state could certainly be interpreted to refer to delineated 
entities occupying and controlling territory during the Renaissance, the states of that period were 
not precisely those of today. For example, the political system was not territorial in the sense 
discussed above. The main argument of this chapter is that territoriahty in the twentieth century 
arises fi’om a specific conception of territory that links it to the identity of the citizens, and it thus 
depends upon the rise of nationahst sentiment and popular sovereignty. The concepts of state 
and territory found in these early texts are ones in which territory is a source (and a symbol) of
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power, but not of identity or legitimacy. Thus there is an open-endedness to the classical 
concept of statehood. Territorial borders were approximate and negotiable. Princes could fight, 
marry, and bargain for more territory and greater pohtical power. While these states or duchies 
or principahties were certainly territorial in the sense of being dehneated territories under rule, 
they were not territorial states in the sense of being necessary for the creation and maintenance 
of national identity. The archetype of such a fiiUy territorial state is a creature of the twentieth- 
century: the non-interventionist, anti-imperialist member of the international society of equals. 
The greatest impact of this concept of territoriahty is a fuhy developed sense of the border as the 
beginning and end of national identity. Thus the territorial state seeks to stop both itself and 
others at its border. It wishes not only to defend against intrusion, but to avoid invasion and 
thereby incorporation of anything outside or other than itself. This conception of the territorial 
state is one which rehes heavily upon (and which in turn contributes to) the concept of national 
identity. Given this understanding of the changes wrought by territoriahty, it is clear why 
secession was not possible before the nineteenth century, and why it fuhy blossomed as an 
international concern in the twentieth. The acquisition of territory prior to this time was not an 
act which created or destroyed national identities. International relations were a kind of 
statecraft played as a game by aristocrats who were bom or fought into its ranks rather than 
legitimated through pohtical consent. Legitimacy was inherited or patronised. The people were 
largely irrelevant. Territoriahty began to occur when the people started to have an identity, when 
they started to share an abstract sense of belonging — the “imagined community. The 
territorial state arises fi’om the identification of a people with a territory as a basis for pohtical 
legitimacy. Thus the story of territoriahty is indeed intertwined with the concepts of class 
struggle, the industrial revolution, hteracy, and the philosophy of individual rights. Within the 
scope of this thesis, however, the emphasis wiU be on the historical and pohtical understandings 
of territoriahty as revealed in the assumptions occurring in representative texts.
Dante’s Monarchy
Like any writer, the authors of the texts examined here were responding to the currents 
of their age. The eminent thinkers discussed here are not chosen because they accurately 
represent the pohtics of their age, but rather because they represent the reflections of what it was 
possible to think in their time. They are presented, then, as the problem solvers of their ages, 
attempting to solve questions of pohtical identity as they were present in their day, just as —
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today — we consider secession as a response to problems of political identity. The impossibility 
of secession as a plausible response for these writers only emphasises the distinctiveness of our 
contemporary conceptions of sovereignty as deeply territorial.
Dante 'mote Monarchy as a strong argument in favour of the power of the Holy Roman 
Emperor, “the Monarch”, over that of the Pope. Dante equated the papal bid for pohtical power 
with the disintegration of the Empire and thus of peace. He makes a universahst argument 
which would seem modernist if it were not for Dante’s assumption of Christendom as the 
obvious basis for human commonahty. Universahsm under one monarch is the only system 
which ensures justice, hberty and peace for all, Dante asserts. The image Dante creates is one of 
harmony and wholeness: “mankind is most one when the whole human race is drawn together 
into complete unity, which can only happen when it is subordinate to one Prince.”"^ Notably, 
Dante speaks not only of Christendom, but of the entire human race —  equating humanity with 
Christianity in a particularly late Medieval way. Local identities, languages and customs, are 
irrelevant to his conception of the appropriate ruhng structure. Dante argues that the Emperor’s 
political legitimacy stems from approval by God, “as should be obvious”. But Dante also 
presents numerous practical arguments for universal rule. Throughout the course of the work, it 
becomes increasingly clear that he abhors disunity. The modem international system with its 
anarchical relationship among states would have signified the utter collapse of human goodness 
for Dante. He sees in the person of the Emperor a natural judge over the disputes of princes, 
believing that “Justice is at its strongest only under a Monarch; therefore Monarchy or Empire is 
essential if the world is to attain perfect order. The secret to order and justice, for Dante, is 
the power of the Monarch to “render each his due”. Thus Dante’s universahst conception of 
order is not only non-territorial, but antithetical to a terri tori ahst order. For Dante, the Monarch, 
by having no territorial hmits — “unhke other princes, such as the Kings of Castile and Aragon, 
whose jurisdictions are hmited by one another’s frontiers” — would have no wish to acquire 
new territories and would be unclouded by unjust thoughts and warhke desires. Dante firmly 
beheved that the breakup of the Empire would spell pohtical disaster. But even this dichotomy 
was not between terri tori ahst states and the empire — for the states of the fourteenth century 
were not such exclusivist entities. Although Dante was arguing against a nearly foregone
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conclusion, the result of a weakened Emperor was not the creation of modem territorial states,
but the consohdation of local princely powers. Although their territories and jurisdictions were
defined, these states had no meaning independent of the various princes who used them to
extend their power. It was the chaos of all the overlapping monarchs that led Dante to argue so
passionately for the benefits of a single overlord in the person of the Emperor. But these princes
and their so-called “states” were still a far cry from twentieth-century states recognized under
modem intemational law. As Benedict Anderson aptly describes it:
|T|n fimdamental ways ‘serious’ monarchy hes transverse to all modem 
conceptions of pohtical hfe. Kingship organizes everything around a high 
centre. Its legitimacy derives from divinity, not from populations, who, after all, 
are subjects, not citizens. In the modem conception, state sovereignty is fuhy, 
flatly, and evenly operative over each square centimetre of a legally demarcated 
territory. But in the older imagining, where states were defined by centres, 
borders were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded imperceptibly into 
one another. Hence, paradoxically enough, the ease with which pre-modem 
empires and kingdoms were able to sustain their mle over immensely 
heterogeneous, and often not even contiguous, populations for long periods of 
time."^
Not only were the monarch’s subjects irrelevant for his legitimacy (a divine right), but monarchs 
were frequently “foreign” in the sense of having gained mle through marriage or invasion from 
another kingdom.
The sense of universahsm to which Dante tried to appeal in Monarchy was strengthened 
by the widespread use of Latin among the hterate classes. Since Latin was the only language in 
which one could be educated, there was in effect a single community of hteracy throughout 
European centres of learning. Although vemaculars continued to flourish, amongst the 
intelhgentsia there was a cross-cultural, cross-temporal dialogue. This “sacral language” allowed 
Dante of early fourteenth century Florence to write in what was essentially the same language as 
Grotius, of the seventeenth century Netherlands. Before the spread of printed works in the 
vemacular and of hteracy, there was no medium for the development of regional identities.
Before identities were recognized in the abstract as based upon language and culture, they could 
not have been territorial. They were at this point, if anything, identities of subjection — deriving 
from common status as “subjects” of the Prince. This form of pohtical identity emerges quite 
clearly from Machiavelh’s sixteenth century study The Prince.
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Machiavelli’s The Prince
This work has been interpreted in many ways since it was published in 1513.^ ^® It has 
variously put its author on a pedestal as the “father of pohtical science” and also condemned him 
as an unprincipled “immorahst”. These labels are unhelpful for a contextual understanding of 
Machiavelh's concepts. His handbook for the pohtical success of sixteenth century princes 
carries an irony in its very title. Machiavelh’s perception of a need for such a work —  a book 
containing advice for the acquisition and maintenance o îstates by princes — and the structure 
and characteristics of the work itself indicate the vast changes in the meanings and 
understandings of these terms between the ages of the Renaissance and the United Nations. 
These different meanings are, in fact, the constant source of translator’s complaints. Most 
notably with Machiavelh’s use of the term virtii — a characteristic word with a highly 
contextual meaning and virtually untranslatable into any single word in Enghsh.^^^ For the 
purposes of this chapter, the most important shift in meaning occurs in the word Principe itself 
— Machiavelh’s chosen title. Our contemporary understanding of the term “Prince” is a far cry 
from the subject of this Renaissance work. In the late twentieth century, princes are quaint 
reminders of by-gone times, and they retain a faint mythical quahty that evokes the agelessness 
of children’s fairy tales. They do not do the one thing that Machiavelh’s principe did —  they do 
not rule.
Machiavelh’s prince is not our prince by a long shot — he may, for example, be 
what we would call a king or he may be a mercenary soldier; he may be elected, 
hke a doge, or be a churchman hke a pope. . . A “principahty” [in Enghsh] is 
what a “prince” governs, and he is defined chiefly as not a king, not a duke, not 
a president, not a pope, not a condottiere — not even a prince, really, because in 
Enghsh usage a prince (hke the Prince of Wales) doesn’t govern, and that’s one 
thing that Machiavelh’s principe emphatically does. “Prince” and 
“principahty” are chiefly defined in Enghsh by negatives, whereas for 
Machiavelh they are nothing if not positive and inclusive.
Although explained by this translator as a difficulty between Enghsh and Itahan, it is quite
clearly more than that. The difficulty of translating Machiavelh is a temporal as well as hnguistic
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one. Not only has the meaning of the word prince changed, but there are no twentieth century 
equivalents of il principe or principato. These terms, which described Machiavelh’s world, are 
no longer relevant — even for contemporary Itahan pohticians.
Machiavelh addresses a world where the concepts of state and repubhc exist, but where 
the system as a whole had a profoundly different reahty to what we understand today. 
Territorially dehneated pohties abounded, to be sure, but they were open targets for enterprising 
schemers. It is perhaps in contrast with twentieth century notions of state sovereignty, non­
intervention and the sanctity of borders, that Machiavelh’s advice to his prince acquires its most 
sinister aspect. But Machiavelh was not suggesting that modem states with national identity, 
symbols and sovereign recognition be invaded for personal gain. He had no concept of such 
uniform and territoriahsed units — and his concept of relations with other states was not one of 
a system of''international relations”, but rather one of diplomacy amongst a variety of different 
pohtical entities. Florence in 1513, was one of five major units of pohtical power in the area of 
Italy, comprising Milan, Venice, Naples and the Papal states (under the dominion of Rome). 
These five city-states had maintained an uneasy balance of power because none was strong 
enough to rule the other four. They each had revolving internal struggles for rule and various 
systems of leadership. Naples was a kingdom (the crown of which was claimed by France,
Spain, and the Pope); the Venetian doge and the Roman pope were nominally elected; Milan had 
been ruled by a family dictatorship which in 1450 was ousted by a professional soldier who had 
been bora a peasant. Florence had an ancient history as a repubhc, but had recently been subject 
to sporadic rule by the Medici. In short, Itahan Renaissance pohtics consisted of a motley bunch 
of wealthy successful cities which had control over the surrounding countryside and which were 
the objects of power struggles by various and sundry important people. Residents of the five 
city-states were, however, all considered to be Itahan, and spoke dialects of the same language. 
They were all Cathohc and had similar customs. This did not stop them from plotting each 
others’ demise. Machiavelh’s Florence was a city with a long history as a repubhc — yet it was 
not a "repubhc” in the contemporary sense of a "state with representative government” for it was 
not a state in the modem sense. Moreover, although Florence had the luxury of a history as a 
repubhc, that did not stop it fi'om exercising rule over other cities in surrounding Tuscany. With 
a population of roughly 100,000, sixteenth century Florence (along with its four sister states) 
belongs in a category by itself.
Machiavelh begins his advice to the prince with a discussion of the types of states.
There are two kinds, he says, repubhcs and princely states. He designates the latter as his main 
concern, and specificahy princely states which are newly acquired by the prince. Machiavelh
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advises the ruler of newly acquired lands to extinguish the Une of the previous prince and to keep
the laws in place, “because in other matters, as long as you keep their old way of hfe and do not
change their customs, men will hve quietly e n o u g h . A l s o ,  if the new acquisitions are in an
area with different language and customs from the prince’s own, “[o]ne of the best and most
effective pohcies is for the new possessor of territories to go there and hve.”^^  ^ Regardless of his
own preference for repubhcanism in Florence, Machiavelh’s assumption about the “people”
here is that they are subjects. They may cause trouble if their customs are forcibly altered, but
there is no expectation that the prince’s rule is ihegitimate because they did not consent to it.
The “state” or “territory” is a possession, and Machiavelh uses that term quite hteraUy in terms
of its being acquired, kept and lost.
These states were not equal and sovereign. They were given pohtical attention
according to their mihtaiy might and economic wealth. Machiavelh learned this lesson to his
chagrin during his mission to the French court.
Machiavelh discovered that his native city’s sense of its own importance 
seemed to the French to be ludicrously out ofhne with the reahties of its 
mihtary position and its wealth.. . Although he tried making a speech ‘about the 
security your greatness could bring to the possessions held by his majesty in 
Italy’, he found that ‘the whole thing was superfluous’, for the French merely 
laughed at him.^ *^^
There were various territories, but the governing principle was anything but territoriahty. There 
was no concept of permanency or of strict borders. Machiavelh does not even discuss 
sovereignty. It is not relevant as a principle of legitimacy for his historical context. Machiavelh 
would have found extremely odd the suggestion that a state’s power was proportionate to the 
strict control of its boundaries regardless of the competence of its prince. The legitimacy of 
Machiavelh’s prince derived fi’om his virtii. If a man could rule well, then he was a prince — 
even if he were bom a peasant (as Francesco Sforza) or the illegitimate son of a pope (as Cesare 
Borgia). Thus, “a new prince taking charge of a completely new kingdom will have more or less 
trouble in holding onto it, as he himself is more or less capable For Machiavelh,
then, virtii acts as a new principle of legitimacy, operating independently of divine right. So
141
Niccolô Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. and ed. Robert M. Adams (New York: Norton, 1977), 6.
142
Ibid., 7.
143
Quentin S^ àsaxQX, Machiavelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 7.
144
Ibid., 16.
82
although the pope continued to be acknowledged as God’s representative on earth, he also 
played a pohtical role and as such was included as one of the group of princes who would find 
Machiavelh’s work usefiil. Two hundred years later, Dante’s nightmare about the loss of 
universal allegiance and the disintegration of order amongst states seems to have come true. But 
it was not as simple as that. The Holy Roman Emperor was stiU a presence in the sixteenth 
century, but one with a decreased sphere of influence. Thus Machiavelh’s world incorporated 
Dante’s and also involved substantiaUy different perspectives. Ironically, the men were both, 
two centuries apart, writing fi-om Tuscany — thus iUustrating the devastating effects wrought by 
temporal distance over the same geographical space.
More’s Utopia
Sir Thomas More’s Utopia was pubhshed in 1515 — not even three years after The 
Prince. Thomas More and Niccolo Machiavelh were hving at opposite ends of the European 
continent as well as under very different local pohtical circumstances. The Enghsh More was 
largely exempted from the turmoil of the constant exchange of rulers which plagued the Itahan 
city-states. The two scholars were joined, however, by a common humanist upbringing with its 
emphasis on mastering the classical languages, history, philosophy and rhetoric. In fact. More 
wrote a number of works, including Utopia., in Latin. While More and Machiavelh had 
distinctly different inteUectual commitments (one was wilhng to lose his hfe standing up for the 
unity of Christendom while the other maintained a frankly pragmatic approach to the papacy as 
another example of a power-seeking prince), they each spent years in the service of their prince, 
including diplomatic missions abroad. They both drew on years of pohtical expertise in writing 
their works. But while Machiavelh’s book contains many historical examples and aspires to be 
a genuine handbook. More’s work resembles a parable which teaches through iUustration.
More’s target is not the prince but the entire fabric of Enghsh society. Nonetheless it is clear 
from their texts that Machiavelh and More inhabited the same Renaissance time frame. The two 
writers share the same concept of the “prince” as ruler. More begins his book by referring to 
King Henry the Eighth as “most accomphshed in ah the virtues of an outstanding prince.” "^*^ 
During that period, rulers as diverse as kings, popes, nobles and even accomphshed mihtary 
leaders were unified in one category. Although the Medicis (who sometimes ruled Florence and 
to whom The Prince was addressed) were not rulers in the same dynastic sense that the kings of 
England and France were, they were nonetheless entitled to recognition as legitimate rulers —
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“princes”. This discrepancy between power and title indicates that the principle of pohtical 
legitimacy had far more to do with personal power than any concept of territoriahty. Borders 
were not assumed to be permanent indicators of the beginning and end of the state, much less of 
the nation. Even dynastic kings had to exhibit competent leadership skiUs or suffer the 
humihation of losing parts of their realm to enterprising neighbours. It was this world that 
Machiavelh and More shared — and criticised.
More’s Utopia operates on dual levels of understanding, crossing easily back and forth 
between fact and fiction. While the story of the mythical island country, where money is 
unnecessary and ah needs are provided for, offers sharp social criticism through a description of 
what an imaginary hfe would be hke without certain evils, it also reveals the hfe and times of its 
author through contemporary details and More himself as first person narrator. Like The Prince, 
Utopia is about virtu, but in this case the meaning is confined to virtue. More is concerned with 
men’s souls rather than pohtical success. He describes in his mythical “non-place” of Utopia, a 
society in which “what is cherished as examples of virtue in More’s present is turned into utmost 
vice.” "^*® The foremost of the vices targeted for criticism by More is the concept of private 
property. Every facet of Utopian hfe is meant to mitigate against the greed and unfair 
distribution of private ownership. While More’s arguments must have seemed at the time hke a 
glorification of the simple peasant communities of the Middle Ages, today they also have a 
distinctly proto-Marxist flavour. In fact, both nostalgic and futuristic hints can be discerned in 
the text.^ '*’ Using classical rhetorical skiUs, More could not conceal his humanist education, nor 
could he hide the social assumptions of the world in which he hved. He imagines a new and 
unfamihar world, but he cannot completely remove himself fi'om his own perspective.
Territory in Utopia plays a much more definitive role than it did in More’s Renaissance 
Europe. The Utopians are blessed with a naturally perfect geological basis for their state. By 
artificiaUy creating an island out of a peninsula, they have provided themselves with boundaries 
against both invasion and their own greed. For Utopians have aboUshed pride and greed as the 
greatest vices, and obtaining territory for the sake of power would amount to an evil on the 
largest of scales. Indeed, More’s narrative device, in the character of Raphael Hythloday, who
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recounts to More (as first person narrator) the wonders of Utopia, provides an ample platform for
More’s own commentary on the nature of European pohtics. If he were to give counsel to
princes in the midst of their most secret negotiations, Hythloday says, he would advise “that Italy
should be left alone and the French stay at home; that the kingdom of France is practically too
big to be conveniently administered by one man, so that the King should not think of adding
others.” "^® In this starthng contrast to the typical princely concerns of the time, Hythloday
verbahses More’s own finstration at the effects of wilful princely rule. A virtuous society can
only arise when the prince keeps his focus on the territory he already has. Hythloday would
advise such a prince to “look after the kingdom he inherited, and embellish it as much as he
could, and make it as flourishing as possible; to love his people and be loved by them; to hve
together with them and make his rule gentle; to say good-bye to other kingdoms, since the one
that had fallen to his lot was enough and more than enough.” '^*^ In fact, Machiavelh gives
similar advice, asserting that the people who feel no connection to their prince wiU be
troublesome and difficult to rule. More and Machiavelh are both responding to a world in which
such civic attention was not the norm. Rule over territoiy was a matter of acquisition and the
prince who cultivated the love of his people — his subjects — was a rarity.
The loyalties of the inhabitants of Utopia are to the collective project — which acts in
More’s scenario as a unified whole. Instead of owing allegiance to a Prince, Utopians submit
themselves to the good of the system. This apphes even to such personal matters as family
planning. Each household in Utopia is kept between ten and sixteen adults. If the number
increases for one family, the surplus will be transferred to smaller households. If an entire city
exceeds its limits, the surplus is transferred to other cities or colonised. Thus the inhabitants of
Utopia are moveable goods — fiUing in the gaps in the cultivable territory. This conception of
More’s assumes a far greater civic awareness than was common in his time, but it also leaves out
any notion whatsoever of national attachment to place. The development of nationalism was yet
embryonic and More could not have conceived of it in his vision of “no-place”. So non-existent
is the fink between people and territory for the Utopians, that when their island population
grows beyond its hmits, citizens are chosen to colonise the nearby mainland, absorbing or
conquering the native inhabitants.
They take in any of the inhabitants of the country who wish to hve with 
them...But those who refijse to hve by their laws they drive out of the
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boundaries they mark out for themselves. If they resist, they go to war against 
them. For they think it the justest reason for war when any nation refijses to 
others the use and possession of that land which it does not use itself, but owns 
in idle emptiness, when the others by the law of nature ought to be nourished 
from it.
There could be no more convincing evidence for the lack of territorial attachments at the time
than the suggestion by a scholarly man attempting to provide meaningful social commentary that
justice would be served by violently expeUing those who are unwilhng to share their territory
with a fair and industrious people. What a far cry from the jus cogens of the twentieth century
and the near universal response in favour of territorial sanctity during the events of the Gulf
War.^^  ^ Given the impact that statement would have had if territorial sentiments were strong and
widespread. More could not have made it without further explanation. He makes the suggestion
as one who knows that it differs from the norm, but that it has some merit.
It would not be long in fact before the concept of nationahsm would begin to take hold
and the first inkhngs of non-intervention would provide a peaceful solution to the Thirty Years’
War. More’s own perspective was certainly still based on universal Christendom, and when
Henry Vm decided to create his own version of the Church, More’s steadfastness cost him his
hfe. Greenfeld argues that More’s behefs were already out of date, and he was a pre-nationahst
in a nationahst world (at least in England).
Sir Thomas More was a Christian; this was his identity, and all his roles, 
fimctions, and commitments that did not derive from it (but were imphed, for 
example, in being a subject of the king of England) were incidental to it. The 
view that “one realm” could be a source of truth and claim absolute sovereignty 
was, to him, absurd. “Realms” were but artificial, secondary divisions in the 
ultimately indivisible body of Christendom... He found the position of his 
judges incomprehensible. He failed to reahze that they were already 
transformed, that being Enghshmen, for them, was no longer incidental to their 
ahegiances, as it was for him, but had become the very core of their beings.
Whether or not this level of nationahsm had already taken hold in England in 1532 does not
matter for the present argument. Even if Henry could command his subjects to abandon
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Christendom as they knew it because he was the symbolic head of their nation, this only 
indicates that personahty, not territoriality, was still a primary factor in pohtical legitimacy. 
National allegiance, such as there was, was fixed upon the person of the king. Territoriahty itself 
was stiU a thing of the distant future. The important point to take jfrom More is the complete lack 
of the concept of the outside in his Utopia. This is the clearest indication that his notion of 
sovereignty was non-territorial. The body of Utopia is an inside which has no outside because 
ah of the territory beyond its borders is a potential part of itself. Utopia’s borders have nothing 
to do with sovereignty, history, or the identity of its people. They are adjustable borders in 
accordance with the needs of the population for land resources. Any people hving on this land 
which the Utopians simply absorb may become Utopians themselves. Thus ah lands and 
peoples are potential Utopias in the making. This total elasticity in the conception of borders 
surely reflects More’s commitments to the unity of Christendom. But it also indicates the extent 
to which the inside/outside dynamics of the territoriahy sovereign border were unthinkable for 
him.^^^
The Treaty of Westphalia
The seventeenth century was one in which the processes of both war and peace 
transformed the structures of European leadership. On the continent, the Thirty Years’ War 
devastated the resources and terrain of Germany and finahy broke Habsburg claims to Christian 
hegemony, while in Great Britain the question of rehgion plunged the country into a brutal civil 
war. The medieval theoretical model of the unity of all of Christendom was shattered by the 
spread of Protestantism and the increasing wiUingness of Cathohc princes to proclaim pohtical 
independence fi'om the pope. As the hierarchy of the Empire gave way, and the coahtion of 
French and Protestant powers succeeded in destroying the strength of the Habsburg forces, a 
new kind of relationship grew up among the pohtical units which had not existed previously. 
Without the nominal universal authority of the Emperor, the variety of kingdoms, duchies and 
principahties suddenly stood in roughly equal relation at the negotiating tables. This is in stark 
contrast to the experience of Machiavelh as a forlorn Florentine diplomat in the court of the 
French king.
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Two of the most memorable minds of this memorable century were Hugo Grotius and 
Thomas Hobbes. Grotius was an eminent diplomat who served both the Netherlands and 
Sweden during the course of the war. He died before the Treaty of Westphalia was negotiated, 
but not before he had noted and written about the need for some kind of ordering principle 
governing the relations between the newly autonomous segments of the empire. In writing his 
major work De Jure Belli ac Pads (On the Law of War and Peace), pubhshed in 1625, Grotius 
explored the basis for laws in and among nations. Although writing as a devout Christian with 
an assumption of divine providence, Grotius attempted to create a secular basis for law among 
nations based on “unbroken custom”. Thus blending natural law concepts with customary ones, 
Grotius intended to describe a body of laws which were acceptable to both divine and princely 
wills. The concept of laws governing war had already been developed in the sixteenth century, 
but the aftermath of the Thirty Years’ War had created an atmosphere which gave new potency 
to the concept of law among nations. It is significant, however, that while the elements of the 
empire were becoming more and more independent, even to the point of being recognised as 
equals, the concept of territory was still relegated to a background role. Grotius himself defines 
the state as simply “a complete association of free men, joined together for the enjoyment of 
rights and for their common interest” ’^  ^— thus emphasising the voluntary contractual aspect of 
the state as a pohtical unit rather than its control over a specific territory. Grotius goes on to 
discuss the nature of the state as an association where an individual or a group has a relation of 
supremacy to the others, but again without exphcit reference to territory. While Grotius’s 
discussion of personal property rights imphes that the state may indeed exist to protect territory, 
“these imphcations fall short of the conception of an area of exclusive jurisdiction, and they 
require assumptions other than those constitutive of Grotius’s conception of the state.”^^ ’
Again, while territory continued to be vital to the existence and maintenance of pohtical units, it
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was yet to become the sole legitimating basis for a national state in the manner of the 
contemporary territoriahty of the twentieth century state.
The other great seventeenth century theorist of the state was Thomas Hobbes. A well- 
travelled and well-known intellectual both in France and in England, Hobbes took refiige from 
the ravages of the Enghsh Civil War (and from possible retribution for his pohtical views) at the 
Court of Louis XIV of France. The Thirty Years’ War must have affected him personahy, but 
instead of discussing peace between states, his famous Leviathan was concerned almost 
exclusively with maintaining stabihty within the state and avoiding civil war. Leviathan, 
subtitled The Matter, Forme and Power o f A Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, was 
pubhshed in 1651, just three years after the signing of the Treaty of Westphaha. Hobbes is often 
credited with having provided the model for the modem state because of his proposition that all 
men have equal status. Hobbes’s citizens, using their naturally given freedom, voluntarily join a 
commonwealth for the sake of protection against the violence of the state of nature. The 
sovereign described in Leviathan may be a single person as in a monarch, or may be a group of 
people in the form of an assembly, but Hobbes insists on the necessity of its being absolute. 
Naturally, given that the basis of legitimacy for his sovereign was secular, and that his model for 
the equahty of the citizenry precluded both aristocracy and bourgeoisie, Hobbes was pohtically 
unpopular with both sides in the Enghsh Civil War. Whatever his social standing, Hobbes was 
nonetheless recognised as one of the great thinkers of his time. It was during this period, as 
Grotius’ concept of law among nations imphes, that the concept of sovereignty began to take 
hold. Something beyond mere power of rule, sovereignty includes both the idea of internal 
absolutism and external equahty. While Hobbes does not exphcitly treat of relations among 
leviathan-type commonwealths, his sovereign provides order through absolute power to regulate 
the commonwealth within. The coroUary of this notion of sovereignty is that it creates an inside 
and an outside — a peaceful orderly commonwealth inside, and a brutal state of nature outside.
Thus, Hobbes hit upon the very element of sovereignty which makes up the modem 
territorial state — its abihty to dehneate the borders between members and non-members, inside 
and outside. There is one cmcial distinction, however. Unhke the sovereignty of the twentieth 
century state, Hobbes’s dehneation between commonwealth and state of nature was 
metaphysical and exphcitly non-exclusive. Hobbes was not interested in allowing only certain 
national types into his commonwealth. His model was for all men. It offered the way out of the 
state of nature for any man who exercised his will and submitted to the laws of the sovereign. It 
is not accidental, then, that Hobbes’s definition of the commonwealth does not include any 
mention of territorial boundaries or control. Hobbes’s “Essence of the Common-wealth” is
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One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutual Covenants one with 
another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the 
strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and 
Common Defence.
Hobbes’s only mention of borders for the commonwealth occurs in connection with sovereigns 
defending their realms with “Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their 
Kingdomes”.^ ^^  But this is meant to contrast the state of war among sovereigns, which upholds 
“the Industry of their Subjects” with the natural condition of individual men in anarchy which is 
“misery”, and not as a statement of the necessity of the territoriahty of sovereigns. Seventeenth 
century pohtical thought, then, was beginning to develop away from the universahsm of 
medieval Christianity and from the Princely board game of the Itahan city-states. The concept of 
the state as a container of peoples, and thus of relations among states as relations among units 
entitled to equal recognition and treatment, was making its first appearance. But it would stUl be 
over two centuries before states completely shed their erstwhile role as a measurement of 
princely power.
It was this concept of territory as princely property which was perpetuated in the Treaty 
of Westphaha, even though the Treaty is often cited as the foundational document for the 
European state system. Westphaha’s contribution was to ehminate the top — unifying — layer 
of European pohtics, the authority of the Emperor. Fought partially on rehgjous, partiahy on 
power-balancing grounds, the Thirty Years’ War resulted in the final end of any concept of the 
unify of Christendom. The Cathohc kingdom of France fought with the Protestant powers of 
Sweden and the German principahties to put an end to the abihty of the Austrian-Spanish 
coahtion of the Empire to exert control in their realms. The Treaty of Westphaha, signed at 
Munster, October 24,1648, confirmed and redistributed territories among the victors. The 
Treafy also confirmed the terms of the ninefy-three year old Peace of Augsberg which granted 
rehgious tolerance within the Empire according to the rehgion of each Prince in his realm {cujiis 
regio ejus religio). The negotiations forced the Emperor onto a level field with the rest of the 
“Electors, Princes, and States” of the Empire. As Adam Watson describes it, Westphaha was a 
profoundly anti-hegemonic act, it was the “charter of a Europe permanently organized on an
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anti-hegemonial principle.”^^® So, although Westphaha can be said to have begun a new 
ordering principle within Europe (making it for the first time an order among the states of 
Europe), it stiU fell short of creating a system which resembles that of the contemporary United 
Nations system.
Territory was an important part of the Westphahan settlement, but it was still clearly
regarded as the property of the prince, the stuff of the realm. Territory was not considered
essential to the legitimacy of the prince, and also was not yet equated with the identification of
the nation. The words of the Treaty itself indicate that it codifies the redistribution of goods
among the Princes — not only land, but all that goes with it. The victorious French King
acquired Alsace and a fi-ontier west of the Rhine.
All the Vassals, Subjects, People, Towns, Boroughs, Castles, Houses,
Fortresses, Woods, Coppices, Gold or Silver Mines, Minerals, Rivers, Brooks,
Pastures; and in a word, all the Rights, Regales and Appurtenances, without 
any reserve, shall belong to the most Christian King, and shall be for ever 
incorporated with the Kingdom of France, with all manner of Jurisdiction and 
Sovereignty, without any contradiction fi-om the Emperor, the Empire, House of 
Austria, or any other: so that no Emperor, or any Prince of the House of 
Austria, shall, or ever ought to usurp, nor so much as pretend any Right and 
Power over the said Countrys, as well on this, as the other side the Rhine 
[sic].'®'
These items hsted shall belong to the King of France. They are not the property of an abstract 
state or even of the French nation, for such entities did not exist. The Thirty Years’ War was 
fought and won on behalf of individual princes. Its concluding Treaty instituted the novelty of a 
promise to refi-ain fi'om involvement amongst each other’s affairs, but it did not create a system 
of national territorial states. The prevaihng order was still one in which pohtics was based upon 
personahty. The state was not an abstract unity of peoples, but was still a “realm” which was 
ruled patriarchally by the prince. Westphaha can be noted for changing the principle of 
legitimacy fi-om one of divine right to secular mutual recognition and agreement.
The Eighteenth Century
Once pohtical legitimacy came to be seen as an earthly (though not secular) matter 
instead of a divine one, the way was paved for notions of individual rights and equahty to
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become widespread, as indeed they did throughout the eighteenth century. The most famous 
formulation (if not the first) of these ideals was perhaps the Jeffersonian one found in the 
American Declaration of Independence: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” The colonists of North America 
were antagonised into a revolutionary fervour by precisely the fact that their sense of what was 
due to them as Englishmen had been gravely violated. The American Revolution is sometimes 
mistakenly characterised as a secession. This is inaccurate since the Americans sought to create 
a state de novo where one did not exist. Their status as colonies of Britain was precisely what 
was so irksome to their pohtical expectations. Furthermore, the independence of the colonies 
and the creation of the “united States of America”^^  ^lefl; the government of Britain in form, 
structure and identity essentially untouched. Not only is this because the colonies were never 
fully integrated into Britain proper, but it is also because the concept of territoriahty, so 
necessary to secession, had yet to make an appearance.
The world of colonial America was still largely one which operated on European 
assumptions and models. As famous as Jefferson’s opening sentences are, few are famihar with 
the paragraphs which follow. These contain a long and irritated htany of the faults of King 
George HI, whose entire purpose in hfe, if the Declaration is to be credited, consisted in none 
other than “the estabhshment of an absolute tyranny over these States.” The King is charged 
with several exaggerated sins, including calhng meetings at distant locations “for the sole 
purpose of fatiguing them into comphance with his measures”, and creating so many new offices 
that “swarms of Officers” appear “to harass our people, and eat out their substance.” While the 
inconvenience of distant meetings and a multitude of pubhc officials may seem an unhkely 
justification for revolution, there are several serious charges which were more calculated to boil 
an Englishman’s blood. The monarch had imposed taxes without any form of representation or 
consent, he had cut off colonial trade, and had deprived the colonies of trial by jury, thus 
removing the legal protections that all Englishmen had come to expect. The colonies, then, were 
both o f  and other than Britain. They expected the full rights of Enghshmen, but were not fully
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integrated into a union with Britain. They had reached a point where it was either union or 
revolution. Americans found themselves increasingly treated with condescension by the British 
administration and continued to point out that they were entitled to the full complement of 
Enghsh hberties. John Adams stressed, “Is there not something exceedingly fallacious in the 
commonplace images of mother country and children colonies?... Are we not brethren and fellow 
subjects with those in Britain, only under a somewhat different method of legislation and a 
totally different method of taxation?”^^ The answer to this query came to be more and more 
clearly in the negative, and the union with Britain grew less and less desirable or hkely.
As modem as tiie rights asserted in the Declaration seem to the contemporary ear, the 
structure of the document still bears traces of the hierarchy of feudal Europe. Rather than 
directing their ire to the British parUament, the colonial delegates focused their address upon the 
person of the King. He refused, and He imposed, and He abohshed. The hated entity was not 
the abstract state with which we now deal in the intemational system, nor was it the English 
nation with whom the revolutionaries claimed brotherhood. It was the Machiavellian Prince. In 
short, the King was deemed in the Declaration to be “A Prince, whose character is thus marked 
by every act which may define a Tyrant, [he] is unfit to be the mler of a fi’ee people.” It was not 
the office of monarchy itself which the colonists rejected, it was the perceived injustice of the 
monarch’s mle. While even Machiavelh had mentioned the need for judiciousness on the part of 
the wise Prince in order that his people would love him and not rise up, the theoretical ease with 
which the Declaration claims the right to freedom from tyranny indicates that the newly 
secularised principles of legitimacy were already at work.
The concept of territory in the colonies was still a European one. Spheres of jurisdiction 
and control were certainly dehneated between the States, but there was no concept that the 
current borders were the final ones and must not be tampered with. In fact, the newly 
independent United States were in the uniquely privileged position of having vast amounts of 
frontier territories into which they could expand (the Native inhabitants being only a temporary 
impediment). So far were the Americans from seeing their original thirteen colonies as 
constitutive of their boundaries and identity, that one of their most grievous complaints against 
the King in the Declaration involved his attempts to control the growth of the colonies. He 
“endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws of 
Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither, and
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raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.”^^  ^ Americans were aware that the 
physical resources of the vastness of their land was one of the sources of their greatness. Far 
from seeing themselves as defined and contained by the boundaries of the estabhshed colonies, 
American identity was geographical in the continental sense. A federal union, and therefore the 
possibihty of a national identity, was not assured until the Constitution was ratified in 1789.
The International System in the 20th Century — Citizens and Foreigners
The twentieth-century intemational system differs from any order that has gone before
in being the first tmly global order based on the nominal equahty of all its members. Also for the
first time, the acquisition of territory by conquest has been universally acknowledged to be
illegal. The quintessential text of twentieth century territoriahty is the United Nations Charter
which asserts in Article 2.4:
Ah Members shah refrain in their intemational relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or pohtical independence of any state, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
States, by becoming members of the United Nations, agree to refrain from interfering in the
intemal affairs of other states, thus the territorial boundaries of states which have exercised the
right of self-determination are held to be inviolable. The combination of these aspects has
produced a type of territoriahty that is more absolute than anything which existed previously.
Geographical space has been claimed pohticahy in ah but the polar and deep sea bed regions. As
every inch of space has been labeUed and deemed to be under a specific sovereign, so also has
every individual been labeUed as a national of a specific state. Those identities which are not
ahgned with any sovereign pohty have become both precarious and defensive, as the term
“stateless persons” so aptly iUustrates. State identities have become institutionahsed as can be
represented by the importance of passports for intemational travel. While no one would think of
travelhng abroad without one today (with the exception of intra-European Union travel, and
across certain neighbouring borders deemed friendly by treaty) passports as national identity
documents are a feature of the twentieth century . The intemational passport regime first
became estabhshed after World War I with the attempt to regulate (and also to help guarantee)
travel rights. But travel was not impossible without such documents for most people until after
World War H. For example, it was not illegal for American citizens to travel abroad without
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passports until legislation to that effect was passed in 1941. While passports are meant to
extend protection and the right to leave and re-enter the issuing state to their bearers, the fact
that they are a requirement for entry into states almost universally can have the opposite effect.
Rather than merely aiding travel, passports serve to simplify the means by which states patrol
their borders and maintain control of the people over whom they exert sovereignty. It is this
form of control which is a so recently developed feature of our conception of the world.
According to David Campbell, this conception of citizen inside and ahen (or foreigner)
outside is dependent on the conception of the intemational itself— thus Unking the study of
intemational relations very closely with the study of foreign-ness, and lending a new meaning to
the making (of) foreign poUcy.
The passage from difference to identity as marked by the rite of citizenship is 
concemed with the eUmination of that which is ah en, foreign, and perceived as 
a threat to a secure state....[I]t was not until Bentham coined the phrase 
intemational in the late eighteenth century that foreign came to be firmly 
associated with the different character of other nations. Foreign always 
signified something that was on the outside and therefore distinguished from the 
inside, but the parameters that constituted the demarcated space differed greatly 
from our contemporary understanding. In the first recorded use offoreign in 
the Enghsh language, the thirteenth-century term chamber foreign represented 
a private room in a house. From then until the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries,/oA'e/^« served to indicate the distance, unfamiharity, and ahen 
character of those people and matters outside of one’s immediate household, 
family, or region, but stiU inside the pohtical community that would later 
comprise a state.
There are several interesting correlations to the development of the word foreign and the coining 
of the word intemational in the late eighteenth century. It was at this time that the first 
appearance of the term immigrant occurred in the Enghsh language; it began specificahy in 
reference to the population of the United States. It was also at this time that the concept of 
citizenship which had lain dormant since the demise of the Roman Empire had a revival in the 
wake of the American and French Revolutions. While the Romans used citizenship as a means 
of distinguishing residents of Rome from those of the conquered territories, it eventuahy came to 
cover ah the incorporated residents of the empire. At that time, it had more to do with one’s 
personal status as free versus slave than with any concept of national identity. Now, however, 
citizenship and nationahty have become closely bound. With a universal presumption of free 
status (notwithstanding immense differences in relative statuses among individuals), citizenship
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is no longer a social classification. One’s citizenship creates legal ties to the associated state
which preclude obhgations to other states regardless of prior or ancestral national affihations.
The concepts of citizenship, foreign-ness, and intemational which began in the late
eighteenth century are by now closely intertwined with state and national identity. Taken
together, they reflect the late modem tendencies of the state to assert sovereignty through
territorial control. States achieve this through strict control over their borders and through
control of the categories of citizens and foreigners or — even more bluntly — ahens. Nowhere is
this more evident than in the interrogations involved in the process of naturalization or making
the unnatural natural. In its process of admitting foreigners to the privileges of citizenship, the
United States Immigration and Naturahzation Service (INS) must make several determinations
of ehgibihty based on certain factors. Aside fi'om the various residency requirements, the INS
informs apphcants in its pamphlet/I Guide to Naturalization that “To be ehgible for
naturalization you must be a person of good moral character. INS will make a determination on
your moral character based upon the laws Congress has passed.” Thus the INS suggests to
prospective citizens (outsiders) that not only are those in the privileged (inside) class of superior
moral standing, but that the nature of that superiority may be determined by the subjective
decisions of the inside class itself and may be subject to change. Should the determination of
moral character and other procedural requirements be made in the affirmative, an “ahen” must
then take The Oath o f Allegiance which follows:
I  hereby declare, on oath, that I  absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure 
all allegiance andfidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or 
sovereignty, o f whom or which I  have heretofore been a subject or citizen; 
that I  will support and defend the Constitution and the laws o f the United 
States o f America against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I  will bear 
true faith and allegiance to the same; that I  will bear arms on behalf o f  the 
United States when required by the law; that 1 will perform noncombatant 
service in the Armed Forces o f the United States when required by the law; 
that I  will perform work o f national importance under civilian direction when 
required by the law; and that 1 take this obligation freely, without any mental 
reservation or purpose o f evasion; so help me God.
The first half of this oath in particular evokes a much older era of sworn allegiance amongst
crusading knights. It is the language of a sovereign commanding his (its) subjects, and the
required renunciation of “all allegiance and fidehty” goes beyond the old citizenship concept of
voting rights, tax obhgations and mihtary service. This is an oath of identity. It binds the
declarant to the inside of the sovereign state and requires her to defend this inside against ah
enemies, foreign and domestic. IronicaUy, once one has become a citizen of the United States,
one cannot be made to pledge ahegiance, as fi*eedom of pohtical speech and conscience is a
constitutional right. The naturahzation process, however, remains a pohcing one, in which the
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character and allegiance of the ««-naturalized must be proven, and the collective identity of the 
inside must be protected.
Territoriality Lived — Characteristics of the Contemporary State
Nothing illustrates the odious novelty of contemporary systems of citizenship and 
identity as well as a social anthropologist’s perspective on the changes which occurred in a 
European border town after the Second World War.^^* The village of Leidingen is a tiny place of 
200 inhabitants which has been on the German-French border of the Saar-Lorraine region since 
1815. Before the Second World War, the villagers had managed to ignore the border and 
maintain a village hfe with both French and German populations using the single church and 
school which were located on the German side of the border. Starting with the aftermath of 
World War I, however, the German government maintained tight controls over the border and by 
the end of the Second World War, a separate church and school had been built on the French 
side of the border. At this point, the earher local German dialect was replaced by compulsory 
French on the French side. Not surprisingly, many village famihes were spht by the war, with 
different members fighting on opposite sides. An ethnographic study of the perceptions of 
themselves by the children of the village revealed some surprising tilings about modem pohtical 
identities. The close connections of the two national identities in the village had all but been 
wiped out for the children bom after the war. The ethnographer’s project involved having the 
young students of both the French and German schools visit the cemeteries on the opposite side 
of the border. Already there was a lack of famiharity with and connection to this part of their 
tiny village.
The mood of these German students changed noticeably when we crossed the 
border, unmarked by customs posts or other indications and all but invisible for 
those who do not know about it. Arriving at the French cemetery, the girls had 
a laugh when they discovered plastic flowers on the graves, which were mostly 
covered with marble tombstones, and which displayed other features not 
common in German cemeteries. It was clear that only two of the girls had 
previously visited the French cemetery, although all four had hved in the village 
since birth. Their fliends immediately demanded an explanation of the two who 
knew the cemetery, and suggestions were made about their apparent ancestral 
connections to the French. But the girls who were the butt of these jokes were
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to have the last laugh when it emerged the following day that in fact all four 
girls had relatives buried in the French cemetery.
When asked to note the similarities and differences between the two churchyards, the students
failed to notice the most obvious feature — both churches are Roman Catholic. A close look at
the older German cemetery also revealed several graves from the eighteenth-century, one of
which, dated 1772, was that of lost Hillt. Hillt’s family had a long history in Lorraine, and had
come to Leidingen in the sixteenth century. “That he, as a Lothringian [i.e. from Lorraine], was
buried in Leidingen is an indication of the minor importance of hnguistic and regional
boundaries to the population at that time, and is a clear example of how kinship and economic
relationships extended across a number of social boundaries.” ’^® Not only had the recent
generation been shielded from their coimections across the (invisible) national border, but they
had learned to apply national stereotypes and suspicion of motives to their French and German
counterparts. When the two school groups were brought together there was much apprehension
and in a short time a fight broke out.
Apparently some of the German boys, aged 10-11 years, had initiated the 
conflict by imitating the French attempts to speak German. The French had 
immediately formed a bloc to defend themselves. The Germans who had begun 
the conflict now felt threatened and had called for their class mates. They began 
to push the French girls and earned some slaps on their faces in return. Stones 
were thrown, fists were brandished, and insulting gestures were made. Abuse 
was hurled at the other side, such as, “this will be the reason for the next World 
War, you bloody spiked helmet!”, and “baguette head!”....When a German boy 
pointed out a French one, asking in German for his name, the French boy 
rephed by hitting him before I could do anything about it. I told him that the 
German boy had only wanted to know his name, nothing else, and he answered:
“How could I know that? I don’t understand him, so I decided to beat him as a 
defensive measure. What he said might have been an insult.”” ^
Hostile relations among the inhabitants of such a tiny village who share many blood relations
have been brought about by the modem preoccupation with physically bounding national
identities. The relations of this one village can be seen as a metaphor for national relations
elsewhere which are based on simphstic typologies and willful ignorance of historical ties. This
pattern is repeated throughout the global grid of interstate borders. Allowing territorial
boundaries to dictate personal and national identities is one of the sad hallmarks of twentieth-
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century territoriality. Examples such as the one of Leidingen show how extreme it can become, 
but it is hardly surprising that there has recently been a movement among scholars of 
intemational relations to question the arbitrariness and moral legitimacy of inter-state borders.^’^  
This questioning of modem statehood, and the legitimacy of national claims to territories cannot 
proceed meaninghiUy without an awareness of the historical changes which have occurred in our 
understanding of territory itself, and especially of the conceptual relationship between territory 
and pohtical legitimacy. Furthermore, the symbiosis between territoriahty and the recognition of 
national identities in the twentieth century cannot be ignored. As the example above shows ah 
too clearly, modem territoriahty not only ahows but encourages the sphntering and separation of 
identities which formerly were complexly intertwined. This process pohticises both territory and 
identity in ways which threaten the security of both. The purpose of this chapter has been to 
explore the development of the administration of pohtical space. Territoriahty, upon which 
secession depends, is only a recent form of pohtical control of space. Earher periods solved 
problems of pohtical identity and sovereign control in different ways. Secession, then, is not 
only a logical outcome of modem territorial stmctures, it is an outcome which is all but propeUed 
by the momentum of intemational pohtics and the imperative of controlling the relationship of 
the sovereign inside with the outside other. In the foUowing chapter, I will examine the role of 
identity pohtics in maintaining the inside/outside boundary and theorise strategies for 
encountering and pohticising the other which preclude the exclusivism of secession as a means 
of securing identity.
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Chapter 4.
PROBLEMA USING IDENTITY
The previous chapter examined the changing role of territory in its pohtical historical 
context and highhghted the development of the particularly modem conception of territoriality. 
This phenomenon, sharpened to perfection by the events and perspectives of the twentieth 
century, has compelled a perilous balance between the recognition and legitimation of pohtical 
identities and the sovereign control of a physical territory. Not only must a national group 
maintain sovereign control in order to be legitimated as an international actor, but the actual 
drawing of the borders, the defining of the state’s inside and its outside, creates schisms and 
clashes between groups which have taken on the status of ‘minority’ or ‘majority’ with the 
stroke of a cartographer’s pen. Before territorial sovereignty became the badge of legitimacy, 
identities did not need to serve as political markers. Under contemporary international law’s 
twin principles of Self-determination and Non-intervention, pohtics has inevitably come to rely 
upon the identification of the boundaries of the state and the proper dehneation of its national 
membership. This arbitrary hardening of pohtical boundaries has resulted in a paradoxical 
pohtical dynamic. The contingent and boundless processes of social identity formation have 
been wedded to the static mythology of the sovereign territorial state. It should come as no 
surprise that the match is not made in heaven. This chapter wiU show that the modernist 
conception of securing identity through territory is a misguided goal. Identities cannot be 
secured without damaging the very diversity and richness that makes them valuable. 
Paradoxically, the “secured” identity is a stifled and dying one, while the identity which allows 
itself the constant challenge of recognising and accepting otherness is vibrant and resihent.
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Naturally, these conclusions have broad implications — not only for secessionist pohtics, but for 
the territoriahty of state security practices in general.
‘^Outsiders” Inside — Internal Insecurity
The making of group identity and security through the state creates a system which 
privileges the groups which identify with state power. The identity of the group which is in the 
most advantageous position (for reasons of historical contingency) will claim the national 
identity of the state itself— promulgating its particular histories and conceptions of security 
needs and social values. Those within the state who have identities which differ from the 
privileged national identity of the state will automatically be in a “minority” position and thus 
have “insecure” identities which are unexpressed in pohtical ways. Yael Tamir argues that even 
if the pohtical ideology of the majority advocates a nationally neutral system of redistribution 
and welfare, the identity of the decision-makers and bureaucrats will reflect a set of social values 
which cannot be kept out of the pubhc sphere. Thus minorities “feel ahenated from the pubhc 
sphere, less able to understand its cultural origins, less capable of playing according to the ‘rules 
of the game.’” ’^  ^Minorities are free to famiharise themselves with the dominant national culture, 
she continues, but they will be devoting time and energy to understand what comes naturally to 
members of the majority. The expression of minority identities will not be equated with that of 
the nation as a pohtical whole and they will become relegated to the status of a cultural and 
historical anomaly, usefiil for the promotion of tourism.
The smelting of sovereignty and territoriahty out of which the modem state was forged, 
has very serious imphcations for identity formation. R.B.J. Walker says of territorial 
sovereignty:
[it] fixes an account of where pohtics occurs, and what pohtical hfe itself can be.
It identifies who can be made secure: the pohtical community inside state 
boundaries. . . And it denies the possibihty of alternative arrangements on the 
ground that only through the state do we now seem capable of resolving all 
those contradictions — between universality and diversity, between space and 
time, between men and citizens, between Them and Us — that were once 
resolved by the subordinations and dominations of feudal hierarchy, 
monotheistic rehgjon, and empire.^’"
Not only is the description of pohtical hfe fixed in this “in” or “out” way, but this stmcture has
become so entrenched that we now lack the abihty to imagine any other — non-bounded —
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types of political community. This description highlights the particularly modem difiBculty faced 
by groups which lack the privileging apparatus of the state — effectively those groups called 
“minorities”. Ironically, though, this plight by no means restricts the definition of minority 
groups to the categories of ethnic minority identities currently in common hnguistic use, since 
the minority/majority status of every national group is contingent on the placement and 
maintenance of state borders. The territorial sovereignty of the modem state exerts an irresistible 
pull through the certainty and stabihty of its defined scope of influence. The effective hmitation 
allows those within the state to feel secure in their restricted, dehneated, space. So powerful is 
this need for definition and certainty, and so clearly does the state seem to provide for the need, 
that we are now unable to conceive of secured identity and legitimacy without the mbric of the 
territorial state. But there is a structural flaw within this cozy setup.
In our msh to create definitions of^  and defences against, the outside “other”, we have 
overlooked the “other” that we ourselves are, and will continue to become. The statist 
presumption of identity as territory allows only an extemal location for the insecurity of 
othemess. This presumption has allowed the state to operate as the provider of identity and 
describer of security needs. To acknowledge that threats to identity may occur within the state is 
to abandon the reasoning behind the construct of the territorial (nation) state itself and to 
recognise the impossibihty of legitimate, secured, identities within its realm. Yet it is the very 
nature of the state constmct itself which gives rise to the intemal “threat” of minority identities 
by pointing towards secession as the only means of legitimating their identities. All too often, 
minorities have been left httle choice but to seek a separate territory within which they can 
recreate the state processes of identity legitimation and securitising. This includes the constant 
process of identity creation through the retelhng of national histories and the continual 
participation of the group in its culturally distinct traditions and observances. This need for 
identity creation and affirmation has become part of the current scholarly fascination with 
nationahsm and national movements. While nationahsm is typically associated with ethnic 
identities, any group which makes a political claim for sovereign independence draws on a 
collective affirmation of the collective self of the group.
The mistake of postwar theorists and state leaders was to assume that national loyalty 
and patriotism were identical forces and that they were conveniently bounded by existing, or 
adjustable, state borders. The perfect match of bounded territories to homogeneous peoples has 
never existed and the abihty of states, as pohtical entities, to foster cohesive identities has been
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greatly overestimated.^’  ^ The nation-state as a project was never more than an ideal model.
Even so, the failure of this project has not resulted in a reconceptualisation of the doctrine of self- 
determination into a non-statist ideal. When the League of Nations plan for protecting 
minorities in the wake of the First World War resulted in miserable failure, state leaders began to 
focus on assimilation and accommodation. Many states contain minority groups which do not 
agitate for independence, while others contain groups with active separatist segments within 
generally stable minority identities. Finally, there are separatist movements so fully developed 
that they lead to partition, secession, or wars. Despite the recognition that minority identities 
can potentially coalesce into secessionist movements, such identities have inevitably defeated all 
attempts to locate objective predictive criteria. The bonding of people into group identities has 
such a profoundly subjective basis that actual kinship or common descent need not exist. As one 
commentator put it, “it is not what is but what people perceive as is which influences attitudes 
and behaviour. And a subconscious behef in the group’s separate origin and evolution is an 
important ingredient of national psychology.” ”^  Hence artificially emphasised histories are a 
potent piece of the nationahst repertoire and can be found in almost every example of nationahst 
rhetoric. Erik Ringmar argues that it is only through narrative that we can actually make sense 
of our individual or collective selves. Thus the identity of “we” is “neither a question of what 
essences constitute us nor a question of how we conclusively should be defined, but instead a 
question of how we are seen and a question of which stories are told about us.”” * The telling of 
histories is then a tool for creating a present which makes sense for the identities in question.
This dynamic operates in two directions — we both create ourselves through our own teUing and 
are created through the stories of others. Certain options are foreclosed to collective groups by 
the non-recognition of non-members.”  ^ Making collective and intersubjective use of historical
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narrative is how national identities are formed. This process can be and often is consciously 
manipulated.
The most well-known current example of the potency of the nationahst project is the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia, where différent rehgions and different imperial jurisdictions 
were revived from historical lapses to form the basis of the sharp dehneations of a formerly 
integrated people into three. The fact that the three peoples had formed peaceful friendships and 
intermarriages for years (which could just as easily have served as the basis for forging a strong 
single national identity) came to no consequence when the identity-shaping rhetoric of 
nationahst leaders began to take hold. The bloodiness and brutality of nationahst wars have 
prompted collective confusion from the academic community which shrugs perplexedly that it 
cannot account for something so obviously irrational. Nationahsm rejects common 
denominators and objective criteria. What has become increasingly clear, however, is that where 
matters of identity are concerned, the dry administrative claims of the state become 
inconsequential. The prize at stake is very precious indeed because without it, the social context 
of group identity fails and the individual as previously constituted vanishes. As one former 
resident of Sarajevo, currently hving in London, has described it, she now comes from 
“nowhere” and has no national identity — or rather, an obsolete one. The child of a Serb and a 
Croat, she condemns ah sides for demohshing the multicultural city that created who she is. The 
identity which comes from belonging to a national group, the most potent form of coUective 
identity, has forever been lost to her.^*°
While the obhteration of a national identity constitutes a cultural tragedy for human 
diversity, it is crucial to recognise that the loss of an identity (through violent war or forcible 
assimilation) is not equivalent to the adaptations a distinct group may make over time which 
cause it to seem quite different from its earher manifestations. Ah identities change and grow in 
new directions in response and in relationship to the course of historical events. In other words, 
although we make use of stories of a singular past in the creation of our group “selves”, and 
revere traditions derived from “ancient” times, we cannot actuahy keep a group identity static, or 
“secured” as is so often attempted. For example, as compehing as the charms of rustic hfe can 
be, few late modems have the desire or the fortitude to truly eschew the developments of the last 
two hundred years of Western technology and join the Amish in their devotion to the 
preservation of a distinct and isolated identity. For it requires the strictest codes of social 
isolation and resistance to innovation within in order to maintain the kind of continuity
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demonstrated by the Amish and similar communities. Notwithstanding our reluctance to 
seriously hve “in the past”, nationahst sentiment often causes members of distinct groups to “re- 
hve the past” in order to stoke the passions of an earher — and thus now de-contextuahsed — 
conflict. Of course not ah minority identities take on a mihtant nationahst agenda, but there is an 
intrinsicahy urgent drive behind groups which search for pohtical recognition. Once a group has 
recognition, both intemahy and extemahy, it has substance and existence in the realm of 
international law and pohtics. It is an “actor” and therefore provides a legitimate identity for its 
members. Unfortunately, there are no rules about which groups may be ehgible for pohtical 
recognition. The doctrine of self-determination is ominously silent about the nature of the ‘self 
concerned, leaving the question of membership in the community of states a perilously open one.
Patriots, Nationalists and Minorities
In a recent discussion of modem nationahsm, Thomas Franck states that the certainty of 
old categories of identity are no longer vahd and that many of us must now rethink our identities. 
Franck takes upon himself the task of sorting through the complex meanings of commonly 
misunderstood terms: nation, state, people, ethnie, tribe, nationahsm and patriotism. According 
to Franck, much of what we consider to be nationalism today is actuahy patriotic loyalty to the 
state, since “[i]n the twentieth century, the state has had pride of place in the construct of 
personal identity.”^^ The point is that this type of nationahsm recahs the late eighteenth century 
and the nation-building practices of the United States and France which focused around the 
abstractions of hberty and equahty rather than essentiahst quahties such as race. A century later, 
Franck argues, the nationahsms of Germany and Japan and other recent cases, “tended to define 
their enemies as those of different (and usuahy inferior) gene pools or rehgiocultural 
ancestry....[they] have turned inward in paroxysms of xenophobia.”^^ This is the nationahsm of 
contemporary notoriety, which can be placed at the scene of many an international crime. While 
Franck oversimphfies and thus confuses the difference between civic and ethnic nationahsm, his 
main argument — that modem nationahst movements seek separate states for all the wrong
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reasons — is a point worth making. Regardless of how one feels about the proper pohtical
pohcies of a multiethnic state — even if one beheves that assimilation under the concepts of a
civic ideal is actually another name for a form of cultural imperiahsm — there is something
troubhng about the widespread nature of adamant claims for pohtical independence. The self-
determination which separatists claim is their goal and their right can never actually be achieved
because identities (both individual and coUective) are highly subjective and cannot be purified.
The whole concept of self-determination — as far as it concerns sovereign statehood — is based
on a dangerous myth. Franck terms the concept of a pure national state as nothing less than
“^artheid” and notes that it has become surprisingly “fashionable” again:
jT]t has become sociaUy and pohticaUy correct to aver that pohtical and social 
organization should be based on the principle of ‘hkes-with-hkes” whether 
‘hkes’ be defined in hnguistic, ethnic, racial, rehgious, historical, cultural, or 
other terms....It does not seem much to matter to the force of a secessionist 
claim whether it is based on a demonstrable genetic-cultural-historical reahty, 
or, more hkely, is pure romantic invention.
The point is, that even if a separatist claim is based on a harsh reahty of oppression it also rehes
on a patently false assumption —  that pohtical rule by one’s own cultural group (however
defined) is a good and fair thing and is a fundamental right. The right of belonging to a cultural
group is one thing, but it should and must not be confused with an inherent right to the pohtical
constitution of a state. To argue otherwise would be to assume that membership in national
groups should be maintained by objective criteria for the common good. Such an assumption
curtails the very fi-eedom which was fought for in the first place.
Isaiah Berhn said of national self-determination:
It is a cry for room in which men can seek to realize their natures, quirks and ah, 
to hve hves fi’ee fi’om dictation or coercion fi^ om teachers, masters, bulhes and 
persuaders and dominators of various kinds. No doubt to do entirely as one 
hkes could destroy not only one’s neighbors but oneself. Freedom is only one 
value among others, and cannot be reahzed without rules and hmits. But in the 
hour of revolt this is inevitably forgotten.^*®
Absolute fi-eedom is neither possible nor desirable — because there is no common understanding
of its meaning amongst humanity, how can any single interpretation of the value of fi-eedom be
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privileged over all others? The independence sought by separatist groups is a kind of freedom 
which inevitably entails hmitations on the freedoms of those who do not fit membership criteria 
or who demonstrate nonconformity within the group. The only form of “protection” an 
independent state can guarantee to members of a cultural group which already resides in a liberal 
democracy is the freedom to impose their own criteria of membership and thus transform 
themselves from the minority to the majority. This is not protection for the newly created 
majority identity because it will continue to be subjected to multiple interpretations both from 
within and without. The “protection” of state sovereignty then is nothing less than the pleasure 
of drawing boundaries by mihtary means rather than social and legal ones. This just solution 
which separatists claim as their right, is, then, neither just nor a solution. In cases where the 
minority is genuinely oppressed and prohibited from expressing and creating its cultural identity, 
the blame lies with the state apparatus, and the right which the minority may exert is one which 
operates in favour of restructuring the state to allow for autonomy and cultural protections. In 
other words, there are no national rights to independent states, there are only rights of the 
protection of national (and multiple) identities within and across states. Any other assumption 
supports state-by-state apartheid, as Franck described. It is also fallacious to assume that a state 
border will end the oppression or hostihty between national groups. In many ways, it is hkely to 
exacerbate it. How many Yugoslavs, Israelis, and Northern Irish must be lost before the fallacy 
of self-determination is reahsed?
One suggestion, which many theorists agree upon, for easing the strain of national 
groups strugghng to gain an international voice, is the creation and encouragement of 
international institutions which expressly provide fora for substate and trans-state identity 
groups. Franck and Kymhcka both favour increased franchisement for minorities and non­
governmental organizations, but from vastly different perspectives. For Franck, an international 
forum for substate identities would act as a pressure valve and ease the force behind many 
separatist movements, thus resisting the trend towards the “two thousand-state global system”. 
Kymhcka, on the other hand, finds that the idea has merit as one of the only ways in which 
minority groups may represent their interests and receive justice, since states so often ignore 
minority issues. Kymhcka fiirther critiques Franck’s support as contradicting his earher 
representation of nationahsm as being irrational, asking “wouldn’t we be pandering to this 
irrationahty by giving them representation at the United Nations or other international bodies? 
Wouldn’t representation give legitimacy to their nationahst aims and self-identity?” *^’ In doing
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so, however, he conflates national secessionist aims with the need for legitimating national 
identity. This is precisely the mistake which impels the separatist craze which Franck fears. 
National identities for minorities and majorities, wherever they might be, are in constant need of 
legitimation. But the institution of the state itself is a chimerical means of providing it. One of 
Franck’s very first points was that there seems to be a global identity crisis in this post-Cold 
War era. Majority (or hegemonic) identities are in crisis in unsuspected ways. Russia is no 
longer the other superpower, and therefore what it means to be Russian has been called into 
question on a profound level. Further, with the sphntering of the Soviet Union, there are now 
Russian minorities in former Soviet states and satelhtes whose identity is now one of clear 
political disadvantage. This pattern is merely one example. The White Anglo-Saxon identity of 
the United States is no longer “pohtically correct” and the nation struggles to find an identity 
which can be articulated by all while allowing expression for the multiple cultures currently 
swirling around in the melting pot. Kymhcka’s critique then, falls away because the point of the 
proposal for international recognition of national identities is not to legitimate separatism, but 
rather to legitimate national identities themselves, regardless of their pohtical status. The 
separation of national legitimacy from national statehood is a crucial and long overdue one. 
Pohtical legitimacy through mutual recognition of equals is the only way to satisfy the true needs 
of self-determination. To this end, any such forum must include representatives from all national 
identities — including those which are associated with the national majorities of their home 
state. Only in this way can the voices of the minorities be legitimated as equahy vahd with those 
of the majorities. Such legitimation stands to benefit national identities ah over the globe of 
whatever proportional status.
Kymhcka’s critique contains another interesting point. He disagrees with Franck that 
minorities bear long grudges and often no longer face discrimination in democratic states.
Indeed, he says, ‘T would argue that it is often members of the majority who exhibit an irrational 
commitment to an unreahstic and obsolete identity, refusing to accept the reahty that they hve in 
a multi-nation state.” *^* This statement is undoubtedly true in many respects, but it also contains 
the germ of a counterargument. The best way to counter the irrationahty of the bhnd majority 
which cannot recognise the needs of the minority is to work to raise the status of the minority 
identity to a fiiUy legitimate one. In other words, Kymhcka’s minority groups are necessary to 
force the majority to confront its multinational reahty. Of course it puts the minority in a 
difficult position with no quick fixes and no easy answers, but surely a struggle for recognition is
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more peacefiil and more rewarding than a possibly military and certainly hostile struggle for 
sovereign independence. The way to handle the failure of majority groups to legitimate 
minorities in their midst is to continue to confront them with the reality of difference — not 
“difference as othemess”, in the words of Young, but relational difference, which admits of the 
mutual and integral relationships among identity groups. In other words, majorities and 
minorities need each other in order to be who they are, and also to fully confront the fact of 
legitimate differences among human beings. Kymhcka himself obhquely refers to this when he 
refers to the value of minority nationahsm and how it “enhances the autonomy of its members.” 
The benefits of membership in a cultural group are significant in ways which often go 
unrecognised by tiie majority group. In fact, the ideal of the autonomous selft espoused by 
hberahsm and urged by Franck, is only possible if the individual has the abihty to make choices 
about her identity. Identity choices are only possible and appreciated where there is an 
awareness of alternatives. As Tamir argues, “individuals will be unable to exercise their right to 
make cultural choices unless they hve in a culturahy plural environment.” ®^® Not only do 
multiple cultures provide the individual with an awareness of choice and help define his own 
identity, but they mitigate against cultural chauvinism and the tendency of the majority to 
assume that it has a claim on the sole true image of utopia. Those whose identity rests upon a 
certainty of conviction which rejects doubt are, in the words of Isaiah Berhn, “victims of forms 
of self-induced myopia, bhnkers that may make for contentment, but not for understanding of 
what it is to be human.” ®^^
The contingency of multiple cultures and identities then is of critical importance. 
Minorities, as those who bring the reahty of relational othemess before the complacent majority, 
are crucial for the full reahsation of the identities of ah individuals. The idea that sovereign state 
separatism is a solution for minority oppression neglects the necessary ambiguity of the identity 
dynamic, the constant reappraisal and recreation of the individual and coUective self which 
requires contact with and respect for difference and which alone provides real recognition. 
Another way to describe this dynamic is to use the phrase put forward by Appiah and Gutmann, 
interactive multiculturalism. A society that is interactively multicultural aUows ah its
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individuals to be exposed to multiple cultural possibilities, and no single culture predominates
within any individual identity.
A society is interactively multicultural to the extent that individuals experience 
the creative effects of the minghng of different cultures. A culture need not be 
universally or equally appreciated by aU individuals to be valuable. But, other 
things being equal, cultures are more valuable to the extent that more people 
have access to them.^”
The important point here is that cultural identities should all be seen as equally vahd and
accessible pubhc resources. One need not fuHy participate in a cultural identity to reap the
benefits of its presence in her society. An Irishman may adore Manchurian cuisine and the
music of West Afiica. If he can have access to these cultural accoutrements without leaving
Dublin then his Irish identity is not threatened or diminished but enriched. Additionahy, the
identities of immigrant groups or historic minorities are not warped by being thrown into
constant rehef against the cultural practices of the majority, rather they are enhanced, made
fuller. The Francophones of Québec, as will be argued below, are not the same as the French of
France. They have had more than two centuries of hfe and interaction on a different continent
and under very different circumstances. Their French heritage and language is an important
component of who they are today — but it does not mean that they are identical culturally to the
citizens of contemporary France, any more than Anglo Americans are interchangeable with
contemporary Britons. This unpredictable cultural palette is not something which should cause
concern. Rather it should be hailed for allowing greater access and therefore more meaningfiil
fi'eedom for individuals in their continual processes of identification. Cultural identities do not
have to conform to a single uniform ideal within the boundaries of a state in order for the civil
institutions of that state to be a success and to be stable. The American ideal of the melting pot
is actually profoundly ilhberal in its aim to erase difference and create a homogeneous and single
whole. Such a result is unobtainable and undesirable because it requires that individuals forsake
(or repress) their complex and uncertain identities for something fixed as the ideal. Even were it
possible, it would be a great loss of fi’eedom for all rather than the reverse.
Identity in International Relations Theory
Even in this era of national uprisings and minority activism. International Relations 
theory has been slow to focus on the nature of identity and the importance of culture. The 
traditional theoretical structures of the disciphne — sovereignty, statehood and anarchy —
192
K. Anthony Appiah and Amy Gutmann, Color Conscious: The Political Morality o f  Race (Pnnceton: Pdnceton 
University Press, 1996), 175.
110
mitigate against epistemological commitments to ambiguity and multiple perspectives.
International Relations theory has tended to regard issues of identity as stable and given, and
questions of nationahsm have been ascribed to a historically determined primordiahsm about
which nothing can be done pohtically. This approach yields unhelpful and moraUy barren
results, as described by Campbell regarding the reaction of the West to the crisis in Bosnia;
[T]he representation of the timeless quahty of the confhct is disenabhng of our 
understanding of the cause of fighting, and thus detrimental to future attempts 
to deal with such instances. If ethnic and nationahst conflicts are understood as 
no more than settled history or human nature rearing its ugly head, then there is 
nothing that can be done in the present to resolve the tension except to repress 
or ignore such struggles. In this view, the historical animus has to be enacted 
according to its script, with human agency in suspension while nature violently 
plays itself out.^^^
If national identity is indeed primordial, the structure of international society becomes fiercely 
determinist and the need for pohtical and social science at all becomes questionable. Given that 
nationahst conflicts are ones which threaten the basis of international society, it is difficult to 
justify the disciphne’s hitherto “hands-off” approach to questions of identity. In lamenting the 
late arrival of questions of identity and culture into the realm of IR, Yosef Lapid attributes the 
problem to one of world view. Citing John Shotter, Lapid states that “we have a choice: either to 
think of it as based in invariances (fixed things) and to treat change as problematic, or, to think 
of it as in flux (as consisting in activities) and to treat the attainment of stabihty as a problem.”^^ 
The theoretical commitments of the disciphne have been focused for too long on treating change 
as problematic, neglecting even the possibihty of a choice between the two perspectives. But 
ironicahy, perceiving the nature of the world to be one of flux allows for more engagement with 
the dynamics of identity formation since identity and culture are most coherent if perceived as 
constructed and interactive.
If traditional International Relations theory was one of static structures with the 
variables being the interaction and balance of power and interests, then contemporary 
hitemational Relations theory has evolved into a considerably broader enterprise. Far greater 
interdisciphnary overlap is considered permissible in the field today, and scholars are taking 
notice of the discourses of sociology, anthropology and psychology among others. The question 
of who we are and how our identity is defined have been and are of grave relevance to
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international politics. As Zalewski and Enloe point out, a person’s identity as a European Jew in 
the 1930s and 40s was a matter of life and death, but also a matter of whose definition of 
German was allowed to operate. Identity pohtics have relevance today especially in the 
pohtical wake of the Cold War. Since the consequences of identity are so great — from privilege 
to deprivation, fi*om hostihty to friendship — it is crucial for International Relations scholars to 
account for the process of identity formation and its connection to the state. Additionally, it is 
important to see identity as a two-way process; one which involves both the perception of the 
self and the projection of the other. So, “we need to think of identity pohtics as a process in 
which both the person seeking to answer ‘Who am I?’ and others who want to influence the 
answer are pushing and pulhng each other, though often with unequal resources.”^^  ^ It is 
awareness of the discrepancy between the identity of the self and the identity perceived by the 
other encountering the self which provides scholars with the opportunity not only to understand 
identity dynamics but to encourage more effective political discourse on identity. As simple as 
this discrepancy seems, it has often been overlooked in the theoretical race to eschew ambiguity 
and provide stable “working definitions”. Such definitions are the very antithesis of identity 
itself. That is not to say that identity must involve confi’ontation between two sides, but rather 
that it is negotiated in the encounter of the self with others. Thus the need for defining and 
encountering the other does not vanish when a national group establishes an independent state, 
regardless of the seeming tangibihty of the physical border. The process of identity negotiation 
and the pohtics of group membership continues within the borders of sovereign states vis à vis 
minorities within and foreigners without. This process cannot stop, for when it does the self 
(individual or group) ceases to be — or rather, the self cannot be located in the world without the 
criteria of what it is and what it is not. This dynamic does much to explain the drive for human 
contact: it is self-knowledge. “Selves and cultures come to know themselves, construct their 
identities, in relation to a world beyond themselves. A sense of the world —  a cosmological 
scheme, a vision or a representation of the world — sustains the culture or self, constituting its 
particular conceptions of what it means to be human (and a human community) in the world.” ®^^
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In other words, the more closely the self encounters others, the more finely tuned will be the 
perception of the self and the perception which the other has of the self The more one 
encounters strangers and different others, tiie more facets there are to the identity of the self 
And also, there will be a greater likehhood of the self having grown to understand die need and 
respect for difference.
Applying these dynamics to International Relations theory requires close attention to the
discourses of these identity encounters. In this sense, every pubhc or diplomatic statement is
one which plays a role in the constitution of identities, and consequentiy in the pohtical
strategies which foUow. Language is a powerful pohtical tool which can elaborate structures of
meaning through subtle metaphors. Feminists have made primary contributions to International
Relations hterature on identity through their studies of the gendering of issues through language,
particularly in the areas of defence and strategic studies. National security decisions in most
countries have inevitably been made by men, and a profoundly gendered discourse has resulted.
For example, during discussions by American nuclear physicists on the impact of deploying a
specific type of counterforce attack, it was perceived by the group to be effeminate and
unacceptable when one of them exclaimed that they were actuahy discussing attack models
which would result in milhons of human hves gone instantaneously. The male physicist told his
story to Carol Cohn. “Wait,” he said, “I’ve just heard how we’re talking — Only thirty milhon!
Only thirty milhon human beings kiUed instantly?...Silence feU upon the room. Nobody said a
word. They didn’t even look at me. It was awful. I felt hke a woman.”^^ * Cohn elaborates:
This story is not simply about one individual, his feehngs and actions; it is 
about the role of gender discourse. The impact of gender discourse in that room 
(and countless others hke it) is that some things get left out. Certain ideas, 
concerns, interests, information, feehngs, and meanings are marked in national 
security discourse as feminine, and are devalued. They are therefore, first, very 
difficult to speak, as exemphfied by the physicist who felt hke a woman. And 
second, they are very difficult to hear, to take in and work with seriously, even 
if they are said. For tiie others in that room, the way in which the physicist’s 
comments were marked as female and devalued served to delegitimate them. It 
is almost as though they had become an accidental excrescence in the middle of 
the room. Embarrassed pohteness demanded that they be ignored.
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Thus, things considered to be weak and unacceptable are discussed in terms of feminine 
metaphors while the prevaihng acceptable culture is mascuhnised.^°° This pattern of silencing 
the prospect of alternatives is then repeated during international hostihties in terms of the enemy 
to be defeated (cowardly, feminine) and the members of the national armed forces (brave, 
masculine).^®  ^ Thus the importance of language in the creation of identities and the negotiation 
of the encounter with the other must not be underestimated, and the imphcations far exceed 
gender pohtics. Analyses of the discourses among groups is the methodological key to 
understanding identity pohtics generally. These methods are difficult to employ since “sexuahty, 
masculinity, concepts of racial othemess are hidden not just in an empirical sense but in an 
epistemological sense."^^ A comprehensive interpretation of identity pohtics therefore requires 
an understanding of hnguistic categories which work “backstage” in ways which we all take for 
granted, but which must be exposed and debated in order for international relations to be 
understood.
Meanwhile, International Relations as a field has long taught and reproduced theoretical 
patterns which do not integrate easily with issues of identity. Notwithstanding the recent spate 
of attention on identity as a hot topic, the path is stiU largely untrodden in terms of applying 
theoretical lessons of identity pohtics to the large body of IR practice in both teaching and pohcy 
making. Zalewski and Enloe discuss how the traditional three paradigms into which the great 
majority of International Relations hterature falls — Reahsm, Plurahsm, and Globahsm — are 
largely devoid of any meaningful discussion of the impact of identity dynamics. While Reahsm 
has exerted a powerful influence on thinking within the disciphne since before the Second World 
War, its assumptions of sovereign statehood in an anarchic system and the relative search for 
power work to suppress the subtle workings of identity pohtics. Further, since conflicts are 
expected and integrated into Reahst theory, there is httle incentive to study the hidden 
relationships behind them. Secondly, Plurahsm has shifted the focus away fi'om the state and 
created inteUectual space for the concepts of interdependency and transnationahsm. While this 
would seem to be a positive step towards the understanding of identity issues, Plurahsts have 
maintained a positivist epistemology which discourages any attempt to poke beneath the surface
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of politics to find the cultural meanings. Finally, Globalism also introduces actors beyond and 
within the state, but it tends to operate within a homogenised world view based on a “capitahst 
global structure”, and thus remains bhnd to the possibihty of multiple perspectives. To 
summarise: “reahsts are far too committed to states and mihtary-pohtical affairs; plurahsts are far 
too committed to the empirical nature of transnational processes; structurahsts/globahsts are far 
too committed to economics and classes to allow much room for the consideration of questions 
of identity in international relations.
These mainstream theories are ah hampered by their positivist ontologies. They are 
based on certain assumptions of objectivism and of fixed meanings. The most important 
outcome of this approach is the behef that theory is generated by the observation of reahty and is 
not a participant in its (social) construction. No usefiil study of identity can be made if it 
presupposes the prior existence of an identity and then posits a descriptive theory regarding that 
identity as an object. Thus it is no surprise that IR theory has come so late to the social science 
theory-fest on the construction of identity and has been so helpless in the face of rampant clashes 
of culture. Traditional ontological commitments have proved a stumbhng block to analysing 
multiple perspectives and cultural encounters. Post-positivist theories have finally begun to 
counteract this bhnd spot of International Relations. The hallmark of such theories is their 
express reahsation that theoretical perspective impacts greatly upon the designation and 
interpretation of fact. Post-positivist theory is able to question the entrenched assumptions of 
identity and value and thus gives voice to the silenced and a more responsive answer to moral 
concerns. Positivist theories have prioritised certain issues and marginahsed others, thus 
excluding many of the questions which are of profound relevance for relations in the 
international sphere. Zalewski and Enloe explain that the resistance to admitting issues of 
identity as relevant in the study of IR has actually hampered a sophisticated investigation into 
key questions:
The assumption is made that sexual identity or gender identity can have nothing 
to do with the causation and enactment of war. But although these are just 
assumptions they do a great deal of work in defining what is and is not relevant 
to consider. When this ideological commitment is hnked with a hmited 
epistemological understanding of the construction of reahty, it becomes easy for 
scholars within international relations to think that such things as the pohtics of 
identity can have no real importance to our understanding of the international 
system.^ ^
203
Ihid, 297.
204
Ibid., 301.
115
Such assumptions, as we have already discussed, are not only intellectually confining but leave 
us with few options for a normative pohcy perspective in the face of frequent separatist violence.
Identity with Difference
The simple step taken by post-positivist scholars in recognising the impHcation of 
theoretical contributions in the construction of reality is actually a giant step in terms of its 
repercussions for social science. Once this step is taken, the road is paved for a deeper 
understanding of how identities and differences operate in the pohtical sphere. These dynamics 
have been critically and deeply explored by pohtical philosopher Wilham Connolly in his 
seminal study ldentity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations o f Political Paradox. Connolly 
attributes the need for difference as a component of identity to the human problem of 
responsibihty for evil in this world. In the Christian tradition, we have refused to allocate blame 
to god — therefore finding evil in differences which threaten us. Once god has been exempted, 
evil can only be located in human agency and those whom we perceive to be non-conforming 
with the traits of the dominant (moral) identity are evil through responsible choice. This is what 
Connolly calls the First Problem of Evil. The Second Problem of Evil stems from the 
development of universal truth so that any idea which questions this universal becomes a 
profound and intolerable threat. This is “the evil that flows from the attempt to estabhsh security 
of identity for any individual or group by defining the other that exposes sore spots in one’s 
identity as evil or irrational.” ®^^ Connolly attempts to tease out the features of the dynamic of the 
second problem of evil in late modem society. Although god is no longer discussed in terms of 
cultural security, the pattern of ascertaining a responsible human agent for evil remains. This is 
especially cruel since, “no identity is the true identity because every identity is particular, 
constructed, and r e l a t i o n a l . Y e t  we continue to privilege our own identities as true and 
capable of purity, and we continue to search for human others upon which to focus the blame, 
our Nietzschean resentiment for the sheer arbitrary helpless contingency of the human condition. 
Connolly beheves that a general perspective, which resists totahtarianism, is possible through a 
continual resistance to binary oppositions. Although critics of such a postmodern stance claim 
that any general approach must presuppose truth, Connolly rephes that the concept of truth does 
not necessarily contradict his approach since tmth does not have to be singular. “[T]here is no
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necessity that what must be presupposed as true at one moment must then be validated as 
unquestionable at the next or that what must be presumed in one gesture is unsusceptible to self- 
problematization in another . . .The point is to refiise to curtail thinking in the name of guarding 
the faith.” ®^’ The recognition that there can be many truths opens the door to a perception of the 
other which does not fear difference as an existential threat. In fact, as discussed above, 
difference is absolutely necessary to an identity. “These differences are essential to its being. If 
they did not coexist as differences, it would not exist in its distinctness and sohdity.” ®^* This 
requirement of difference is precisely what makes identity such an insecure experience — it is 
constantly subject to the resistance of others to the categories ascribed to them. Connolly 
describes the paradox of identity by saying that an identity may only be secured through the 
repression of othemess, and any recognition of the vahdity of difference requires the sacrifice of 
the secure identity.^”^  Given the constant presence of difference and ambiguity in the late 
modem age, any attempt to secure an identity must fail or require tremendous efforts of 
repression. Connolly’s approach resonates as an explanation of the drive to ethnically cleanse 
territories perceived as national properties. This is the application of the paradox of identity by 
means of military violence in order to cmsh difference out of existence. But such attempts to 
secure a national identity will fail for identity can never be truly secured — not by violence, not 
by state action, and certainly not by territorial sovereignty. Identity cannot be secured because it 
requires a constant engagement with the other and a constant mediation with difference. It is the 
intertwining rather than the opposition of identity and difference which needs to be recognised in 
pohtics today. Recognising the need of the self for the definition and understanding provided by 
the other gives rise to respect — even among those who are at war with each other. The 
recognition of othemess as vahd and necessary, allows for acceptance rather than the need for 
annihilation. It is the need to annihilate relative tmths in favour of a single absolute real truth, 
which stiU haunts the modernist legacy.
Connolly does not reject the need for or existence of stable social forms. In fact, social 
institutions form another paradox; humans require common social forms to fimction, but any 
kind of social institution requires some subjugation and cmelty. In other words, for every 
standard of the normal or the common there wiU be innocent individuals or groups which faU
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outside of it. But Connolly sees politics as a means of stretching and confronting these gaps and 
ambiguities, and in his eyes, “a society that enables pohtics as this ambiguous medium is a good 
society because it enables the paradox of difference to find expression in pubhc hfe.”^^® The 
point he also makes is that since it is clear that there is no natural utopian plan for human 
existence which we must simply discover and implement, the best system we can attempt is a 
“pohtics of agonism” which recognises difference and accepts it as vahd. The first step in this 
system is to cease the insistence on harmony, since it tends to produce dogmatic results, and to 
give up any behef in one’s own identity as primordial or deep. ConnoUy posits that “[i]f I take 
my identity to be chosen or deep essentially, I am hkely to take you to share those traits too. 
There is a powerful pressure to interpret differences in your conduct through the categories of 
bad faith, false consciousness, innocence, deviation, sickness, and evil.” “^  It is precisely this 
result that he wishes to avoid; but he cannot do so by advocating a singular counter-truth. 
ConnoUy’s goal for pohtics is that it become the “medium for the enunciation of suppressed 
alternatives and the contestation of entrenched commonal i t i e s . Thus  he does not seek to 
bring everyone to his own conclusions — it wiU be enough if there is space in the pohtical realm 
for the expression of difference. And the pohtical realm which permits multiple interpretations 
and locations is not one which is “fractured”, contrary to contemporary pundits, but rather it is 
one which more truly protects the freedoms of both individuals and groups.
There is much to be gleaned from ConnoUy’s understandings of the operation of identity 
formation. The most important lesson perhaps is the need to embrace ambiguity and recognise 
the vahdity of different perspectives. In terms of pohtical science research, the prevaihng 
assumptions of the historical stabihty of national identity must be questioned and the 
underpinnings exposed. Despite the presentation of a united front, every national identity 
contains a multiphcity of practices within it. If these multiphcities are teased out and reahsed, it 
promotes a pohtics of awareness and recognition rather than one of exclusion and protection. 
Although it wiU be analysed textuaUy in detail in the next chapter, the case of Quebec’s 
secessionist agitation wiU serve as an introduction to the contradictions inherent in the operating 
concepts of statehood and national identity.
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Assuming Identity — The Case of Québec
Many who have proposed theories of secession as a right have done so on the 
assumption that group identities are a valuable good and should be protected when under threat. 
But what exactly are identities? Certainly they cannot be protected or preserved without some 
understanding of how they operate. Although they are an inseparable part of each human being, 
and therefore necessarily bound up in our conceptions of the good, can identities be secured? Is 
it desirable to do so? Because national (and other) identities are stabihsed collectively through 
shared understandings of particularity and a perceived common past, the security of an identity 
(whether individual or collective) cannot take place without the control of its history. In other 
words, we must essentiahse a certain history of ourselves or our nation in order to maintain it as 
an unchanging good. However, the processes involved in making such a (truth) claim give off a 
distinct odour of totahtarian “cleansing” and the worst excesses of rehgious zealotry. Such 
nation-building processes do not allow for contradictory — or even various — versions of the 
collective history to flourish. It is this hidden side to the securing of identity that brings an ironic 
resonance to hberahsm’s support for the “right” to group identity. How can collective identities 
be guaranteed? They can only be so if they are assumed to be fixed. This essay is far fi’om an 
argument for a global assimilationist project. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate the hidden 
contradictions in the commonly accepted understandings of national identity and the “rights” 
attached to its maintenance.
In teasing out the arguments of those making claims for a right of cultural preservation, 
it is reveahng to look at a case which is actually made on these assumptions. The fixedness of 
identity is never overtly discussed, and this is exactly why the arguments seem coherent at first. 
A prime example is the liberal/political discussion concerning the secessionist movement in 
Québec. While there has been some popular resistance to the very idea of a secession taking 
place in wealthy, Uberal democratic North America, most hberal theories cannot offer an 
explanation of why the Québécois should not be able to fi*eely decide to become independent. 
Afl;er all, Québec does have a distinct identity within Canada, and it has a history as a well- 
defined semi-autonomous province, so why not? Aside fi'om the basic notion of the social 
contract and consent, the secession of Québec has also been supported on the grounds of self- 
determination and the right to a cultural identity. Nielsen argues that the case of Québec is very 
clear: “The society or nation that is Quebec can rightly form a nation-state if it chooses. . .This 
comes in this circumstance essentially to majority determination. That decision can be made and
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that state formed without violating anyone’s r i g h t s . I n  a rather odd conception of rights and 
majority voting, Nielsen seems to suggest that it is perfectly unproblematic to allow a distinct 
minority of a state population to secede on the basis of a simple majority vote, thus creating a 
further minority (made up of those who voted “no” as well as those with a different national 
identity) in the new state. Apparently, as long as the newly created minorities are protected in 
their turn, no wrong has been done. According to Nielsen, any other conclusion is 
“individuahsm gone mad.”^^ " One may argue that in the case of Québec the distinctness of the 
Francophone identity is under such consistent assault from a bombardment of Anglophone 
culture that any unfairness for the non-Francophones caught up in the new state is 
overshadowed by the need to give the Québécois identity its chance. One may argue this way 
and have a point. But Nielsen actually denies any unfairness to anyone at all on the basis of a 
simple majority vote. This is simple democracy at its — most simple. These arguments clearly 
imply that the identity of the Québécois is something concrete enough to be physically 
dehneated in the form of a state. Ironically, since he argues on the basis of protecting the 
distinctness of the Québec identity, Nielsen shows a careless disregard for how identities are 
made and kept. As Ewin points out in his critique of Nielsen, “[t]he issue of Québécois 
secession requires that the Québécois be considered, not merely as persons, but as a people.
What makes them a people means that we cannot simply ignore the history of how they came to 
be where they are and go ahead and treat the issue as one deahng with Canada as a momentary 
time-sUce.”^^ ’ Ewin’s point here is that group relations are complex and contextual over time 
and space, and arguing that there is a prima facie right to secession, as Nielsen does, seriously 
underestimates the importance of this dynamic.
The dangers of a simphfied theory which fails to account for the formation of identity 
came into brutally clear focus in 1995 when the referendum on Québec yielded the extremely 
close result of 51/49 at the polls.^^  ^ While these numbers perhaps make for a well-balanced 
parhamentary debate on a matter of civic importance, they are harbingers of doom where 
national identity and the state are concerned. The obvious counterfactual suggests itself. What
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would have happened if the numbers had been reversed and 51% voted “Oui”? As it stands 
there are large numbers of disenchanted separatists feehng that their “rights” have been denied. 
They do not hve in the state they would choose. But if the new state had come into being on the 
basis of a majority vote, would the result have been any more fair? Framing the issue of 
Québec’s secession as a matter of a majority vote silences the voices who have a more nuanced 
outlook on the matter. The decision is cast as “Yes” or “No”, but those who find themselves in 
these two camps have many reasons for their decision. Those who make a decision not to secede 
are cast as the outsiders, the non-nationals, those who have no feehngs for the culture which is at 
stake. Even French-speakers who love and respect Quebec’s unique culture do not belong. The 
“outsiders” in Quebec are actually a plurahty of diverse people — not the simple Anglophone 
obstructionists, but immigrants, businessmen, native Indian tribes, and Francophones who fear 
disaster. The choice of secession does not allow these identities to flourish with their own 
vahdity. Many of these people feel that Québec is their home - but the polarisation of the 
“inside” or “outside” vote leaves them ahenated.
What is really at stake here is not the right of a group to have and maintain an identity.
It is the means by which they feel entitled to do so. Why is it that the Québécois — who have 
many protections against assimilation — feel entitled to a state? Nielsen himself concludes that 
“states are necessary evils, essential instrumentahties for security and the very possibihty of 
something approximating a commodious hfe.”^^ ’ But this is not a conclusion which should be 
hghtly made. Or, rather, having concluded that states are necessary for the good hfe, Nielsen 
should provide an argument supporting his connection between a state and a cultural/national 
identity. What rights does a state ensure for a national group beyond those they are entitled to as 
members of a democratic federation? Is the abihty to make foreign and defence pohcy so crucial 
in this era of transnational interdependencies?
Nielsen continues:
It is indeed true that a people can have a sense of nation without having a 
nation-state, but what is also true is that this national consciousness, and the 
identities that go with it are, under modem conditions, only secure when people 
with these national identities gain control of the conditions of their existence by 
having the power that goes with having their own state: a state which protects 
and actively fiirthers these national aspirations. Multi-cultural or multi-national 
states have not worked very well.^ ^*
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Nielsen’s assertions place the majority of the world’s peoples in a position to feel that their 
national identities are under threat. It is no shp of the pen that causes Nielsen to associate the 
need for a national state with modernity. The modem evocation of the territorial sovereign 
imperative has already been discussed. But instead of accepting this framework as an 
undeniable given, one which is obvious and immovable, the role of the modem state should be 
examined closely and critically. Does the state provide the security that we think it does? 
Furthermore, there is a hidden subtext in this argument which is easy to overlook. People with a 
sense of national consciousness want the “control” and the “power” that go (or are perceived to 
go) with a modem state. They will feel insecure if “their state is controlled by foreigners”. I f  
this argument ultimately hinges on power and control, it should not be allowed to masquerade as 
an issue of fundamental human rights. We all have needs as social beings, and these needs 
require an identity which allows us to feel part of a continuous whole. But how can liberal 
philosophy sustain the argument that our collective national identities require the exertion of 
power and control in order to be validated? The important point here is that “power” and 
“control” are not to be exerted on the self, but by the self against others. This is the goal of 
national identities in search of a state because that is the difference that a state border provides 
— the power to make decisions which affect the “other” by defining and controlhng it. When 
Nielsen argues that a people need control over their own destiny, he neglects to frilly parse the 
implications of that operation. How can a group control its destiny without causing serious 
ramifications for non-members of the group who happen to be in its path? Indeed, if Québec 
secedes, the effects will reach far beyond its territorial borders. It is this search for “national” 
control of destiny which has led to the fiercest territorial conflicts of recent years.
There might be some justification for this perspective if national identities were sharply 
and irrevocably fixed and determinable, and membership could never be an issue. But such a 
view would require that nations perceive themselves almost as separate species — unmixable 
and with permanent objective identifying characteristics. This would remove national identity 
from the social and place it squarely in the realm of the biological. The reahty of the matter is 
infinitely (and thankfully) more complex than that. Instead, inclusion in national groups is 
subjective and changeable, and the self-perception of the group as a whole is contingent on the 
time and space of global social relations. Modem cultures, as Tamir describes, “need not 
necessarily be the hnear continuation of long historical traditions beginning in the rural practices 
of small, closed communities entrenched in an ethos of the soil. They can be urban, open, and
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democratic, even populistic.”^^® Given the multiple options for interpreting a national culture, 
the criteria for membership are based on choice. The important criteria of membership, then, is 
not any kind of fixed feature or activity but rather participation in the ongoing practices and 
interpretations of a particular culture, since “at any given time, different cultural interpretations 
compete for recognition within each nation. Membership in the cultural community would then 
be expressed by participating in this debate, rather than by following one specific 
interpretation.”^^ Cultural membership on the basis of participation allows for multiple loyalties 
and identities which reflect the true possibihties of modem hfestyles. Individuals may identify 
with the group into which they were bom, or associate more closely with one of several cultural 
groups of which their extended family is made, or feel tmly “multicultural” on the individual 
level. Additionally, a person might “go native” through marriage or business or educational 
associations. This diversity of vahd possibihties aUows for a confiising but appeahng 
contingency in the making of the self and the coUective. But it also provides a kind of fi'eedom in 
its very indeterminateness. How fi’ee is the individual who resides in a (hberal?) national state 
where his identity is “protected” in a way which locks him forever into his group? For if we 
assume that “foreigners” and “outsiders” are a fixed and definite group, then our own national 
identities as “insiders” are also finite, determinable and hmited. How else is the national identity 
to be protected but by creating constraints on the fi'eedom of its members to leave? In fact, there 
are social constraints on the fi'eedom of the Francophones of Quebec who wish to remain unified 
with Canada. Their national loyalties — hence their identities as Québécois —  are as suspect as 
the rest of those who voted “Non” on the referendum.
By refiising to aUow for the possibihty of altemative views fi'om within their ranks, by 
presenting an independent Québec as the only possible desirable goal. Francophone separatists 
are creating “outsiders” within and among themselves. This pohcy creates intemal borders and 
makes foreigners out of those hving \vithin the (proposed) state.^^  ^ Such insistence on clear 
dichotomies of choice rely on what Young calls “difference as othemess”, a logic of identity 
which sees groups as “mutuaUy exclusive, categoricaUy opposed.”^^ This logic does not aUow
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for the overlap and mutual constitution of identities, but rather sees them as necessarily opposed. 
Not only is this a deeply antagonistic perspective, but it is demonstrably incorrect. Identities 
seep and blend and bounce into and against one another and to view them as impermeable 
harmfully simpHfies a dehcately complex and unpredictable process. Thus, “the attempt to 
demarcate clear and permanent boundaries between things or concepts will always founder on 
the shifts in context, purpose and experience that change the relationships or the perspectives 
describing them.” "^* The separatist Francophone identity is both dependent on and intermingled 
with the various other groups of Québec: Anglophones, Native Indians and Immigrants.
Further, the Francophone identity itself contains ambiguous members — those who are non­
separatist, among others. Instead of the logic of difference as othemess. Young suggests a 
relational conception of difference in which “a group exists and is defined as a specific group 
only in social and interactive relation to others,” so “Group identity is not a set of objective facts, 
but the product of experienced m e a n i n g s . I n  this sense, group membership is always 
ambiguous and never capable of absolute definition. This is not to say that there are no 
recognisable social groups, or that group identity is not a necessary aspect of individual and 
collective existence. Young describes the positive aspects of separatism as calling attention to 
the particularities of the dominant group and forcing them to confi-ont their own supposed 
cultural neutrality. It also provides a disadvantaged group with a focal point for pohtical 
sohdarity, giving it increased abihty to achieve steps toward rehef from oppressive pohcies. 
However, ultimately, separatist pohtics depend upon an exclusivist logic of identity — one 
which attempts to surround and secure a “pure” identity — and must result in a continued cycle 
of absolutist rather than compromising pohtics.
Identity pohtics, and especially those of separatism, hinge on the abihty to control one’s 
history. As Friedman acutely points out, since “history is the discourse of identity, the question 
of who ‘owns’ or appropriates the past is a question of who is able to identify him- or herself 
and the other at any given time and p l a c e . T h u s  the question in Quebec hinges on how the 
different groups perceive both themselves and the members of the other group(s) in historical 
context. The separatist identity clings to a concept of Frenchness based on descent from the
224
Ibid., 159.
225
Ibid., 161.
226
Jonathan Fnedman, “The Past in the Future: History and the Pohtics o f Idso.ûty, '^’ American Anthropologist 94, no. 4 
(1992): 854, 837-859.
124
French settlers of the seventeenth century. The domineering policies of the British after wresting 
control of the colony fi'om France in the eighteenth century provoked a nationahst rebelhon as 
early as 1837 which was suppressed. French Canadians, then, draw on a history of ahenation 
and repression in the constitution of their identity which is formed in opposition to the concept 
of the English and Enghshness. In fact, the French Canadians and Anglo Canadians of today are 
distinctly different from their continental cousins across the Atlantic. Canadians of both cultural 
groups have developed in relation to one another such that the Francophones would not be who 
they are without their history of living on a primarily Anglophone continent, and the 
Anglophones are distinctly different from their British counterparts who have lived without the 
experience of more than two centuries with a strong internal Francophone minority. Indeed, it 
would be difficult to identify the French of the early Québec period as French at all. When 
Papineau led his rebellion in 1837, thus reflecting a developed sense of “national” identity in 
Québec, the unity of the European French identity was itself highly questionable. It was not 
until after the Revolution that the state of disunity of the French identity became clear, and the 
leaders began to implement educational changes to eliminate the variety of patois and local 
customs which had caused many in the south of the country to see the French as foreigners. “If 
one’s home happened to be in the south, then one could get to France by travelhng toward Loire 
and Seine.”^ ’ Even in the mid-nineteenth century, there were still an impressive number of 
citizens who did not speak French: 24 out of the 89 departments contained a majority of 
communes which were not French-speaking. In fact, many Frenchmen “did not know that they 
belonged together until the long didactic campaigns of the later nineteenth century told them they 
did, and their own experience as conditions changed told them that this made s e n s e . S o  what 
becomes of the precious and threatened “Frenchness” of the Québécois? If modem France was 
not even recognisable as a nation to its inhabitants until the early part of the twentieth century, 
what is the source of the historic identity of the Francophone Canadians? It is just that — they 
are Canadians as well as Francophones. The development of contemporary Québécois identity 
cannot be divorced from its history on the North American continent — including the history of 
contentious relations with the British Empire and Anglophone Federalist government. In 
attempting to preserve their identities as separate rather than different, the secessionists in
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Québec (and in general) deny the debt they owe to others (Anglophones, immigrants and native 
Americans) for the identity which they wish to keep “pure”. By denying the contribution of the 
other, separatist identities thus deny a part of themselves.
hi the next chapter, I will analyse the textual narratives of secessionist groups in an 
attempt to expose the mechanisms used in unifying identities as part of the justification for 
separation from the other. This analysis of the perfbrmadvity of language in the creation of 
identity relations is a necessary illustration of the relevance of the above discussion of 
territoriahty and identity in the secessionist imperative.
Chapter 5.
SECESSIONIST PERFORMANCES
Having exposed the contradictory imperatives of territorialisation and stabilisation of 
homogeneous identity groups, I will now examine the social expression of these conflicting 
norms as found in the narratives generated by the leaders of secessionist movements. Textual 
analysis shows the extent to which secessionists take their identities not only as historically but 
as territorially circumscribed, and confirms that they perceive agitation for a separate sovereign 
state to be the only means of maintaining that identity for the future. This chapter will explore in 
detail the secessionist narratives of three contemporary separatist movements: Québec, Padania, 
and Hawai i. The point of this textual combing is to call into question the assumptions upon 
which secessionist claims are based and to reveal the Unguistic processes of the pohdcisation 
(institutionahsation and materialisation) of identity which all such claims must involve. That is, 
secessionist narratives employ reiterated accounts of relational identity formations which operate 
to sohdify the social and cultural boundaries of the secessionist group against Others and to 
fi’ame the State as the only plausible institutional (territorial) manifestation of these boundaries.
It is crucial to note that these analyses are not meant to be an exercise in the comparative 
approach. The examples were chosen for ease of access and current application; the choice is 
acknowledged to be accidental and thus should not be taken as an indication that these cases 
belong together as examples of single or contrasting categories within secessionist narrative 
hterature. The singular common feature of these three cases is simply that they maintain an 
ultimate goal of sovereign independence. It is hoped that careful reading of these secessionist 
stories will highhght the process of the Unguistic performance of secessionist poUtics—how the 
histories of the relevant group identities are created and vaU dated through narrative as poUtical
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necessities. What this chapter definitively does not attempt is an analysis in search of causal 
patterns for secessionist activity. Such approaches have already been attempted and they rely on 
assumptions which directly contradict those of this thesis^ ^®. Specifically, a broad comparative 
approach assumes that there are ahistorical and acultural patterns to political behaviour which 
can be discerned if the samphng is wide enough and deep enough. Under this approach, no 
attempt is made to distinguish historical revolutions fi'om modem guerrilla or terrorist warfare, or 
to understand secession as a historically dependent phenomenon. In direct contradiction, this 
thesis maintains that secession can only be understood as a by-product of the modem 
territorialist state system and that it must be historicised in order to be explained and in order for 
its effects to be dealt with meaningfully.
Constituting Nationalism
The analysis of secessionist texts in this chapter will show that the fiuits of the modem 
territorialist assumption are exclusivist and violent. By definition, secessionists attempt to create 
a state based on a single identity group. These are not neutral or universalist pohtical 
movements with open arms for all who wish to join. They are specifically aimed at defining and 
protecting an “inside” group, and no matter how loudly they proclaim that they will protect 
minorities and remain open to naturahsed citizenship the very basis of their claim to statehood is 
national identity rather than political freedom. Even before the secessionist state materiahses, its 
very purpose calls into question critical issues of civil and human rights. The nationahst 
foundations of such states are described by Robert Hayden as constitutional nationalism, in 
which states are created with “a constitutional and legal structure that privileges the members of 
one ethnically defined nation over other residents”.^ ®^ As Hayden explains, this stmcture does 
not necessarily result in overt discrimination, rather it is based on a vision of the state as the 
embodiment of self-determination for a particular nation, and thus the sovereignty of the state 
resides with the members of that nation and no one else. While Hayden takes the new repubhcs 
of the Former Yugoslavia as his example, his description also apphes to secessionist movements 
generally since they are based on obtaining sovereignty for a specifically defined national identity 
group and not an identity-neutral body of citizens. Additionally, as will become clear below, the 
language Hayden discusses from the constitutions of the former Yugoslav repubhcs strongly
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resembles that of other secessionist texts. For example, the prehminary section of the Croatian 
constitution mentions as “Basic Sources” the “thousand year national independence and state 
continuity of the Croatian nation” and the “historical right of the Croatian nation to hill state 
sovereignty”.^ ^^  The same document continues, asserting that Croatia is “estabhshed as the 
national state of the Croatian nation and the state of the members of other nations and minorities 
that hve within it.”^^ While such language does not seem at odds with the tenets of a hberal 
democratic state, it actually enshrines the principles of ethnic nationalism into the state’s 
founding document. Hayden further clarifies that “Croatian nation” in this context has an ethnic 
rather than a pohtical meaning in the native tongue. He also discusses similar relevant passages 
in the constitutions of Slovenia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but his most important point is 
the conclusion that European democracy and the principle of self-determination are 
incompatible.
The tragedy of Yugoslavia, as Hayden explains, was that the chauvinist pohtics of the 
seceding repubhcs were accepted as democratic by Europe and the United States on the basis of 
the principle of self-determination. But faihng to recognise the inherent contradiction between 
democracy and national self-determination as a pohtical ideology can only lead to the continued 
agitation of separatist groups with exclusionist (cleansing) tendencies. Self-determination in the 
constitutional nation ahsm sense is not the neutral guarantee of pohtical fi*eedom referred to in 
United Nations declarations and covenants. It “estabhshes and attempts to protect the 
construction of a nation as a bounded unity: a sovereign being with its own defining language, 
culture and perhaps ‘biological essence,’ the uniqueness of which must be defended at any 
cost.”^^  ^ This kind of uniqueness is not the harmless neutrahty of open citizenship, but rather 
the harbinger of institutionahsed racism and the repression of free expression of identity. As one 
example, Hayden points to the citizenship laws enacted in the former Yugoslav repubhcs which 
grant special rights to ethnic members of the nation who are non-resident, effectively giving 
them citizenship by virtue of ethnic heritage alone. These laws are accompanied by 
exceptionally rigid naturahsation laws for non-national residents (some of whom have long
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resided in the country) who wish to become citizens.^^" Furthermore, the cloak of democratic 
rhetoric undercuts any protest by minority groups since their grievances will be viewed as 
traitorous in an institutional setting where all are purported to be equal. The result is that 
“Constitutional nationalism therefore builds a massive structural flaw into the pohty that it is 
meant to define, since the permanent exclusion of minorities will hkely make them at best 
indifferent and at worst hostile to the s t a t e . I roni ca l l y ,  the states which are founded by 
national secessionist groups are hkely to engender further secessionist agitation fi'om their own 
minorities who have been defined outside of the sovereign nation.
Secessionist activities, then, tend to generate fiirther pohtical separatism since they are 
based on two incompatible principles of international law: the concepts of national self- 
determination and the sanctity of state territorial boundaries. Because national self- 
determination involves a continual process of discrimination between members and non­
members, it always contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction. By defining its 
territorial sovereignty on the basis of the sovereignty of the people who are members of a specific 
nation, constitutional nationahsm — and, by definition, secessionist movements — deny 
equahty to people who are not members of the sovereign nation. The results can only be further 
unrest by groups who have been “minoritised” by this excluding process. Also, since the 
international pohtical model remains one in which territorial states are the only legitimate actors, 
any organised ahenated groups wiU logically seek the goal of an independent territorial state for 
themselves. It is no simple coincidence, then, that each of the secessionist cases analysed below 
contains the germ of fiirther agitation fi'om internal groups which will become minoritised if the 
movements succeed.
Language, Action, Politics
Before the introduction of particular secessionist texts, it is important to clarify the 
impact of narrative itself as a pohtical act. Regardless of the many forms in which they may be 
told, the historical narratives of national groups have powerful effects upon both the teUers and 
the hsteners. Secessionist leaders exert a kind of power in their telhng of the nation. As Michael 
Toolan puts it:
narrators are typicahy trusted by their addressees. In seeking and being granted 
rights to a lengthy verbal contribution...narrators assert their authority to tell, to
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take up the role of knower, or entertainer, or producer, in relation to the 
addressees’ adopted role of learner or consumer. To narrate is to make a bid for 
a kind of power.^ ^®
Secessionist leaders exert authority as narrators of the nation, telhng the stories which create the 
national identity as distinctive and worthy of statehood. Secessionist stories, then, tell the past 
as distinctive and glorious, and foretell the fiiture as one of sovereign independence. In the cases 
below the addressees are primarily those who will be included within the identity-generating 
narrative, but they are also those who will become marginahsed as outsiders within the 
secessionist state. Stories of nationahty exphcitly claim the authority to draw boundaries around 
social groups. They both unify and divide as they provide historical criteria for the inclusion of 
some and the exclusion of others from the national group. Such narratives constitute acts of 
power. They “act upon people” in two ways: “either by informing them and so modifying their 
perceptions or by defining them and so modifying the ways in which they are perceived by 
others.”^^ ’ These two effects are of course inter-related in the sense that one may have one’s 
own perceptions modified at the same time that others perceive a modified view of oneself. 
Secessionist narratives operate in exactly this way — telhng stories of the tragedy of a separate 
people who will finally triumph when they achieve sovereign statehood. At the same time, the 
texts define the membership of a seceding group and by imphcation create a category of all 
others as not of that group. Thus secessionist narratives exert great power and can be seen as 
acts which have pohtical effects.
As J.G. A. Pocock describes in his discussion of speech as pohtical act, no one’s speech 
is strictly her own. Because language is so contextual and institutionahsed, no statement has a 
completely pure meaning. Further, no statement is purely attributable to its author. Our 
language, both in utterance and understanding, is made up of words which have been formed “by 
sedimentation and institutionahzation of the utterances performed by others whose identities and 
intentions may no longer be precisely k n o w n . O u r  words, then, are only “borrowed” from 
countless others who have used and contributed to their meaning in the past. Language acts 
‘have been preinstitutionahzed; they must be performed by institutionahzed 
means.... |T|nstitutionahzation makes my language available to the person to or about whom I
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speak for purposes of reply and refutation; he can, as we put it, answer me in my terms.”^^ The 
apphcation of this theory to the secessionist situation indicates the extent to which secessionists 
are both impelled and hmited by the institutionahsed setting in which they exist. If they wish to 
be recognised as possessing a vahd identity, secessionists must speak in terms of sovereignty 
and the nation-state. The international sphere is one of sovereignty, democracy, territorial states 
and national self-determination. Each of these words has an ambiguous and intersubjective 
meaning which has come to hmit the way in which a people may perceive itself and be 
perceived. In the institutionahsed practice of the international sphere, a distinct people has only 
two choices: that of being a sovereign nation with a territory or that of remaining a “minority” 
within a sovereign state.^"“ Given the starkness of these options, it is not surprising that despite 
their ambiguity, terms such as sovereignty and self-determination are understood by 
secessionists in their most absolute sense.
The performativity of speech must be understood as a two-directional action. According 
to Pocock, the intersubjectivity of language determines that there can never be an act of self­
definition which is entirely pure. Identities can only be located by reference to others. Charles 
Taylor calls this a crucial feature of the self: “One is a self only among other selves. A self can 
never be described without reference to those who surround it.” "^*^ This is critical to our 
understanding of the pohtics of self-determination.
Now clearly [a nation] cannot say ‘we’ without redistributing a number of other 
human beings among the categories ‘we’, ‘you’, and ‘they’. To do this to 
people can have very considerable consequences for them....Liberation, even, 
that image of such potency in the contemporary sensibihty, involves an act of 
power over others: a speech-act by which I define myself is performed in 
another’s universe and redefines him as well as me.^ *^^
Self-determination must also involve other-determination and thus constitutes an attack on the
others’ pohtical understanding of themselves. This is not to argue that social boundaries and
identity definition are harmfiil in general, but rather that institutionahsing these boundaries
within the territorial sovereignty of the state perpetuates the pohtics of identification by
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exclusion rather than by encounter with the Other. Secessionist groups, then, do not only cause 
a redefinition of the boundaries of the parent state, but of the social boundaries of the rest of the 
world. When Croatia and Slovenia seceded fi'om Yugoslavia, they redefined themselves as 
national groups with international standing, and the rest of the international community was 
redefined as one which contained the actors “Croatia” and “Slovenia”. Furthermore, the national 
identities now permissible were redefined from those of a world in which “Croatian and 
Slovenian” were subsumed under “Yugoslavian” (and the rest of the world could claim a non- 
Yugoslavian identity), to one in which non-Yugoslavian-ness did not rule out the possibihty of 
being Croatian or Slovenian (and the rest of the world had to rethink itself as not just non- 
Yugoslavian, but also non-Croatian and non-Slovenian). And all this in just the simplest terms, 
excluding all the difficulties of re-definition for the many members of non-national groups within 
the newly defined areas.
Performing the Nation
Identities are necessary to all of us, so why should secessionist identity performative 
narratives pose any problem? Even while secessionist narrators assert their authority to tell us of 
their nation’s history and cause, we (the non-secessionist hsteners) also exert authority in our 
willingness to beheve (or not) the vahdity of the narrative. Toolan concludes that “the ultimate 
authority for ratifying a text as a narrative rests not with the teller but with the 
perceiver/addressee.”^^  ^ However even if the text is recognised as a valid narrative, there is a 
further act of recognition which the addressee must grant a secessionist narrative — the 
recognition of the moral point of the narrative — that the national identity which the 
secessionists assert deserves sovereign statehood. This is the crucial distinction between 
narrative and non-narrative accounts, as Hayden White argues. Narrative necessarily refers to 
and creates a normative context for the subject. Thus, narrativity “is intimately related to, if not 
a function of^  the impulse to morahze reahty, that is, to identify it with the social system that is 
the source of any morahty that we can imagine.” "^*^ Secessionists do not write historical 
narratives for entertainment, they write them to create moral authority for their claims to a 
separate state. It is in this way that these texts are performative: they are discursive practices
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which produce the effects which they name. '^'  ^ By continually asserting the terms of their
identity, secessionists perform that identity. These performances become more meaningfiil and
more authoritative to the extent that they are repeated and compelled. As Judith Butler explains:
“Performativity is thus not a singular ‘act,’ for it is always a reiteration of a norm or set of
norms, and to the extent that it acquires an act-hke status in the present, it conceals or
dissimulates the conventions of which it is a repetition.” "^*^ Repeated identity performances,
then, have the cumulative effect of normalising their own assertions. The less we question these
norms (i.e., the more hidden their performativity), the more successful they become at achieving
authority as natural or ideal. This estabhshes a critical hnk between performative speech and
norms which must be kept in mind while attempting to reveal the concealed processes which
produce pohtical conventionality. As Cynthia Weber explains:
Key to understanding the difference between performance and performativity is 
their connection to normativity, understood as the ongoing citational processes 
whereby ‘regular subjects’ and ‘standards of normahty’ are discursively co­
constituted to give the effect that both are natural rather than cultural 
constructs.^"’
Normativity is the paradoxical element in the performative act, however. It provides both the 
end and the beginning. The performative subject cannot be engaged in the citation of norms 
without being herself created by them. Neither can these norms be resisted or re-articulated 
except by a subject which has been produced by the norms. This constitutive circle is what 
Butler calls “The paradox of subjectivation”. Where does this leave the reader of secessionist 
narratives? The task here is both to reveal and to question the extent to which norms of national 
identity have been essentiahsed through authoritative performances. In reveahng the 
underpinnings of secessionist identity performances, we must remember that the ideals which 
secessionists strive to authorise have arisen from the pohtical norms of the current international 
system. In this sense, we are all impUcated in the identity performances of others, even while we 
reiterate the performances which legitimate ourselves.
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An Act Respecting the Future of Québec
On October 30,1995, the government of the Canadian province of Québec held a 
province-wide referendum on the question of secession. The word “secession” was not 
mentioned, rather the question was posed as one of sovereignty under the terms of a Bill, called 
Bill 1, An Act Respecting the Future of Québec. The Bill, subtitled as “Declaration of 
Sovereignty”, included a preamble, a text and an appendix discussing the schedule of political 
separation under the terms of the June 12,1995 agreement among the three secessionist parties. 
The effect of a “yes” vote on the Bill would have committed the government of Québec to 
attempt to negotiate a treaty of economic and pohtical partnership with Canada. One year after 
such negotiations would have begun, the Québec government would have had a mandate to 
declare Québec’s sovereignty, either under the terms of the partnership treaty or after having 
determined that the negotiations had failed. As is now well-known, the 1995 vote ended with 
the narrowest of margins in favour of rejecting sovereignty. Nevertheless, the text of Bill 1 
provides an excellent example of a secessionist narrative identity performance.
The Preamble of Bill 1 consists of about two and a half pages of the reasons why 
Québec is a nation and why it should be sovereign; the passage ends in a declaration of 
sovereignty. The Preamble is the stuff of great drama — narrated hke a Greek tragedy, it 
contains a monologue of the history of the people, interspersed with songhke choral interludes.
It begins:
L The time has come to reap the fields of history. The time has come at last to 
harvest what has been sown for us by four hundred years of men and women 
and courage, rooted in the soil and now returned to it The time has come for 
us, tomorrow’s ancestors, to make ready for our descendants harvests that 
are worthy of the labours of the past. May our toil be worthy of them, may 
they gather us together at last.^ '^ ^
This opening paragraph provides a clear set of clues about the assumptions and goals of the
Bill’s supporters. It is heavy with territorial import. The agricultural metaphor of toil, sowing,
harvest and reaping creates a strong tie between the Québécois and the territory of Québec.
Moreover, there is an element of obhgation imphed in the references to the ancestors who have
laboured so hard for four hundred years. It is the honourable choice, the words imply, to vote
yes and bring to a culmination all the work of the “ancestors”. In fact, this preamble speaks only
to the national group of Francophones and excludes both immigrants and English-speakers,
whose ancestors have not “toiled” for independence.
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After this opening chorus, the Preamble continues to further describe the group for 
whom the referendum is specifically designed. They are “the pioneers” who had “come from a 
great civihzation” and who “maintained the heritage of France”. Despite the “conquest” of 
1760, the determination of these pioneers’ descendants to “remain faithful to a destiny unique in 
North America” continued. “Neither attempts at assimilation nor the Act of Union of 1840 
could break their endurance.” These passages cement an image of the heroes of the narrative: the 
gritty, tough hard-working settlers who fought to keep their French identity, despite dehberate 
assaults on their very Frenchness. This version of Québec history establishes a record of protest 
against domination, of the constant struggle not to succumb to the temptations of Englishness, 
no matter what the cost. It describes a clash of cultures in which an embattled minority of 
French speakers emerges victorious. To give the (un-named) authors some credit, they do 
acknowledge a debt to non-French peoples: “the First Nations” who further “enriched” their 
great civihzation, the Enghsh community “that grew up at their side”, and the immigrants “all 
have contributed to forming this people which became in 1867 one of the two founders of the 
Canadian federation.” But if the native peoples, the Enghsh, and the immigrants did indeed 
contribute to the formation of the Québec people then why is the narration of Québec’s history 
one which excludes their stories?
The Preamble continues with a series of points justifying the right of the people of 
Québec to choose their future. “Because the heart of this land beats in French” — the words 
resonate. “Because we inhabit territories dehmited by our ancestors”, and “because for four 
hundred years we have cleared, ploughed, paced, surveyed, dug, fished, built, started anew, 
discussed, protected, and loved this land that is cut across and watered by the St. Lawrence 
River.” The insistence on four hundred years of history persists in excluding all who do not 
spring from the loins of the first French pioneers. Here is the performative “We” in clear rehef 
— the “We” which enacts and creates the Québécois norm. The many histories, longer and 
shorter than four centuries, which went into — which were crucial to — the making of today’s 
Québec are nulhfied in this text. The description of the nature of the land and the work done on 
it shows a staggering deafness to the history and rights of the tribes of the “First Nations”. In 
the story told by this Preamble, the land simply had no existence before the pioneers came and 
called it “Québec”. At most, the narrative allows that the natives and the non-French-speaking 
peoples can claim to have “contributed” to the making of the nation — a helpful, but not 
formative role. Meanwhile, those who can comfortably belong to this specific French “We” are 
exhorted by “the legacy of the struggles and courage of the past” to “take charge of [their] own 
destiny.”
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Interestingly, the Preamble’s attempts to include “all those men and women who inhabit 
it” among the people of the land of Québec are fraught with contradiction. The non- 
Francophones are those who currently feel most threatened by the prospect of an independent 
Quebec. They perceive their interests in self-expression to he in a multi-cultural Canada rather 
than in a French nation which promises to uphold their rights. They also perceive their legal 
status to be at risk from a change of state governance. More specifically, the native peoples are 
parties to a treaty with the Federal Government of Canada respecting their rights and usage of 
reservation lands. This treaty covers a very large portion of the northern half of Québec’s 
provincial territory. A secession by the province, the native peoples have warned, would be 
regarded as a unilateral (and therefore void) change in the terms of the treaty and would not be 
vahd in their eyes. They would, moreover, claim a secession of their own in order to maintain 
control over their lands. In the referendum on this Bill which took place in October 1995, the 
Enghsh speakers and immigrant population, about 18 to 20% of Québec’s total, voted sohdly 
“no”. These people were not convinced by the story of the Preamble — the story which 
excluded them and spoke to a particular national group, privileging it in the founding document 
of the proposed state. The story the Preamble tells, of an obhgation to claim sovereignty over the 
land because “it is this land alone that represents our pride and the source of our strength, our 
sole opportunity to express ourselves” is a story which performs a particular subject. The people 
who claim “our pride”, “our strength” and “our sole opportunity” for expression, are the 
“descendants” only of the French. They are the people whose Frenchness has been a baton 
passed by each generation, who feel that their very selves are imperiled unless they can be 
guaranteed the normative materiahsation of a sovereign (French) state. The language of self- 
preservation and expression in the Preamble speaks only to Francophones. It is only they who 
feel so fiercely the connection between their cultural preservation and a secessionist state.
Native peoples, immigrants, and English-speakers, by contrast, cannot identify with the 
embattled metaphor since their identities are not tied to the story of a French cultural struggle. In 
fact, these non-French identities fare far better in multi-cultural Federal Canada where they are 
subsumed in a plurahty of identities, and where the state is no longer overtly finked to a 
particular (sub-federal) national identity.
The Preamble’s second chorus sings:
n . We know the winter in our souls. We know its blustery days, its solitude, its
false eternity and its apparent deaths. We know what it is to be bitten by the
winter cold.
Here seasonal metaphors set the tone for a passage which discusses the difficult times in the 
history of the Québec people. The images of winter, blustery cold and “apparent death” narrate
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the hopelessness and despair of the Québécois, of their thwarted dreams and aspirations to build 
their own sovereign nation. The story then takes a turn with the entry of Québec into the 
federation with Anglo-Canada “on the faith of a promise of equality” and “respect for our 
authority in certain matters that to us are vital.” This description of the province entering 
wiUingly into a federative union misleadingly imphes that it had a choice. The territory of 
Québec as a colony had been lost by France in a war with Britain. Thence it became a British 
territory to be governed as Britain saw fit, which eventually included unifying it with the rest of 
Canada as one administrative unit. The French-speaking province wished fi'om the beginning to 
be recognised as “distinct” and vociferously withstood all attempts at assimilation. Although 
current Federal poUcies of bihngualism privilege Francophones beyond the proportion of their 
numbers within the Federation, they continue to long for a status beyond that of one culture 
among a multitude. They wish to be recognised as “unique”, a “distinct society” and an 
autonomous national group. At this point, the Preamble introduces Anglo-Canada as the villain 
and paints a tale of betrayal: the arrangements within the Federation “did not hve up to those 
early hopes. The Canadian State contravened the federative pact, by invading in a thousand 
ways areas in which we are autonomous”. Attributing a unitary motive of trickery and deceit to 
the Federal government, the Preamble declares, “We were hoodwinked in 1982 when the 
governments and Canada and the Enghsh-speaking provinces made changes to the Constitution, 
in depth and to our detriment, in defiance of the categorical opposition of our National 
Assembly.” These words maintain an assumption of bad faith on the part of “Enghsh-speaking” 
Canada which narrates a confhctual relationship between Francophone and Anglophone, making 
it hkely to become a performative one. This behes the previous assurances of welcome given to 
the Anglophone minority of Québec. There can be no clearer statement of othering than that of 
We were hoodwinked by Them, the Enghsh-speaking provinces. Although the writers and 
supporters of Bill 1 clearly have no wish to ahenate their own non-French minorities, they also 
cannot refrain fi’om narrating Québec the way they see it — the way which involves an 
oppressed nation strugghng to break fi-ee of the cultural chains of the Federahst state. For 
Québec, anything but total independence is an insult to its greatness. The other stories tied to 
the history of this province cannot be told without marring the purity of the movement for the 
hberation of the French “Us”. The story told by the Québécois is one in which the very presence 
of the province in an Enghsh-speaking country is one of constant threat. Thus, the We “reached 
a decision never again to restrict [themselves] to mere survival but fi'om this time on to build 
upon [their] difference”. And this difference cannot flourish in a plurahty but must have the 
fi'eedom to be pure: “Because we have the deep-seated conviction that continuing within Canada
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would be tantamount to condemning ourselves to languish and to debasing our very identity.”
The identity performativity of these words produces profound social divides. These words act
upon the people of Québec to create two groups: those who are the “We” of French pioneer
ancestry and who therefore must vote for independence as an act of self-preservation, and those
who are the “Them” of Canada, of plurahty, of multiculturahsm, who will be excluded from this
story of Quebec no matter what they vote for. By producing the identities which it describes,
such identity performative language serves to create and perpetuate social fault hues which are
not easily repaired. These groups will remain at odds in Quebec for as long as the issue of
secession continues to be active, and would certainly not quietly assimilate within an
independent state.
The third and final choral interlude of the Preamble reads:
HL For the men and women of this country who are the warp and weft of it and its 
erosion, for those of tomorrow whose growth we are now witnessing, to he 
comes before to have. And this principle lies at the very heart of our 
endeavour.
Images of woven fabric and of present and friture set the tone here for a segment which 
elucidates the characteristics which will make the new nation great. It will be the very 
expression of the identity of the Québec people, an existential necessity regardless of the 
economic cost. “To be comes before to have”. Contextually, this passage could only imply that 
being cannot be expressed in any way other than through a fully independent state.
The Preamble continues with a section about the distinctness of French language and 
culture. “In order that the profound sense of belonging to a distinct people be now and for all 
time the very bastion of our identity, we proclaim our will to hve in a French-language society.” 
The recurring phrase “distinct people” and its dependence on French language and culture 
reveals assumptions about the nature of the identity cherished by the Québécois. It is an identity 
which is seen as identifiable (distinct) and therefore as pure. The ferocity of the will to be 
French evinced in this document stems from a shared feehng that Frenchness is something 
definite, recognisable, fixed, and therefore capable of being adopted as a pohtical agenda. Why 
else would there be a desperate need for a state? The assumption of the supporters of Bill I is 
that Frenchness is necessary for the identity of the Québec people, and that political sovereignty 
is necessary to guarantee Frenchness. This is a hidden — but nonetheless clearly present — 
statement of constitutional nationahsm along the hnes of those indicated earher by Hayden.
Interestingly, the need to acknowledge the presence of non-French people in Québec 
surfaces immediately foUowing the strong declaration of the need for a French identity. But 
again, the non-French elements of Québec are relegated to the place of attractive side dish.
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definitely not part of the main course. The non-French peoples are described as “varied and new 
contributions” through which “our culture takes on fresh colour and amphtude.” This is not an 
acknowledgement that modem Quebec's identity is produced through continued contact and 
mutual absorption of various cultures, it is a statement of toleration under the wing of the French 
Québec nation. Thus the purity of Frenchness is preserved, and also enhvened, through contact 
but not minghng with other cultures. The Québécois see that “It is essential that we welcome 
them in such a way that never will these differences be seen as threats or as reasons for 
intolerance.” '^*^  The non-French cultures are to be made “welcome” — they will be guests, 
tolerated — part of the state of Québec, but not part of its special Frenchness. Although the 
nature of the state envisioned by Bill 1 is that of a hberal democracy, it is a mistake to see it (and 
indeed, hberal democracies in general) as automaticahy culturahy neutral. The whole raison 
d’être for an independent Québec is one of nationahsm and identity. And although the rights of 
the Enghsh-speaking community “wiU be maintained” and also the rights of the First Nations 
wiU be “safeguarded”, that does not erase the fact that the state which wiU be in charge of the 
maintaining and safeguarding them will be one which has an official national identity of 
Frenchness. This identity is actually mandated under the terms of the Bill in the section entitled 
The New Constitution. Clause 7 reads: “The new constitution shall state that Québec is a 
French-speaking country and shall impose upon the Government the obligation of protecting 
Québec culture and ensuring its development.” Institutionahsing the protection of a national 
culture in the state’s constitution is the hallmark of a nationahst state.
One year after the 1995 referendum, the former leader of the Parti Québécois, Jacques 
Parizeau, contributed several articles to the newspaper Le Devoir. These were translated and 
pubhshed in Toronto by The Globe and Mail. In these articles, the secessionist leader clarifies 
his post-referendum stance and his continued insistence on a vision of a sovereign Québec in the 
future. In a piece poignantly titled “Who Are We? Where Are We Going?”, Parizeau reiterates 
that “We” the people of Québec must have sovereignty: “Québec’s sovereignty appears to me 
necessary for the Québec nation. It must be responsible for itself.”^^® Defining it as a simple 
equation of rights and interests, he states: “Defending one’s interests, promoting them, isn’t just 
an option, it’s absolutely natural.” But Parizeau dehberately simphfies the complex question of 
whose interests and how they are to be determined. With the clarity of a purist, he sees the social
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conflict as normal and acceptable. The behaviour of those who voted against secession is 
“perfectly comprehensible. They prefer to remain part of the Canadian majority rather than 
becoming a minority in Québec. Their interests dictate this attitude.” There is nothing to 
condemn them for, their interests are not our interests — the We^  the French. For Parizeau this 
is acceptable, because the We will prevail and the referendum will finally be won; “Afterwards, 
they will adapt.” Thus with stunning simphcity, the foundations of the secessionist standpoint 
are laid bare. The Us of the nation must have sovereignty in order to preserve our fixed and 
definable identity. Others who are not of this identity may contribute to the fife of the nation as 
long as they choose to also preserve and adapt to it. Any other non-national groups will be 
allowed to continue as institutionahsed minorities with special “protections”. However, the 
identity of “The Nation” will be enshrined in the state.
Parizeau himself answers the question of what is the Québécois nation with the 
response: “It is constituted essentially of Francophones (whatever their origin), sharing a culture 
unique to them.” That is, anyone may be a Quebecker — as long as she speaks French, and 
joins in the French Québec culture. As for those other elements of the society, the native groups 
and Enghsh speakers, “once sovereignty is achieved they should, at their own pace, integrate 
themselves into the Québécois nation.” The irony of this sentiment seems completely to have 
esc^ed Parizeau, who writes it with ah apparent seriousness. The Québécois must not be 
assimilated into Enghsh-speaking Canada— this is an insult to their very identity, yet Enghsh- 
speaking Canadians should, in order to be Quebeckers, assimilate into French-speaking Québec. 
This is natural. Having writhed under the cultural constraints of bihngual Canadian federahsm, 
the Francophone leader feels no compunction about advising the members of Québec’s 
minorities to capitulate. He might as weU have included the sentiment that French culture is 
superior to any of the others and therefore more worthy of being assimilated into. Of course, 
Parizeau himself does not see it as a question of exclusivity, but of open welcome to membership 
in the Québec culture: “We need to be responsible for ourselves. There is nothing racist or 
xenophobic in saying it: A Quebecker is whoever wants to be one. Case closed!”^^  ^ What he 
does not allow for is the possibihty that many people wish to be both Quebeckers and 
Canadians, or Quebeckers and Native Americans, or Quebeckers and representatives of various 
immigrant groups. The secessionist view of national culture is an absolutist one — you may be 
either “in” or “out” on the terms with which the secessionists have defined the nation.
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This analysis does not presuppose malicious intent upon the drafters of any particular 
secessionist text. Rather, these texts are the logical outcome of a political ontology of national 
being which blindly impels an exclusivist ideology towards disastrously conflictual results.
These texts show that the Pandora’s Box of secessionism is actually more like a Russian doll. 
Having been denied a fulfilling sense of recognition for their identities, secessionists feel the 
need, in turn, to create pure political spaces for themselves where their identities may be 
sheltered and protected. This constitutional nationalism, in turn, threatens the identities of 
members of non-national groups — many of whom have made their home in the country for 
centuries, if not actually indigenous. The driving forces behind secessionist movements which 
enable them to succeed in the difficult goal of state creation are invariably nationalist. If a people 
do not feel the ties of a common identity, no matter how recently constructed (or reconstructed), 
they will not be willing to suffer the difficulties and uncertainties of creating a new state. This is 
especially the case now when global economic interdependence has greatly increased the 
possibilities for regional prosperity based on global markets. This dynamic will be illustrated 
most clearly in the next set of narratives.
The Northern League
The activities of the Northern League (LegaNord) of Italy represent an interesting blend 
of radical secessionism and practical politicking. The Northern League itself is both a political 
party with a respectable presence in the Italian parliament and a pohtical movement for 
independence for the North of Italy. The thirteen regions of the North have been given the 
national name “Padania” after the god of the Po River which runs through the area. Padania has 
a flag (a green Celtic star on a white background) and a national symbol (a medieval warrior 
with sword raised — commemorating the struggles of the North Itahan communes for self-rule in 
the 12th and 13 th centuries). There is a parhament of Padania which has 200 members elected 
from a field of 1,175 candidates. Identification cards and currency have been designed, but are 
not in general use. These activities are largely due to the efforts and motivation of one man, 
Umberto Bossi, the founder of Lega Nord. Tapping into the economic finstration of heavily 
taxed businessmen of the North, Bossi attacked Rome both with pleas for a federalist structure in 
which the North would have autonomy and with threats of secession if this did not occur. The 
political activities of the Northern League in Rome’s parliament carry a high percentage of local 
support. However, support for secession is calculated at a maximum of 20%.^’^  Despite having
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been coy about the possibility of secession in his speeches to the Italian Chamber of Deputies in
Rome, Bossi took steps to set up a government for Padania. He announced the approval (by the
Constituent Assembly of the Regions of the North) of a provisional “Constitution of the North”
on 24 March 1996. On 4 May 1996, the Parhament of the North changed its name to the
Parhament of Padania, and began the business of forming a government of Padania. Eight days
later, the Padanian Parhament chose its first Prime Minister, Giancarlo Pagharini, and appointed
a Committee for the Liberation of Padania. On 15 September 1996, a ceremony announcing the
Declaration of Independence and Sovereignty of Padania was held on the banks of the Po River.
The State of Padania currently exists in virtual hmbo — no longer a simple pohtical party, but
also not a recognised state with an international presence (despite its symbohc efforts and
“foreign office”). Its pubhc relations documents indicate a certain ambivalence between the
contradictory goals of sovereign independence and a federalist restructuring of the Itahan state.
Most of the population of Padania considers itself to be Itahan, but that does not seem to bother
Bossi, who declares “History is made by minorities, not the majority.
The Declaration of Independence and Sovereignty of Padania is a textual performance
which attempts to produce an identity for Padanians on several levels. On its face, it acts as a
document for the purpose of declaring that Padania is a separate state. But through its language
and style, it evokes an image of Padania as one of a distinguished company of secessionist
revolutionary nations destined for democratic greatness. The opening passage of the Declaration
is taken more or less directly fi'om the American Declaration of Independence of 1776:
When in the course in [sic] human events it becomes necessary for one Peoples 
[sic] to dissolve the bands which bind them with another, to estabhsh 
themselves as an independent and sovereign community, and to assume the role 
assigned to them by the Natural Law of Self-Determination among the nations 
of the Earth, respect for International Society and all of humanity requires that 
they should declare the reasons which impel them to the separation.^’"*
The Padanian version of this passage has been shghtly altered to fit more securely into the 20th
century system of international legal norms. Thomas Jefferson’s text made no reference to the
“Natural law of Self-Determination” (a post-World War I form of usage), but instead refers to
“the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God”. The shght differences in language between these
two passages serve to highlight the vast differences in effect between the two documents on the
whole. While the American document is largely one of complaint and invective against the
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monarch, referring to the Lockean doctrine of equahty to support its (then novel) claims for 
popular sovereignty, the Padanian declaration strives to locate itself within a context of 
sovereign states based on historical national rights. While the Padanian declaration, hke the 
American one, accuses the central government of abusive coloniahst pohcies toward its people, 
its main claim to legitimacy derives both from the concept of national self-determination and the 
identification of Padania as a historical nation which belongs to Europe and the tradition of 
democracy.
The Declaration strives to produce a distinctive “We” in the people of Padania: “Since 
time immemorial, we hve, we build, we work, we protect, we love these lands handed down to us 
by our forbearers, bathed and quenched by the waters of our great rivers”. In order to lay vahd 
claim to the principle of self-determination, a people must be distinct. Thus: “Here we have 
invented an original way of hving, of developing the arts, and of working. . . We therefore 
constitute a natural, cultural, social, and economic community founded on shared values, culture, 
and history, and on harmonious social, moral, and economic conditions”. Not only is Padania a 
historical entity (regardless of the fact that its name is of recent vintage), but its independence is 
necessary for the security of the cultural identity of its people: “Padania is our pride, our precious 
resource, and our only chance for freely and fully expressing our individual natures and our 
feehng of community”. These are the performative words of secessionist speech acts in 
operation—the differentiation of a people, and the declaration that those people cannot hve under 
the rule of any other people but themselves. The definition of the people in Padania's case is 
almost entirely based on prior administrative territorial dehneations. The fact that Venice and 
South Tyrol have vastly different histories is casuahy ignored in order to assert the unity of 
identity within the declared boundaries. And since there is no distinct language to help 
distinguish the differentness of Padania, grounds must be elaborated for the distinctness of its 
people from those of the south of Italy. In other words, not only must the Padanians declare that 
they exist as a people, but they must clarify how different they are from the people with whom 
they are now forced to share a political system. This is a crucial part of every secessionist 
movement. Without this process of social and cultural othering, there can be no justification for 
the territorial political othering which they hope to achieve.
In Padania's narrative southern Italy, symbolised by the Italian State, is painted in the 
colours of a coloniahst power which bleeds the wealth of Padania dry. In contrast to honest, 
hard-working Padania, “the history of the Itahan State has become the history of colonial 
oppression, of economic exploitation, and of moral violence; The Itahan State has, over time, 
systematically occupied Padania's economic and social system through its parasitic bureaucratic
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apparatus; The Italian State has systematically annihilated every form of autonomy and self- 
government of our Towns, our Provinces, and our Regions”. But again, unhke the American 
Declaration of Independence, which refers to the British people as “our brethren”, the writers of 
the Padanian Declaration find it necessary to make a national case beyond the one of coloniahst 
exploitation. The Itahan state, they claim, “has dehberately attempted to suppress the languages 
and the cultural identities of the Peoples of Padania through the colonization of the pubhc 
education system”. Also, the laws of the Itahan State are not only unfair, but are “apphed with 
racist criteria” and enforced by “Roman-style prefects and law enforcement oflBcers applying the 
most hateful forms of Statist coloniahsm”. These grievances finahy lead to the necessary 
conclusion; “We are profoundly convinced that the continued presence of Padania within the 
confines of the Itahan State would lead to gradual extinction of ah hope of rebirth and the 
annihilation of the identities of its Peoples”. Thus, despite the fact that technicaUy Padania is 
stiU very much a part of The Italian State ^ the performative rhetoric of its secessionist leaders 
attempts to effect a social chasm between residents of Padania and the rest of Italy.
The advocates of Padanian secession adopt two contradictory metaphors to vahdate the 
need for independence. The first image is one of history, the continuity of the present day 
Padania with the communes of the medieval Northern Italy, as symbohsed by the medieval 
warrior of the national symbol. This image tells a story of Padania as a continuous entity whose 
ancestors struggled and toiled to build a prosperity which the current people are bound to 
protect. But in direct opposition to that, the narrative also tells a tale of Padania as a new baby 
being birthed by the secessionist leaders and embodying new hopes for the inclusion of Padania 
in a Federation of European regions. Thus, the assertion, “Padania will become a pohtical and 
institutional focal point for the construction of a Europe of the Regions and of the Peoples”; and 
the proclamation that “the hour has finally arrived to set forth on the great enterprise of giving 
birth to this new Country which we baptize today with the name Padania”. On September 15, 
1996, Umberto Bossi enacted the baptismal metaphor by pouring a jug of Po River water into 
the Venice lagoon afl;er having read the Declaration of Independence to a crowd of one hundred 
and fifty thousand.
Having read out the Declaration, Bossi and his supporters have the heavy task of 
creating a sense of nationhood among the residents of Padania if they are ever to be taken as a 
serious secessionist movement. A document titled “Padania: The Foundations of a Nation” 
provides fiirther details of the points hinted at in the Declaration.^^^ This text also indicates the
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extent to which the secessionist leaders of Padania are aware of the performative potential of 
their language and the intentional re-presentation of history. This document is replete with irony 
and narrative sleight of hand. In a section called “Reclaiming Our History”, the author 
condemns the tactics of the Itahan State in attempting to create an artificial nation by confusing 
the people into beheving that States and Nations are the same thing; “Itahan officialdom 
professes to teach us Padanians that we should regard ourselves mentahy and emotionahy closer 
to the inhabitants of the southernmost islets off Sicily, than to, say, those of neighbouring 
Southern Switzerland, sharing the same mode of speech with Lombardy. How can we build a 
Europe of the Peoples on such an artificial basis?” The People of Padania, the text goes on, are 
more definitively a Nation than the Itahan State, “which for 135 years has attempted in vain to 
define itself as a Nation”. Moreover, according to this history, Padania has long had close ties to 
the rest of the continent of Europe, looking northward rather than towards Rome from the sixth 
century onwards. In the Middle Ages, the history continues, Padania was the site of the 
development of the Free Communes which developed “profound differences in civil hfe and 
social organization” from the rest of the Itahan peninsula, and which “reached the heights not 
only of industry, commerce, and finance, but also of culture, indeed, of Western civihzation.” 
Moreover, we read, the description of the entire territory of the Itahan state as the “Itahan 
peninsula” is an erroneous and “thinly veiled attempt to instiU the idea that the ‘Nation-State’ is 
etemaUy defined by nature itself.” A glance at the map, the Padanian historian teUs us, would 
show that only 130,000 square kilometres of Itahan State territory are peninsular. The 
remaining 120,000 “are clearly part of the European continental land mass.” Therefore, Padania 
is geographicahy as weU as historicahy pointed towards Europe and its “geographical position in 
the center of Europe has made it a strategic area for communications, and also for warfare.”
Thus Padania’s history must be narrated to re-situate it as different, not only pohticahy from the 
modem Itahan central state, but also historically as an entity which was never a natural part of 
the rest of the Itahan territory. Old ways of understanding and speaking of Italy must be swept 
away, and “When we hear people talk about the ‘northern part of the Itahan peninsula’ in 
reference to the Alpine-Padanian regions, we must object to the incontrovertible abuse of this 
expression.”
In a segment of the Foundations o f a Nation document titled “The Padanians Rise to 
Consciousness”, the Padanian narrator attacks even the notion ofhnguisdc compatibihty by 
claiming that the language of the Padanian area is not a dialect of Itahan, but rather an entirely 
different language group: “According to distinguished scholars, the Romance languages (neo- 
Latin dialects) are divided into two large groups: Western, including Gaho-Romance and Iberic
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idioms; and Eastern, including Italian and Romanian.” The border between the two language 
groups apparently (conveniently) runs right along the southern border of the would-be state of 
Padania.^^^ But, the author continues, knowledge of this hnguistic border “is rigorously 
forbidden in Itahan schools so as to make people beheve that our modes of speech are dialects of 
Itahan.” Of course the point that most residents of the Itahan State can freely communicate with 
one another is bypassed in the haste to estabhsh — scientificahy — that the people of southern 
Italy are different. With the Padanian Declaration of Independence, it became crucial to enact a 
unique culture in order for secession to take place. Since the doctrine of Self-determination is 
lauded as the hnchpin behind the right of Padania to sovereignty, the Padanian self mwsi be 
determined. Economic prosperity has never been the appropriate theme for narrating a unique 
culture, and so the Padanians must proclaim their cultural difference as historical. The Padanian 
narrator emphasises that the culture of the North is not simply its tax base: “the Padanian 
identity cannot be explained a priori as the reaction to the oppressive tax burden, the mafia, 
uncontrolled immigration, the arrogant bureaucracy, the inefficiency of the Itahan 
State...etc....The reahty is that we Padanians identify Rome and the unitary Itahan State as the 
carrier of aU these threats to the progress and stabihty of OUR hfe in civil society.”^^ ’ This htany 
of the faults of Rome cleverly strengthens the coloniahst metaphor, while serving to outhne the 
cultural differences by imphcation. Without saying so exphcitly, the Padanian historian imphes 
identity through negativity. Whatever Rome is (oppressive, corrupt, out of control, arrogant and 
bureaucratic, inefficient), Padania is not (hberal, incorrupt, controlled, pohte and decentrahsed, 
efficient). Thus being subject to all the evils of Rome will taint the good Padanian regions. But 
does inefficiency in the central government thereby create a unique culture among those people 
who wish to impose efficiency? Is this what self-determination is meant to achieve? The re- 
telhng of Padanian history illustrates very clearly the means by which a unique culture can be 
“found” among people of the same language, rehgion and geographic region. Moreover, once 
this unique culture is asserted, its leaders can easily argue that separation is necessary for 
survival, as in this case: “The Itahan State, the Itahan rule-by-party/vote-pandering system is a 
beast afflicted with incurable ills which thrives on forcibly and deceptively holding together
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Peoples of different civic traditions.” Thus not only will Padania fall ill with the same fatal 
disease if it is not set free, but it also should be free based on the purity of its “civic tradition”.
The medical metaphor of the Italian State as sick and on the verge of infecting Padania 
continues throughout the document. The Itahan State is “impotent”, it has “been infected” by 
the “cancer of the Mafia” and it uses its “transmission mechanism” to infect Padania as well. 
Furthermore, the demographics of the South of Italy combined with Padania's negative rate of 
population growth have created a “risk of moving down the path to extinction.” The purity of 
Padanian identity is also threatened by the laxity of Itahan immigration control and the “massive 
non-European immigration” which “causes serious problems of pubhc order” and “endangers 
the identity of our Peoples.” Secession is once again cahed upon to protect the dubious idea of 
cultural and racial purity, regarding migration and immigration as invasion: “The point is that a 
People have the human right not to be invaded by other Peoples, thus risking to become 
foreigners in their own land.” Only if a culture beheves in its own inviolable purity and 
distinctiveness can it ever become a “foreigner” in its own land — by refusing to accept and 
embrace difference as a necessary contribution to its self.
The Padanian focus on the fact that the immigration is “non-European” is no accident 
— it is part of a tactic of identifying Padania with Europe (efficient, wealthy, successful) and 
distancing the south of Italy as something “other” than European (lazy, poor, corrupt). In a 
section of the Padanian narrative cahed “Padania Towards a Europe of the Peoples and of the 
Regions”, a specific vision is set forth of Padania as a unique regional voice within Europe. But 
the Europe envisioned by Padanian leaders is one which encourages local authority in the 
regions and avoids “mere transfer of power from the bureaucratic State capitals to the super- 
bureaucratic institutions of Brussels.” In a decentralised Europe of the Regions, Padania would 
shine as a local power and become further differentiated from its southern neighbour. The 
Padanian European vision is one in which southern Italy is isolated by its inefficiency and 
corruption. For the Padanian narrator, localism “is a European-wide phenomenon which the 
retarded and provincial Italian State, culturahy and economicahy mired in the backwaters of 
Europe, cannot and wishes not to see for evident reasons of self-interest.” Ironicahy, (since the 
Itahan State is a fiih member of the European Union) the Padanian version of Europe — the true 
Europe, the one of regional autonomy — excludes the south of Italy.
Thus Padanian secessionists envision their role as European regional power in a Europe 
which somehow, oddly, excludes Italy. The distancing tactic employed in this Padanian text 
resembles the phenomenon formulated by Edward Said as Orientalism. The Orientahst 
perspective “refers to pervasive patterns of representation of cultures and societies that privilege
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a self-confidently ‘progressive,’ ‘modem’ and ‘rational’ Europe over the putatively ‘stagnant,’
‘backward,’ ‘traditional’ and ‘mystical’ societies of the Orient. Strangely, in the Padanian
narrative, the “Orient” is southern Italy. While Padanian historical narrative cannot give
southern Italy a past within the Ottoman Empire, it hnks the south with all of the same
undesirable characteristics usually associated in the European mind with the Orient. This
othering tactic is not necessarily hmited to the Ottoman/Christian dichotomy, but includes a
whole symbohc geography of Europe which distinguishes among axes between eastern and
western churches, communist and non-communist states, and northern and southern cultures.
As Bakié-Hayden and Hayden point out, a rhetoric similar to orientahsm,
has been preserved and apphed in regard to another orientation of post-war 
symbohc geography, one in which an underdeveloped, poor south is contrasted 
with a developed, rich north. This modem economic geography of the world 
reflects and continues an older European pohtical geography in which 
“undisciphned,” passionate” peoples of southem Europe (e.g. Italy, Spain,
Greece) were contrasted to the industrious, rational cultures of the north.^^^
So even though most of the region which is historicised as Padania in this narrative has been
referred to as “Itahan” for centuries, there is a conscious and overt need on the part of the
secessionist leaders to dissociate Padania from Italy and its Oriental (negative) connotations.
This dissociation extends even to the Pope — Padanian documents refer to the medieval history
of the region and describe Papal mle as a “conservative, sometimes oppressive regime”, which
had a stagnant economy (unhke the north) and “worst of ah, the Papal State acted as a barrier
(both pohtical and cultural) between the South of Italy and Europe.” ®^® Thus Padanian texts
vividly iUustrate the pohtical uses of historical narratives and the norm-creating potency of the
performative language used to declare and enact a separate people. By definition, because of the
requirements for state recognition and the understanding of self-determination, secessionist
movements can not be neutral. They must rely upon narratives of othering and difference, and
also by definition exclusion of that difference. But as the situations of Québec and Padania have
shown, not only do these attempts to separate and purify identities make for hostile and violent
pohtics, they are also futile since even so-cahed “distinct” and “unique” cultural identities must
be created in an interactive process with the Other.
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The Kanaka Maoli
The population of Hawai'i literally embodies the contradiction between a purifying 
preservationist narrative of secession and the inescapable mutuahty of human interaction. In the 
two centuries since the isolation of the indigenous peoples was breached by the arrival of 
Europeans, a diverse ethnic mixture has come to populate the islands which includes, along with 
the native Kanaka Maoh, Caucasian, Japanese, Fihpino, Chinese, Portuguese, Vietnamese, 
Korean, and other Pacific Island peoples. The Hawaiian spirit of aloha has permeated the 
cultural mix and resulted in the ready acceptance of intermarriage and mutual respect among the 
different cultures, to such an extent that few individuals would claim unmixed heritage of any 
sort, and pure Kanaka Maoh have practically vanished. Therefore it is all the more surprising 
that there is a strong (if tiny) secessionist movement astir in this multiculturahst archefype, and 
that it is overtly based on racial criteria. No one denies that the history of Hawai'i has been one 
of exploitation and dishonest deahngs by the United States. Beginning in 1893 when the 
Hawaiian monarch was overthrown by resident Americans in cooperation with the U.S. mihtary, 
the United States acted unilaterally and unlawfully by annexing Hawai'i (1898) and turning it 
into a territory of the United States (1900). Further, in 1946, when Hawai'i was designated by 
the United Nations as a non-self-goveming territory and placed under the authority of the United 
States, the option for full independence was never given, and the 1959 vote on the question of 
Hawai'i's immediate statehood included U.S. mihtary personnel and others who had resided on 
the islands for only a year. In 1993, the U.S. Congress finally passed a law known as the 
“Apology Resolution” which officially apologised for the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of 
Hawai'i and recognised that “the indigenous Hawaiian people never directly rehnquished their 
claims to their inherent sovereignty.”^^  ^ Given the discrimination and socio-cultural 
disadvantages which accompanied U.S. territorial administration and statehood, many of Kanaka 
Maoh descent feel entitled to reparations. These range fi'om better funding for the Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs, to some form of autonomy over pubhc lands, to fully-fledged sovereignty.
Sovereigntists claim that Hawai'i is currently in a state of occupation but is undergoing 
a transition phase towards restoration of the original Hawaiian Nation. On January 16,1994, a 
coahtion of sovereignty organisations gathered in Honolulu to endorse a document called The 
Proclamation o f Restoration o f the Independence o f the Sovereign Nation State ofHawafi?^^
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Apart from declaring independence, the Proclamation authorised the Council of Elders ('Aha 
Kapuna), to act as Hawai i's provisional government and to take steps towards restoration and 
the development of a constitution. The Proclamation narrates a story of injustice — the invasion 
and suppression of an indigenous people. It consistently speaks for “We, the Kanaka Maoh” 
who reestabhsh their Sovereign Nation and “join the World Community of States.” Its very title 
emphasises that this people do not claim self-determination to create a new state but to restore a 
historical one. “We have resided here forever, from time immemorial. We have displaced no 
other people. We, the Kanaka Maoh, are the original inhabitants and occupants of these 
Islands.” Kanaka Maoh historical narrative does not hst character traits or language differences 
in order to demonstrate the distinctness of this people. Rather, the Kanaka Maoh define 
themselves strictly and simply by genetic relationship. “The current citizens of the Independent 
and Sovereign Nation of Hawai'i consist of all those who are descendants of the Kanaka Maoh 
prior to the arrival of the first westerners in 1778, and [those who are descendants of persons] 
who have hved in Hawai'i prior to the iUegal overthrow, invasion and occupation of January 17, 
1893". This is constitutional nationahsm in its clearest form, and especially striking in a 
population famous for the breadth of its genetic mix. The strictness of this definition of nation 
does not allow pohtical space for those who have some Kanaka Maoh heritage but do not 
identify themselves with the national movement, or for people with a Hawaiian hneage more 
recent than 1893. Although possibly fourth or fifth generation, these “habitual residents of 
Hawai'i” must apply for citizenship by means of naturahsation, according to the Proclamation. 
Thus the Kanaka Maoh identity performative language is stunning in the sharpness of its 
dehneafion, and therefore in the finahty of its exclusion.
One of the primary reasons for restoring sovereignty is the feehng by the sovereigntist 
Kanaka Maoh that their culture is in danger of being wiped out. The Proclamation declares that 
the new state wiU revive the traditions of the pre-1778 nation: “We, the Kanaka Maoh, today 
embody within our governmental structure traditional customs and culture of the ' Aha Kuka O 
Na Kupuna (Council of Elders), based on mutual respect, traditional practice, and family order. 
Their consultation on many decisions is highly regarded as the basis of ah authority and 
principle, as handed down through generations of teachings.” The assumption underlying these 
sentiments is that ancient traditions can and must be resurrected and preserved from the 
destructive forces of modernity. That is, the ancient Kanaka Maoh culture is something 
knowable and reproducible in the late twentieth century; and further, that it is Hawai'i’s only 
salvation. “We must protect our sacred ' aina [land] from such invasion and exploitation, to 
hberate it from ahen destructive forces, and preserve and protect our Cultural Heritage for friture
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generations, from the devastation of extinction.” Designating the land as something “sacred” 
immediately estabhshes a relationship with it which has religious connotations in terms of purity 
and reverence. In conjunction with designating the land of Hawai'i as sacred, the Kanaka Maoh 
have associated non-Hawaii ans (ahens) with destruction, and their own native traditions with 
preservation. Such clearly drawn social boundaries preclude the possibihty that non-native 
Hawaii ans might wish to love and protect and claim Hawai'i as their home also. This narrative 
estabhshes the Kanaka Maoh not only as a people with cultural traditions in need of respect and 
protection, but as the sole legitimate arbiters of the fate of Hawaiian territory. The Proclamation 
describes those non-Kan aka Maoh who now “illegahy occupy our Territory” in no uncertain 
terms as “Those who disregard the Principles and Rule of the Law of Nations, Justice, Integrity, 
Morahty of Character, and Humanity, by force and acts of aggression”. Institutionahsed national 
exclusivity of this sort can only lead to bad feehngs between the Kanaka Maoh and ah the 
various peoples who caU Hawai'i their home.
Exactly one year after the Proclamation was read out, the Kapuna (elders) met to sign 
the national constitution.^^^ As a document which details the type of law and government a 
society wiU have, how its powers wih be both mandated and circumscribed, a constitution may 
be considered essential reading for theorists of pohtical narrative. The Hawaiian Constitution 
does not disappoint. It begins with a Preamble describing the members of the nation not as “We 
the People”, but as “We the Kanaka Maoh Nationals and Descendants”. As a people who have 
been “subjected to the international crimes of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity”, the 
Preamble asserts, the Kanaka Maoh have a right to self-determination and to “freely determine to 
restore Our pohtical, economic, social, and cultural rights”.^^ The difficulty is that the new 
Hawaiian State, as envisaged in the Constitution, is one which creates legal discrimination 
against non-Kanaka Maoh citizens, regardless of whether they have resided in Hawaii since 
1778 or wish to become naturahsed. There are officially two separate types of citizenship 
defined in the Hawaiian Constitution, and they are endowed with different rights. The Kanaka 
Maoh are referred to as “Nationals” and defined in Article XV as “any person who by birth or 
national origin and ancestry is a descendant of the original inhabitants who prior to 1778 
exercised sovereignty over the Archipelago of Hawai'i.” The second definition, “Citizens,
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Naturalized”, covers anyone not descended from the original inhabitants and is defined as “all 
persons who quahfy and choose to become citizens of the Nation.” The quahfications are left 
open for enactment by the Legislative General Assembly. The differences between these two 
classes of citizens are apparent throughout the Constitution. The constitutional structure of the 
proposed Hawaiian government is based on a tripartite system with Legislative, Executive and 
Judiciary branches. The proposed Hawaiian Legislative General Assembly contains two parts, 
the Na Kapuna Council and the Citizen’s Assembly. The former shall consist only of Kanaka 
Maoh Nationals, while the latter shall consist of “56 Nationals” and “56 Citizens”. The duties of 
the Na Kapuna Council include laws relating to “the preservation of Hawaiian cultural values” or 
“maintaining cultural values”. Consent by the General Assembly may occur concerning the 
passage of Bills on cultural values, but it is not necessary as “the Council law shall have 
supremacy”. The Executive Administration consists of “the Head of State, a Deputy Head of 
State, and all Ministries estabhshed for the purposes of executing the laws and business of the 
Nation.” The office of the Head of State or Deputy Head of State shall only be held by a person 
“who is a Kanaka Maoh National and Descendant”. Thirdly, the Judiciary consists of National 
Tribunals as the Legislative General Assembly sees fit, and one Supreme Tribunal. All judges 
are to be selected by the Na Kapuna Council, and ‘Bvery judge shah be a Kanaka Maoh 
National”. Thus, the Hawaiian Constitution describes a State in which there are two classes of 
citizens with one, the “Nationals”, definitively privileged over the other in exercising 
governmental power. Of the three branches of government, one (the judiciary) is entirely closed 
off to non-nationals; one (the legislature) restricts membership to one half of one of the two 
chambers; and the third (the executive) aUows non-nationals only as appointed to the ministries 
with the consent of the Na Kapuna Council.
Despite its references to international law and human rights, the Hawaiian Constitution 
contains provisions which would alarm the most jaded of peace negotiators. Not only do non- 
Hawaiian descendants have hmited access and representation in government, but they are 
constitutionally locked out of the communal land tenure system which is part of the Restoration 
of the Hawaiian regime. “Prior to 1778, the Kanaka Maoh Nationals hved in a communal land 
tenure system, and every National had the right and privilege to receive and acquire the use of 
land.” Once the “transition” to an independent Hawaiian State has been made, ah National land 
wih be held in trust “for the Kanaka Maoh Nationals” by the government. Thus not only wih ah 
private ownership of land vanish but only individuals of the proper hneage may apply for use of 
the communal land. Institutionahsed discrimination of this sort can never make reparation for
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past wrongs, it can only further exacerbate the friction among the various groups that make up 
Hawai i's  richly various culture.
Secessionist Narratives and the Uses and Disadvantages of History
Any examination of secessionist texts soon reveals an assumption shared by them all — 
that the nation in question had a common history and that it was glorious and deserving of 
preservation through the continued reverence and traditions of the national population today.
But what is also clear is that history can be narrated in many ways, and that the politics of 
secessionist identity performance require it to be told in an exclusivist, boundary-drawing 
fashion. The secessionist nation (“We”) performs its identity against non-nationals (“Others”) 
in ways which neglect the necessity of the non-national for the identity of the nation. Historical 
narrative is the tool used for this social and political boundary drawing, and as such its meanings 
have become as contested as the territorial space to which it so often refers. Nietzsche 
recognised and criticised this use and abuse of history, considering it an encumbrance on human 
abihties. He wished for history to be used in the pursuit of life being lived, rather than that lives 
should be dedicated to the perceived fulfilment of history. Nietzsche argued that man could only 
feel happiness during moments of forgetting, or feeling unhistorically, since history burdens us 
by circumscribing our identities.^“  He compares humanity to animals, reminding us of how 
much the latter are unburdened by memories of a historical past. Mankind cannot live, or have 
an identity, without a memory, but, Nietzsche might argue, the essence of truly living occurs in 
the space between remembering and forgetting. That is, we must remember in order to know 
who we are, and forget in order to become what we may be. The disadvantages of historical 
narratives, for Nietzsche, are that they focus on the past to an extent which hmits the 
possibilities of the present and the future. In terms of the secessionist texts discussed here, 
historical narratives have been used to hmit the terms of identity of the particular groups and to 
call on the members of these groups to fulfill their historic destiny by fighting for independent 
statehood. The vision is one of constraint (by perceived historical imperatives) rather than 
freedom. Because their Frenchness, their Northern Itahan-ness, or their Hawaiian-ness was 
narrated historically in certain circumscribed ways, these secessionist groups now maintain that 
their current and future identities must perpetuate these patterns. But Nietzsche’s critique 
equates such historical identities with death; they are the identities of the dead, and therefore to
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maintain the pattern of the past is to mortify your own present identity, excluding the 
possibilities of the hving present.
Nietzsche provides a useful schematic of humanity’s three types of relationships to 
history and how history is necessary for hfe. These uses of history contain recognisable echoes 
of secessionist narratives. He describes the first relationship as Monumental History, which 
involves the behef that “the great moments in the struggle of the human individual constitute a 
chain, that this chain unites mankind across the millennia hke a range of human peaks . . .that is 
the fundamental idea of the faith in humanity” But, Nietzsche argues, it is this demand for 
eternal greatness that causes great conflict. Monumental history inspires foolish courage and 
fanaticism. “As long as the past has to be described as worthy of imitation, as imitable and 
possible for a second time, it of course incurs the danger of becoming somewhat distorted, 
beautified and coming close to fi’ee poetic invention; there have been ages, indeed, which were 
quite incapable of distinguishing between a monumentalized past and a mythical fiction”.^ ®’ 
Monumental history clearly plays a role in secessionist narratives in the way that the past is told 
as a story of grand struggle and the mythical ancestors whose toil and oppression shall not have 
been suffered in vain. Secessionist movements do not confess to the faults in their national 
histories: to the violence against indigenous peoples, or the exploitative use of cheap immigrant 
labour or the long intervals of peaceful integrated hving amongst different groups. National 
histories must be exalted as sacred and worthy of pohtical enshrinement through sovereign 
statehood.
Nietzsche’s second category of man’s relationship to history is that of Antiquarian 
History. The antiquarian historian is a preservationist, painstakingly recording the conditions of 
his existence for the generations to come. This kind of history builds on the sense of communal 
continuity: “the contentment of the tree in its roots, the happiness of knowing that one is not 
whoUy accidental and arbitrary but grown out of a past as its heir, flower and finit, and that 
one’s existence is thus excused and indeed, justified”.^ *^ But Nietzsche finds antiquarian history 
to be problematic in its extreme restrictedness of vision. Everything old and of the past is taken 
to be worthy of equal reverence, while everything new is rejected. He compares antiquarian 
history to a tree’s awareness of its roots. It judges its roots by the size of its visible branches.
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but if “the tree is in error as to this, how greatly it will be in error regarding the rest of the forest 
around it! —  for it knows of the forest only that in it which obstructs or favours it and nothing 
beside.” ®^^ Antiquarian history, too, is a recognisable part of secessionist pohtical discourse.
The attempt to recreate the past as the only system worthy or valuable, and the rejection of 
change (and the present) as destructive and threatening bear all the hallmarks of Nietzsche’s 
typology. This is perhaps most clearly reflected in the wishes of the Kanaka Maoh to resurrect 
all of the ancient patterns of governance, including the land tenure system, because these 
patterns were theirs historicahy. The Kanaka Maoh are exhibiting great reverence for the roots 
which they cannot see and are neglecting the impact of their actions on the rest of the forest.
The third relationship is one Nietzsche describes as Critical History. This is the 
necessary mode because if man is to hve fuUy, he “must possess and fi'om time to time employ 
the strength to break up and dissolve a part of the past: he does this by bringing it before the 
tribunal, scrupulously examining it and finally condemning it”. This sweeping away of the past 
is necessary to hberate mankind fi'om the burden of history. Furthermore, no group is immune 
because “every past...is worthy to be condemned — for that is the nature of human things: 
human violence and weakness have always played a mighty role in them.” ’^® But, Nietzsche 
warns, critical history is difiBcult and dangerous, since it is always hard to know when to stop — 
the complete denial of the past results in a denial of one’s own participation in the chain of 
human history, and therefore also of the responsibihty of being human. According to Nietzsche, 
the best we can do is maintain knowledge of our inheritance and try to combat it with the 
cultivation of a new instinct, a new habit. The logical outcome of critical history is in fact the 
downfall of nationahst identities, since a thoroughly scrupulous look into any nation’s past will 
crumble its monumental and antiquarian pretensions. This is what E.J. Hobsbawm meant when 
he wrote that a serious historian of nations or nationalism could never be a dedicated nationahst: 
‘Nationahsm requires too much behef in what is patently not so.” ’^  ^ It is critical history which 
is missing fi'om (indeed which vitahy threatens) secessionist historical renderings. Rather than 
examining their histories as burdens and restraints on their present, secessionists must persist in 
the veneration of the past, in both monumental and antiquarian terms. Such uses and abuses of
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history fail to create a “new origin” which will bequeath a less violent and weak legacy upon the
future. What Nietzsche’s categories urge is that we reahse our identities as socially constructed
and therefore historically indebted, but also that we recognise the contingency of history and use
that contingency to open up the critical space required for hving a creative pohtics.
The critical relationship is a frightening way to engage with history, but it is a necessary
one if the cycle of violent encounters is ever to ease. As Michel Foucault commented in his
discussion of the Nietzschean typology, “The search for descent is not the erecting of
foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fr'agments
what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with
itself.” ’^  ^ For Foucault, history can only be seen as productive to the extent that it exposes the
discontinuities (or contingency) of our existence, thus disturbing the myths of monumental
history and the reverence of antiquarian history. As Foucault elaborates:
Where the soul pretends unification or the self fabricates a coherent identity, the 
genealogist [critical historian] sets out to study the beginning — numberless 
beginnings whose faint traces and hints of color are readily seen by an historical 
eye. The analysis of descent permits the dissociation of the self, its recognition 
and displacement as an empty synthesis, in hberating a profusion of lost 
events.
It is this critical vision of history which secessionist politics obscures and obstructs in its attempt 
to lay claim to a purity in the present and the worthiness of the past. But it is this critical history 
which is so necessary to the generative rather than preservative form of pohtics. This is not a 
call to forget, or disrespect history — but rather an urging to dig more deeply into history in 
order to lessen its hold on the hving present. Nietzsche urges us to confi-ont our inherited nature 
through our knowledge of it, and thus to grow the seeds of new habits and patterns for the 
future. The possibihties and new habits hberated by the pohtical space formed by critical history 
provide the basis for the speculations of the final chapter of this thesis.
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Chapter 6.
POSSIBILITIES: THEORY & PRACTICE
The previous chapters have discussed the internal contradictions of the relationship 
between the territorialisation of politics and the contingency of identity formation. As this 
journey through several secessionist texts has shown, groups must emphasise their differences in 
order to make secession a credible option. In drawing the necessary social boundaries, 
secessionists must carve a political space for their national identity which is exclusive — thus 
secessionist movements inevitably display troubhng tendencies towards discrimination and 
concepts of ethnic purity which easily lead to violence against perceived others. This is not 
because national identities are inherently violent, but because the territorialisation of any identity 
establishes an exclusive claim to space which provokes contestation by those defined outside the 
nation. These dynamics have been institutionalised through the apparent customary 
requirements of international society. Secessionist activity, as a phenomenon which grows out 
of the twentieth-century territorial nation-state and its inherent tensions, occurs within (and is 
defined by) certain institutional limits. These are: the international legal fi*amework which 
upholds both self-determination and territorial integrity, the political fi'amework which allows 
only states to have an international voice, and the social fi'amework which privileges majority 
identities over minority ones according to arbitrary boundaries. All work to encourage secession 
as the only viable option for unrecognised (internationally illegitimate) identity groups. 
Unfortunately, secession turns out to be a pyrrhic victory, for it recreates and perpetuates the 
tensions and incoherencies already enmeshed in the nation-state, often inflaming the violence of 
cultural encounters.
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The problem of secession — and secession is a problem rather than a solution — is that 
it occurs as a logical outcome of the structure of the international system today. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, Historicising Secession/Deconstructing Territory, pohtical identity in the last 
century has become more closely associated with territorial claims and control than ever before. 
Derrida calls this phenomenon a “primitive conceptual phantasm of community, the nation- 
State, sovereignty, borders, native soil and blood.” ’^'* This phantasm is outdated, Derrida argues, 
because of its rehance on ontopology. Ontopology is defined as a social axiom “Unking 
indissociably the ontological value of present-being [o«] to its situation, to the stable and 
presentable determination of a locahty, the topos of territory, native soil, city, body in 
general”.^ ’  ^ David Campbell argues, in his discussion of the Bosnian war, that ontopolo^ 
assumes “that the pohtical possibihties have been hmited by the ahgnment between territory and 
identity, state and nation, all under the sign of ‘ethnicity,’ supported by a particular account of 
history.” ’^  ^ Because we have identified (and thereby hmited) pohtics as a fimction of power 
exerted over territory, we have all but required any group craving pohtical recognition to exert a 
claim to specific territories as well. Thus the system ensures that “secession” will continue to 
lurk beneath the surface as the only pathway to pohtical viabihty for certain determined groups. 
If identity was a neat, pure and stable thing this would not present a problem. Indeed, there 
would be httle reason for the violence of the conflicts we see now amongst groups struggling to 
“cleanse” their identities of those who might “taint” them or keep them fi’om being recognised. 
Stable identities would be instantly recognisable, and thus would require no protection — they 
would have no “others” in the sense discussed here. Difference among us would be a non- 
constitutive thing — and we would obviously also be lacking in much of the adaptabihty and 
learning capacity that makes us human.
Because we are all profoundly affected (created) by the presence of others, and our 
identities are thereby contingent through a process of constant negotiation with others, the 
territoriahsation of pohtics presents a major problem. Not only does it provide a constant 
temptation for unrecognised groups to create their identity through seizing territorial control by 
whatever means are available to them, but the territoriahsation of pohtics is based on the false
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assumption of uniformity among those who do reside within “legitimate” territorial states.
Territories do not come “stranger-free”. There is no way to territoriahse pre-existing,
homogenous comprehensive group identities in neat state-packages. Such identities cannot exist
— and even if they could, locking them into a fixed territorial space (which must maintain strict
control over movement inward and outward) can hardly be the most desirable or hberty-driven of
outcomes. Social identities cannot be locked in to a place — or out. What appears to be the
historical rootedness of groups is due to the “performative” nature of identity. Performativity, as
described and apphed by Campbell, includes both the creative and the stabihsing effects of
discursive identity formation.
Rather than viewing identity — which is an inescapable prerequisite of being 
— as either given by intentional human activity or granted by natural extra­
human forces, the idea of performativity draws attention to “the reiterative and 
citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names.” ’^’
Performativity, then, points to the enormous power of language to create, through repeated terms
and relational understandings, a sedimentation of meaning which, though contingent, appears
historically settled. In other words, when secessionists claim that they “are a nation”, their
words (in stories, speeches, pohtical actions and declarations) generate narrative performances
which, repeated unproblematically, produce nationhood (in a joint conceptual sense) over time.
Secessionists can legitimate their nationhood through an ex post facto  constitutive decision.
Any sovereign entity can be traced to a foundational moment in which its legitimacy was simply
declared and then became actual through the continued absence of contestation.^^* It is thus that
secession performs a Derridean coup de force — a legitimating act which “receives its
interpretive justification as true after the fact,” as does, for example, the declaration of
independence of a new nation.^’  ^ Yet, even if it was never contested, secession as an identifying
act would not be a neutral choice. “Self-cession” is self-removal, but it is also an “other-
removal” by definition. By creating social and territorial boundaries around the declared nation.
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secessionists both delineate and remove the “other”. “Self-cession” is also a call for self- 
cleansing.
If secession is only a symptom of these inherent conflicts and not a solution to them, 
what then? How can identities flourish in a political space which does not depend on territorial 
legitimacy or definition? What alternative form of political legitimacy is possible given the 
tensions between territory and identity? Can democracy operate under conditions which differ 
fi'om those of the modem territorial state? These questions can only be approached through the 
continuous process of international politics. There can be no perfect unitary model which stops 
all the conflicts and creates universal harmony. But certain possibilities are not necessarily 
unforeseeable. The fiiture will be an outcome of this present, and the particular choices it creates 
can already be recognised in the variations on pohtical space which currently exist. What is 
crucial for our understanding of future possibihties is an awareness of the shifting meanings of 
our most important pohtical concepts today. Anyone who undertakes a conceptual history must 
reahse that not only do concepts “teach us the uniqueness of past meanings,” but they “become 
the formal categories which determine the conditions of possible history.” *^^  As KoseUeck puts 
it:
It is only concepts which demonstrate persistence, repeatable apphcabihty, and 
empirical vahdity — concepts with structural claims — which indicate that a 
once “real” history can today appear generally possible and be represented as 
such.^ *^
Concepts, then, allow us to recognise certain histories as possible, to trace their paths through 
past and present meanings, and furthermore, to allow for future possibihties. The importance of 
Koselleck’s statement extends not only into our understanding and reading of history, but also 
into our understanding of our choices for the future. The pohtical concepts we are currently 
operating under wih be the conditions of a possible future. We are not bound to maintain our 
contemporary understandings of these concepts, but they wih be the basis of our fiiture 
understandings of the conceptual signifiers. Just as the words territory, sovereignty and state 
had very different meanings in 1648 than they do at the turn of the second mihennium, so these 
same terms, these same concepts wih carry different meanings in the future. We cannot set goals 
for the universal achievement of world peace according to a single model and expect to see them 
reached. But we may make possible now the changes in conceptual meaning which wih
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compensate in fixture for the obvious failures of the past. In this vein, anything which 
problematises the ontopology of the state is to be encouraged as a step in a helpfiil direction.
The authors examined in this chapter all question, or make it possible to question, ontopological 
structures and are thus usefiil in exploring alternative ways of performing fiiture pohtics. By 
allowing our concepts of identity and statehood to grow beyond the ties of territory, our concepts 
of the national and the international to grow beyond the state border, and our concepts of law 
and recognition to grow beyond sovereignty, we provide both the hnk to a “real” history and to 
the conditions of possible futures.
Within and Without the State
I have referred to the nation-state in various ways in this text, and although I have tried 
to problematise this concept, its very presence — unquestioned — perpetuates its meaning as a 
sohd unchanging uniform thing. In actual practice, however, it has already become 
commonplace to point out the variations on the nation-state theme. Not only are all nation states 
in the world today the territorial (if not pohtical) home of individuals of more than one ethno­
cultural group, but the pohtical structures of each state provide countless interpretations of 
voting, citizenship, representation, legitimacy and the role of the state. International Relations 
has traditionally been silent about the “domestic” pohtical systems of states, but in fact these 
variations are highly relevant for our understanding of new forms of pohtical space, and thus for 
the future of the concept of the international.
Various theorists have examined the changing nature of the state and discussed the need 
for new pohtical perspectives, some of which will be treated below. But any discussion 
involving the nature of pohtical space would be incomplete without a nod to the theorist who 
first fiilly articulated the concept of the pohtical. Carl Schmitt merits the dubious distinction of 
being at once a brilhant critical pohtico-legal theorist and an unrepentant anti-democrat with 
close ties to the Nazi party. Yet, his theories on pohtics nonetheless bear further scrutiny. His 
definition of the pohtical highhghts the division of pohtical space into sovereign units, but his 
insistence on the identity-constitutive nature of pohtics serves also to undermine the legitimacy 
of state boundaries. He is a theorist, then, who both underpins and undermines ontopology, and 
for that reason, he is worth a look.
As a modemist-reahst, Carl Schmitt saw the pohtical in terms of the fiiend/enemy 
distinction. The nature of the pohtical, he pointed out, is rarely discussed, but it must depend 
upon a particular set of distinctions as do the concepts of morahty (good and evil), aesthetics
162
(beautifiil and ugly), and economics (profitable and unprofitable).^^ For Schmitt, the 
fiiend/enemy distinction “denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an 
association or dissociation” but it is also very important to separate this distinction fi'om private 
disHke: “The pohtical enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as 
an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business 
transactions.” *^^  Schmitt carefiilly distinguishes the pohtical as a public rather than a private 
concept, in an attempt to strip the concept of the emotions of personal fiiendship and enmity and 
define it as something more fimdamental. The enemy is not necessarily hated, but “he is, 
nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially 
intense way, existentially something different and ahen, so that in the extreme case conflicts with 
him are possible.” *^^  Although he describes the relationship in an individuahstic third person 
tense, Schmitt (writing in the 1920s and 30s) refers to states in the classic modernist sense as 
self-contained units: “In its entirety the state as an organized pohtical entity decides for itself the 
fiiend-enemy distinction.” *^^  This perspective does not lessen the import of his contribution 
however, since the definition of pohtics as constitutive carries great significance at whatever 
level it is apphed. The major contribution of this distinction is the clarification of the meaning of 
pohtics as the process which determines the “who”. In other words, pohtics is irrevocably 
bound up with identity — the two concepts cannot be separated. As Schmitt himself points out, 
so-called pohtical terms such as sovereignty, society, class, constitutional, and even state are 
“incomprehensible if one does not know exactly who is to be affected, combatted, refiited, or 
negated by such a term.” *^® Any decision or process which determines who will be included in a 
group and who will be excluded is thus a pohtical one.
Although he discusses his concept of the pohtical in the context of a theory of state 
relations, Schmitt recognises that the use of the term “pohtics” carries strong meaning 
domestically in the interaction among pohtical parties and interest groups. He sees this as the
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result of the “intensification of internal antagonisms [which have] the effect of weakening the
common identity vis-à-vis another state.” *^’ Given that the determination of enemy is made by
the possibihty of combat, it is possible for the Schmittean fiiend/enemy relationship to take place
within the state if “domestic conflicts among pohtical parties have become the sole pohtical
difference [and] the most extreme degree of internal pohtical tension is thereby reached; i.e., the
domestic, not the foreign fiiend-and-enemy groupings are decisive for armed conflict.” *^* When
the fiiend/enemy grouping takes place within the state, the conflict is hkely to end in civil war —
or secession. But Schmitt does not equate pohtics with war, insisting that war is merely the
extreme case and tiiat a decision to pursue peaceful relations may be a good pohtical one. The
possibihty of war is the exception which proves the rule of the pohtical relationship. And
conversely, if ever the fiiend/enemy distinction were ehminated, there would be no possibihty of
war and it would therefore be “a world without pohtics”.^ *^  Schmitt refrains fi'om comment
about whether this result would be desirable or not. But he comments that if the attempt to
eradicate pohtics (the possibihty of war) were ever to become the justification for a war, it would
“constitute the absolute last war of humanity”:
Such a war is necessarily unusuaUy intense and inhuman because, by 
transcending the hmits of the pohtical fi'amework, it simultaneously degrades 
the enemy into moral and other categories and is forced to make of him a 
monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed. In other 
words, he is an enemy who no longer must be compeUed to retreat into his 
borders only.^^°
Writing this in the thirties, Schmitt appears almost prescient. Further, the imphcations of such 
absolutist views of pohtics are fiightening in terms of territoriahsing identity. Should the 
conflictual nature of fiiend/enemy relations ever be overcome, it would involve the eradication of 
the enemy and thus of pohtics. But universal peace (the absence of pohtics) requires the 
annihilation of the other. Schmitt adopts a pretext of neutrahty about the concept of the 
universal, but when he hypothesises about a world state it is clear that he neither desires it nor 
feels that it would be possible to achieve. To begin with, a world state would only nominahy be 
a state, based primarily on economic needs and regulation. In the absence of any global enemy.
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interest groups would become completely apolitical and be reduced to navigating between ethics 
and economics. Finally, Schmitt poses the core question of where the power for a world 
organization would fall.^ ^^  In a universal state, humanity would either be totally oppressed or 
totally free — but in the latter case, free for what? Without pohtics, people would have no 
identity. Without the knowledge of who the other was, people would not know who they 
themselves were, and thus would end loyalty, friendship and belonging — the concepts for 
which today we entertain the ever-present possibihty of conflict (pohtics). Universahsm, then, 
presupposes homogeneity, and homogeneity, as we have seen, requires the suppression of ah 
difference.
In his and-essentiahsm, Schmitt encourages the existence and maintenance of diversity, 
and he clearly contributes to the understanding of identity as an integral part of the pohtical 
equation. But Schmitt in the end must be seen as an apologist for secession since he refuses to 
acknowledge the impossibihty of cleansing the enemy (other) from within. Schmitt operates on 
the assumption that a purified coUective self is the essence of the state — the “fiiend” in his 
fiiend-enemy equation. When difference is found within, it must be suppressed or a civil war 
must ensue which wih recreate the sovereign boundaries surrounding the world’s pohtical 
fiiend-enemy units. These assumptions, while acting as the foundation of reahst theory for many 
decades, have completely failed to account for or anticipate the changes in the state system. The 
proliferation of pohtical spaces within and across state borders continues to present problems for 
ontopological assumptions. Some of the theorists who delve into these problems are discussed 
below.
The Future is Many
As we search for pohtical forms which accommodate multiple and overlapping loyalties, 
the domestic structures of the state become highly relevant for the stabihty and composition of 
international society. In a sense, any attempt to freely speculate about the possible shapes of 
future pohtical spaces requires a touch of (pohtical) science fiction, for otherwise we can scarcely 
escape the inteUectual confinement of our contemporary understandings. Perhaps because it has 
even less claim than most to ethno-cultural homogeneity. North America provides a fertile 
theoretical ground for thoughts on a future pohtics of state-transcended identity and difference. 
Robert Kaplan provides some “futuristic” speculations about the pohtical shape of the fiiture
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based on his recent travels throughout the North American continent. Some of Kaplan’s
conclusions do indeed have the ring of science fiction:
Imagine a land in which the dominant culture is an internationalized one, at 
every level; in which the political units that really matter are confederations of 
city-states; in which loyalty is an economic concept, when it is not obsolete; in 
which “the United States” exists chiefly to provide mihtary protection...[This 
land] is no longer beyond the horizon.
But alarmist as this introduction sounds, Kaplan is ultimately fascinated by current
developments which hint at shapes of the future and sees them as something to be embraced
rather than resisted. He predicts not only the demise of traditional bordered states as we know
them, but beheves that their successors are already taking shape in the north and southwest of
the North American continent. The border between the United States and Mexico, he concludes,
is “an artificial, purely legal construct [which] will one day revert to what it always has been: an
unruly and politically ambiguous ‘brown zone’ of desert, several hundred miles wide, where
civilizations (Spanish and Anglo, Athapaskan-speaking Indians fi'om the Arctic, and Aztecan
Indians fi'om southern Mexico) once m i n g l e d . A s  a consequence, there is a widespread
process of integration and of “bi-nationhood” developing, as cities on both sides of the border
become economically dependent on each other.
Cities in these areas of mingling cultures are playing host to a new kind of
“internationalist” culture which allows multiple identities to flourish side by side without any
one threatening the other. Kaplan, remarking on the size of a Chinese supermarket in Los
Angeles (with its “forty aisles, each a hundred yards long, devoted to noodles, pork, taro, tofu,
pea sprouts, dried shrimp, soybean paste, spicy bean cabbage, dried seaweed, rice spirits, and so
on”) finds himself speculating on the future of the American nation in the face of an onslaught of
immigration:
Traditionally nations rise and fall; but at the 99 Ranch Market I wondered if 
America might escape that fate by shedding its skin as a nation altogether and 
revealing an international civilization based on a single continent. ..Why, I 
asked myself, worry about ‘the Asian threat’? The best way to contain Asian 
economic dynamism...is to absorb it, which is exactly what the United States is 
doing by attracting and Americanizing so many Asian immigrants.^^
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The main lesson to be learned from Kaplan’s speculations is not to fret about the future. The
“loss” of apparent national homogeneity is not a loss at all but a gain of new forms of the nation.
These questions are particularly relevant for the wealthy nations of the West which currently
harbour numerous ongoing battles about the sanctity of their borders and the “threat” or
“economic salvation” posed by large groups of immigrants in search of a better hfe. These issues
resonate deeply with identity pohtics, but they are also issues of economics and perceived
limitation of resources.
While the United States is often seen as a natural breeding ground for muldculturahsm
due to its history as a land of large frontiers and settlement opportunities, its current blend of rich
diversity continues to generate struggle and conflict. The flashpoint is the question of the extent
to which new immigrants must assimilate in order to become “American”, and the extent to
which a common American identity even exists or is desirable. While diversity and choice are
deemed good, there is growing concern about the lack of a shared sense of community. Recent
changes in demographic balances (resulting in plurahdes rather than strong majority/minority
relationships) have led Americans to “demographic balkanization” and a “powerfiil preference to
see [themselves] through a racial prism, wary of others, and, in many instances, hostile.” ’^  ^ The
traditional story of immigration as an upward progress towards economic success and the
accompanying social assimilation is giving way to economic “mobihty traps” and a perception
that there is no dominant mainstream into which immigrants may assimilate. Nevertheless,
whites have long tended to lump groups into broad ethnic categories:
It is a particularly American phenomenon, many say, to label citizens by their 
ethnicity. When a person hved in El Salvador, for example, he or she saw 
themselves as a nationahty. When they arrive in the United States, they become 
Hispanic or Latino. So too with Asians. Koreans and Cambodians find httle in 
common, but then they arrive here they become “Asian,” and are counted and 
courted, encouraged or discriminated against as such.^^^
Failure to treat many immigrant identities with respect for their distinctiveness, and instead
focusing on the simplest way to difierentiate them from the (White European) mainstream, has
contributed to this demographic balkanization and struggle along ethnic hnes. However, the old
broad racial categories continue to stick as the composition of the nation becomes a pohtical
issue.
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Nothing reflects the entrenchment of American racial politics like questions about the 
US Census. Since 1971, there have been only five racial categories on the Census form: black, 
white, Asian or Pacific Islander, American Indian or Alaskan native, and other. But the last time 
the Census was taken, in 1990, there was a 45% increase in the number of respondents checking 
the “other” category. Birth data now indicate that the number of children of mixed race couples 
is increasing faster than the number of children bom to single race couples, thus prompting a 
movement to add a new Census category called “multiracial”.^ ’^ The categorisation of 
Americans has become even more pohticised with the entitlements of affirmative action, 
apportionment, educational and research funding, which have been apphed to redress historical 
inequahties in recent years. In fact, it is members of estabhshed “minority” groups who are the 
strongest critics of the multiracial category. They consider it a threat to their organisations and 
hard-won pohtical strength since many of their members could conceivably “defect” to the 
multiracial category. It has even been estimated that at least seventy-five percent of those who 
currently define themselves as “Black” would be able to check the Multiracial box because of 
their mixed heritage.
Such a statistical swing would drasticahy affect the civil rights programs at the state and 
federal levels, leading many to question the vahdity of any racial classification at ah. But 
without such classification, it has been argued, civil rights protections may faU prey to lurking 
discrimination and prejudice which remain statistically significant in American society.
However, official categories of racial classification may exacerbate racial conflict: “By creating 
social welfare programs based on race rather than on need, the government sets citizens against 
one another precisely because of perceived racial differences.”^^ * Additionahy, by offering 
specific categories of race for census respondents to select, the government takes a hand in 
restricting and enforcing the racial identities of its citizens. This is especiaUy problematic when 
the identity category is as troublesome to define as “race”.
Many Americans do not have a clear understanding of who they are raciahy, as 
iUustrated by a study in which 5.8 percent of the participants who considered themselves to be 
Black were described as White by an interviewer. Almost one third of self-described “Asians” 
were considered to be Black or White by outside observers, and the same result was true for 75
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percent of self-identified American Indians?^^ This study does not even begin to illustrate the 
complexity of identity in racial terms of someone with cross-cultural heritage on both sides of the 
family. The larger question in America’s race debate is one of group membership and the extent 
to which an individual’s identity must be articulated in terms of membership in a group (or many 
groups). In this sense the debate is a variation on the struggle to simphfy and pohticise 
(territoiialise) national identity and this aspect gives it broader relevance as an example of the 
internal pohtics of identity and difference which “threaten” the state. The idea that people can be 
counted and compartmentahsed on such bases is an illusion: “To be effective, the concepts of 
individual and group identity need to reflect not only who we have been but who we are 
becoming. The more these categories distort our perception of reahty, the less useful they 
are.”"°°
The intensity of the racial classification debate appears in stark contrast to Kaplan’s 
futuristic musings of multicultural, economically dynamic “polycentric urban pods”, which 
appear bland and uniform by comparison. In fact, one of Kaplan’s sources, a business journal 
editor in Orange County, Cahfomia, admits that there is httle local loyalty or community feehng 
since most people have migrated to the county fi’om elsewhere primarily for economic benefit.
He concludes that “In the future, patriotism wih be more purely and transparently economic.
But Kaplan himself wonders whether urban areas such as Orange County, which act as magnets 
for motivated entrepreneurs, can really maintain the stabihty they appear to present in the 
absence of shared notions of patriotism or civic virtue. Libertarianism thrives in such “urban 
pods” and the side effect of this independent-minded pursuit of the good hfe is social 
fi'agmentation and inequahty: “the threatening and unsightly poor are kept out of sight; hence 
the growth of social- and income-exclusive residential a r e a s . I n  contrast to the individuahsm 
of Orange County, Kaplan identifies another model for the regional pohtical space of the future 
— the revival of the city-state as exemphfied by Vancouver, British Columbia. Geographicahy, 
economically, and socially isolated fi'om the rest of Canada, British Columbia maintains a strong 
regional identity. FueUed by a large, wealthy Asian immigrant pool, the city of Vancouver is
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developing an “East-West hybrid culture” of economic success. But it also maintains a cohesive 
sense of identity which generates civic loyalty of the kind necessary for perpetuating a new type 
of political space.
As a Vancouver urban geographer enthused:
“This is all you need to be sovereign in the phase of history we are entering; a 
dynamic and highly educated population and strategic transport Unks. Cities 
and their environs already provide you with everything you need — garbage 
collection, schools, neighborhood whatever — but they get the least of your 
taxes. The bulk of your tax money still goes to the state or province and the 
federal government, and what do they do for you....Isn’t it antiquated? But that 
will change. In the coming decades your tax money will increasingly go to the 
place you really care about. ...Though I guess we should all pay taxes to that 
Information Age mihtary you are creating in Washington, D C. They’ll in effect 
sell us the protection we will need against terrorists and other bad people. You 
see, we don’t needyow [he meant America], and we certainly don’t need 
Canada. What we need is your mihtary
Whether or not these speculations are accurate, what Kaplan and his sources teU us is that
change is afoot, and even wild approximate guesses as to what shape the future may take are a
more positive approach than denial and resolute insistence on the forms of the past. One of the
biggest problems for Kaplan’s thesis that the state structures of North America wih disintegrate
into a combination of urban pods and city-states is that it fails to address the question of whether
the current success of these areas can be maintained without the support of the state structures
within which they currently sit. The urban geographer envisioned contracting out for mihtary
protection, but national pohtics cover many more issues such as health, education, welfare,
environmental protection and a strong legal system. This is not to say that these issues caimot
be resolved in the future space Kaplan has in mind, it is only to point out that the question of
future pohtical spaces is a complex one and caimot ever be thought of as “solved” by a single
theorist, however courageous his musings.
The fact that this discussion of Kaplan’s work has apparently been restricted to local
urban areas rather than states and the sphere of the “international” by no means makes it
irrelevant to International Relations theory and secession. The fiiture of such regions wih
certainly change the nature of international relations by changing the type of pohtical body
among which the inter-relations take place. International Relations theorists would neglect such
possibihties at the peril of a disciphnary descent into irrelevance. True, Kaplan’s ideas are
particularly based on North American conditions and therefore can be seen as culturahy possible
only in the Western New World. But the ties of economic interdependence and inter-cultural
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relations are so widespread now that no such change could be strictly local. Furthermore, while 
these forces of inter-relationship and change cannot be fully controlled, they can be analysed and 
accounted for in any vision of future possibihty. The key is to appreciate the necessity of 
complexity, and to fight the tug of comfortable certainty, in attempting to understand the new 
pohtics of space and time.
Democracy sans frontières
Given the intensity with which pohtical power is being puUed in multiple directions on a 
multitude of issues, both locally, as in Kaplan’s models, and regionahy, as economic and 
strategic coahtions such as the European Union and NATO illustrate, national governments can 
no longer claim to be the sole relevant bodies for deahng with a large number of pohtical 
questions. Globahsation, Held and McGrew argue, has led to a new kind of “boundary 
problem”, in which states’ decisions affect not only their own citizens but many others who have 
had no voice.^^ This raises tricky questions of accountabihty and responsibihty which badly 
tangle the happy clarity of the old sovereign inside/outside divide. Held and McGrew remark 
that “Pohtical space for the development and pursuit of effective government and the 
accountabihty of power is no longer coterminous with a dehmited pohtical territory. What,
then, becomes of the post-Gold War project of spreading democracy as a means of achieving 
peace? This “boundary problem” is actuahy a crucial question of pohtical theory — making 
pohtical decisions which are legitimate and accountable. Global government is certainly not the 
answer to this question, and Held and McGrew are quick to point out that globahsation does not 
act as homogenisation. States stiU maintain unquestionable power over the big pohtical issues 
concerning their territory — namely mihtary security and border control. But in most other 
areas of the pohtical sphere, as it is currently fashionable to point out, the pretensions of states to 
dominance are wearing thin. In short, authority over many pohtical questions is now being 
transformed, by the simple coUective force of world shrinkage due to the vast increase in the 
speed with which we conduct aU of our transactions. Held and McGrew urge that “If the most 
powerfiil geo-pohtical forces are not to settle many pressing matters simply in terms of their own
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objectives and by virtue of their power, then existing institutions and mechanisms of 
accountabihty need to be reconsidered.” ”^® To this end, they identify a “taxonomy of prospective 
world orders”: four estabhshed schools of thought which focus on the reallocation of pohtical 
power.
The first of these is the increasingly popular neo-hberal school, in which economic 
forces cause transnational networks to develop and marginahse the influence of the state.
Market forces become authoritative and consumerism pervades, causing a new identity to prevail 
over traditional societies. “The global spread of Western hberal democracy further reinforces the 
sense of an emerging civihzation defined by universal standards of economic and pohtical 
organization.” ”^’ Another school of thought is hberal-reformism which seeks to promote “a new 
global civic ethic based upon ‘core’ values that ah humanity could uphold.” Liberal reformists, 
in the tradition of the great hberal ideals of the nineteenth century, with their “faith in progress 
and human rationahty...have argued that creating a peaceful and democratic world order is far 
fi’om a utopian project but, on the contrary, a necessity in a world of growing 
interdependence.” ”^* Rather than relying on the market to push democratic standards, hberal- 
reformists would make states more accountable through reform of international institutions. 
Thirdly, in contrast, there are those who adhere to the ‘radical project’, emphasising a ‘bottom 
up’ means of change in world order. Radicals do not rely on individuahsm or rationahty, but 
beheve alternative mechanisms such as social movements which “challenge the authority of 
states and international agencies as well as orthodox definitions of the ‘political’.” Thus, the 
radical version of ‘humane governance’ is based on “a multiphcity of ‘communities of fate’ and 
social m ovem en ts .F in a lly , Held and McGrew identify the cosmopohtan project, which aims 
to specify principles of accountabihty for “forms of power which presently operate beyond the 
scope of democratic control.”^^ ” Cosmopohtans beheve that citizenship and loyalty wih be 
“mediated” through different and multiple traditions and communities and that this wih increase 
the possibihty of mutual understanding. Démocratisation, in the cosmopohtan project, involves
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not only “deepening” democracy within states and local communities, but also encouraging 
“cosmopolitan citizens to gain access to, mediate between, and render accountable, the social, 
economic and pohtical processes and flows which cut across and transform their traditional 
community boundaries.C osm opohtanism , as envisioned here, centres on the legitimacy of 
pohtics and how that can be reconceived as democratic principles in a non-territorial fashion. 
Held and McGrew conceive of these four schools of thought, or ‘projects’, as constituting an 
invigorating pohtical debate — in contest against one another. That a multi-faceted discussion 
of the new possibihties of non-territorial pohtics is necessary seems obvious enough. What is 
not clear is why these “schools” should be seen as competing against one another for ultimate 
and exclusive success. There is nothing about the features of neo-hberahsm, hberal-reformism, 
radicahsm, or cosmopohtanism as described here which shuts out the indicators of other projects 
or requires mutual exclusivity. Rather, one should require of Held and McGrew a vigourous 
defence of why global market forces, international institutional reforms, global social 
movements, and cross-boundary citizenship cannot all occur at once. In fact, they are ah 
occurring today as we struggle to discern trends and order in a confusing and transitional global 
ethos.
It is the extension of accountabihty for constituencies which span territoriahty that hes 
at the heart of the concern for new forms of a democratic order. Held examines this idea in 
another piece (elaborating the cosmopohtan project) in which he points out that our prior 
assumptions about democracy have been bifurcated by the inside/outside sovereign divide. The 
international system has been distinguished by “democracy in nation-states and non-democratic 
relations among states; the entrenchment of accountabihty and democratic legitimacy inside 
state boundaries and the pursuit of power pohtics (or maximum advantage) outside such 
boundaries; and democracy and citizenship rights for "insiders" and their fi’equent negation for 
"outsiders" G l o b a h s a t i o n  obviously threatens the legitimacy of a democratic system 
manifested solely within the state. Held’s point in advocating a “cosmopohtan democracy” is 
that we must reconceive of democracy as a system which apphes to all the constituencies which 
should monitor accountabihty regardless of territorial boundaries and national identities. Held 
envisions referenda of transnational groups on issues such as energy policy and the formation of 
regional authorities, because cosmopohtan democracy is “based on the recognition that
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democracy within a particular community and democratic relations among communities are 
interlocked, absolutely inseparable, and that new organizational and binding mechanisms must 
be created if democracy is to survive and develop in the decades a h e a d . T h e  question 
remains. What kind of mechanisms and how can they be created? Held is aware of the 
difficulties of asserting a specific global program, since it is arguable that globahsation has 
sparked the renewed affirmation of particular identities and separatist tendencies. He is carefiil 
to assert that the existence of cosmopohtan communities requires neither integration nor 
consensus along pohtical and cultural hnes, since “part of the appeal of democracy hes in its 
refusal to accept in principle any conception of the pohtical good other than that generated by the 
people themselves.”^^ " In other words, democracy is the only system which conveys legitimacy 
upon hmitless numbers of competing “narratives of the good”. What must be instituted globaUy 
in order for Held’s vision to become meaningful is a “precommitment” to follow democratic 
procedures — each pohtical entity or interest must “recognize the other as a legitimate presence 
with which some accomodation must be made; and each must be wilhng to give up exclusive 
claims upon the right, the good, the universal and the spatial.”^^ ^
Covert Coercion and the Liberal Utopia
With the idea of plurahstic recognition and participation of ah perspectives, and the 
abandonment of a single claim to the truth, the theoretical difficulties of democratic pohtics 
become more apparent. How are the multiple voices to be heard without the strong and the 
numerous drowning out the weak and the few? National boundaries have much less to do with 
the dynamics of democratic accountabihty than popularly acknowledged. The problem of 
“coercion” is one which has plagued democratic theory since its inception. Jane Mansbridge 
goes so far as to argue that true pohtical legitimacy cannot exist in the real world: “If coercion is 
legitimated only by equal power in the decision to coerce, and if no real democracy can achieve 
equal power, then no real democracy — especiahy no real large-scale democracy — can ever 
fiiUy justify the coercion it exerc ises.L eg itim acy , then, can only be approximated but never
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fully achieved. Coercion, in the sense of unequal deliberative power over decision-making, is
always present, even in the smallest groups. Thus pohtical accountabihty and representation
problems are present within as well as among national identity groups. On one hand, this would
seem to dissolve the importance of borders for pohtical democratic decision-making through the
equally “coercive” conditions to which all participants are subject in any pohtical process.
However, it does httle to attract one to the cosmopohtan project since the conditions of
democracy as a whole are severely caUed into question. So how can the democratic process be
legitimated? How can its participating identity groups be vahdated? Mansbridge herself
considers that the coercive nature of democratic dehberation, if recognised, can serve to drive the
process of compromise and accommodation continually onward, forcing us to reahse that the
state of equahty and justice is never actually achieved.
Each balance of power creates a new underdog, each settlement a new group 
who would benefit fi*om unsetthng. Each settlement accordingly creates not 
only the necessary capacity for action but also the need to protect and facihtate 
in some way those who have lost. Because no democracy ever reaches the point 
at which justice is simply done, democracies need to recognize and foster 
enclaves ofresistance.^^’
This is a crucial point — justice is never done — both in the sense that it is never simply
achieved and that the process of trying to achieve it must continue. This is so because there can
be no common perception of justice determined in a coercion-fi’ee dehberative environment. The
best democracies, then, are never stable, but always poised on the point of unsetthng balances,
shifting alhances and topphng the powerful. We must always be aware of the need for
opposition and resistance.
As Chantai Mouffe puts it, “the relation between social agents becomes more democratic
only insofar as they accept the particularity and the hmitation of their claims; that is only insofar
as they recognize their mutual relations as one fi"om which power is ineradicable.”^^ * For
Mouffe, the notion of a democratic system which is fi’eed of power relations is a dangerous
illusion. She advocates a project of “radical and plural democracy” in which “the specificity of
modem plurahst democracy — even a well-ordered one — resides not in the absence of
domination and of violence but in the estabhshment of a set of institutions through which they
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can be limited and contested. In her critique of John Rawls’s concept of just society, Mouffe
asserts that any attempt to resolve with finahty the question of what constitutes justice in a
democratic community yields dangerous consequences. Rawls’s theory of the well-ordered
society is one which has ehminated politics because a common conception of justice has been
reahsed by “reasonable and rational citizens” who act in accordance. These citizens’ mutual
“differences” occur in their conceptions of the good, but these conflicting ideas are private and
do not affect the public sphere. All disputes over pubUc issues are resolved through the agreed
upon principles of justice. But any dissent about what constitutes these principles of justice
must be by an “unreasonable” or “irrational” person who must be forced to submit. This
coercion, however, is legitimated, in Rawls’s society, by its source in the communal exercise of
reason. Mouffe concludes that “Rawls’s ‘hberal utopia’ would then, be a society in which
legitimate dissent would have been ehminated from the pubhc sphere.”^^® Because Rawls and
others who attempt to maintain a fixed definition of justice, assume that an “ordered” society is
one in which there is full agreement about pohtical processes in the pubhc sphere, he has
consigned all “difference” to the private sector. But this is to profoundly miss the constitutive
nature of pohtics itself. Democratic order is not the staid absence of dissent in the pubhc realm,
but rather the reahsation that “undecidabihty is the condition of existence of democratic
pohtics.”^^  ^ The more contentious and indefinite are relations among participants in a society,
the better the democratic project of giving voice to the plurahty has been approximated.
Instead of trying to erase the traces of power and exclusion, democratic pohtics 
requires bringing them to the fore, making them visible so that they can enter 
the terrain of contestation. The fact that this must be envisaged as an unending 
process should not be cause for despair, because the desire to reach a final 
destination can only lead to the ehmination of the pohtical and to the destruction 
of democracy. In a democratic pohty, conflicts and confrontations, far from 
being a sign of imperfection, indicate that democracy is alive and inhabited by 
plurahsm.^ ^^
The only way to properly accommodate identity and difference within pohtical theory is to 
recognise the inevitabihty of conflict (pohtics) among the many selves and conceptions of the
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good. This conception of democracy has profound imphcations for the conclusions reached by 
most theorists of secession and has been largely ignored.
Leaving Home
Pohtical theorist Bonnie Honig makes a crucial connection between the “inescapabihty
of conflict” and the concept of “home”. If we are to attempt to seriously integrate the concept of
identity\difierence into democratic theory, we must “give up on the dream of a place called home,
a place fi'ee of power, conflict, and struggle, a place — an identity, a form of hfe, a group vision
— unmarked or unriven by difference and untouched by the power brought to bear upon it by
the identities that strive to ground themselves in its place.”^^  ^ Honig is not making a call for the
primacy of the individual and the relative unimportance of group identities. Rather, she is
emphasising the need to recognise that “home” is a collective illusion which hides the struggle of
the constituted identities taking part in it. The inter-relationship of identity and difference (as
discussed in Chapter Four, Problematising Identity) cannot be ignored or downplayed in any
discussion of secession and international pohtics. Instead this relationship must be brought to
the forefi'ont in order to uncover the flaws in our assumptions about the nation and the homeland
and the goal of “solving” ethnic conflict. Difference is not only the self we are not, it is an actual
part of our “self’. Identity contains difference within it, difference is “what identity perpetually
seeks (and fails) to expunge, fix, or hold in place.”^^"* Honig’s “pohtics of home” reflects on the
urge to reside within the illusion of a coUective identity, where values are shared and difference is
kept out. Democratic pohtics within such a Ao/we-land would be fi'ee of conflict because of the
common identity and — thus equahty — of the participants. But we have already learnt to be
wary of complacency in pohtics since it refuses to acknowledge difference and thus hides the
oppression of dissent. Because it must be unitary to maintain its trouble-fi'ee identity, the
pohtics of “home” strives to withdraw fi-om or conquer the difference within. As Honig warns:
The dream of home is dangerous, particularly in postcolonial settings, because it 
animates and exacerbates the inabihty of constituted subjects — or nations — 
to accept their own internal differences and divisions, and it engenders zealotry, 
the wiU to bring the dream of unitariness or home into being. It leads the 
subject to project its internal differences onto external Others and then to rage 
against them for standing in the way of its dream — both at home and 
elsewhere.. .This zealotry takes shape as a propensity either to withdraw fi'om
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conflicts or to conquer them: withdrawal (to a supposedly safe home that is 
elsewhere, away from all this tumult) and conquest (of that tumultuous disorder 
in order to build a supposedly safe home here) are two sides of the same zealot’s 
coin. Both signal an unwilhngness — on the part of constituted subjects or 
formed nations — to settle for anything less than a phantasmatic imaginary of 
home.^ ^^
Through this perspective, secession can be seen as both the attempt to withdraw from difference 
and the attempt to conquer it. Both involve the unyielding attempt to purify the identity of the 
collective self — a fruitless and unsavoury task. Given the anti-democratic imphcations of this 
attempt, secession becomes a phenomena which no democratic theorist ought to justify. But, as 
I have mentioned before in this thesis, secession is not a problem which can be solved through 
carefuUy reasoned methods and analysis. It is an outcome of a certain way of thinking about 
identity and pohtics. When these ways of thinking have changed, secession wiU no longer be 
relevant.
What, then, becomes of our concept of home and our obvious need for some kind of 
rooted identity? Honig theorises optimisticahy that acceptance of the state of conflict and 
difference and the impossibihty of the conventional notion of home is the admission of “a 
vulnerabihty that may look like homelessness”, but actuahy aUows a reconceptuahsation of 
home as a “coahtional arrangement”.^ ^^  Such an arrangement of home is the required first step 
to a true understanding of the freedoms we do have, an understanding that rejects home as 
“spaces of privacy and integrity that depend upon the displacement of abjection onto Others, 
spaces of identity that seem to require for their survival the displacement, conquest, or 
conversion of difference and Otherness that relentlessly intrude upon us.”^^ ’ So the response to 
our need for home and a rooted identity is to recognise the illusive nature of the quest. Like 
justice, home is a concept which can never actually be reahsed, and, hke justice, the desire for it 
is never sated. But this assertion is not a call to abandon order and civil society. To the 
contrary, it is an urgent appeal to recognise the need for constant coahtional negotiations and the 
wide variety of possibihdes for the social self in terms of multiple affihations. With such an 
understanding of home and of the self, we are at once far less secure, and also far less bounded 
— that is, more free to reahse the complexity of the self (both individuahy and collectively). This 
seeming homelessness is the ethical option, in terms of refusing to hide or rename attempts to
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eliminate difference. There is also an element of the psycho-analytical perspective in this 
understanding — it is Juha Kristeva’s recognition of the foreigner within. Kristeva realises the 
pohtical possibihdes of an “ethics of psychoanalysis” in the discovery of our own “disturbing 
otherness”. If we recognise our own “uncanny strangeness we shah neither suffer from it nor 
enjoy it from the outside. The foreigner is within me, hence we are ah foreigners. If I am a 
foreigner, there are no foreigners.”^^ * For Kristeva, the pohtics of psychoanalytic ethics would 
involve:
a cosmopohtanism of a new sort that, cutting across governments, economies, 
and markets, might work for a mankind whose sohdarity is founded on the 
consciousness of its unconscious — desiring, destructive, fearful, empty, 
impossible....[For] the difference within us in its most bewildering shape [is 
presented by Freud] as the ultimate condition of our being with others.^^^
Thus, theories of cosmopohtan democracy and of the pohtics of psychoanalytic ethics cross
disciplinary boundaries to reach very similar conclusions. This should not come as a surprise to
pohtical theorists, since the determination of the self, the “us” and “them” is the foundational
question of pohtics.
Different Democracy
In conjunction with the discussions above about the constitutive inter-relationship 
between identity and difference, it seems clear that even if there were widespread agreement 
about the value of universal peace and organisation, it would be antithetical to democratic values 
to eliminate difference, or, in Schmittean terminology, to ehminate the determination of 
friend/enemy and thus pohtics itself. However, taking Schmitt’s thesis from a modernist to a 
post-modernist stage ahows us to contemplate mechanisms for appreciating the self^other 
distinction on the inside as weU as the outside of the sovereign border, and thus to theorise ways 
of deahng with internal difference and the nature of democratic accountabihty. For Wilham 
Connolly democracy has been injured by its irrevocable theorisation in terms of state 
institutions. Pohtical theorists have assumed the state territorial foundations of democracy 
wiAout questioning the contradictory impulses of democracy itself. The territorial state provides 
the (hberating) organisation of electoral institutions, but also, Connolly asserts, the (confining) 
hmitations of democratic “energies” which seek to find points of identification without regard to
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geographical m a rke rs .R a the r  than seeing democracy as altered or inauthenticated by a non­
territorial reconceptualisation, Connolly envisions democracy as deprived of the fiill 
manifestation of its capabihties while it continues to be restricted to the confines of the territorial 
state. These capabihties exceed the concept of democracy as a form of rule and encompass it as 
“an egahtarian constitution of cultural hfe that encourages people to participate in defining their 
own troubles and possibihties, regardless of where these troubles originate and how narrow or 
broad they are in scope”.^ ^^  Thus democracy can be seen as a social process which continuahy 
overturns settled conventions, thrives on ambiguity and circumvents the attempts of one 
perspective to claim the final truth. In other words, “its role as a mode o f governance is 
balanced and countered by its logic as a cultural medium o f the periodic denaturalization o f  
settled identities and conventions. It is this problematising aspect of the democratic ethos 
that allows it to exceed the confines of the state’s pohtical space and to generate spaces of its 
own. ConnoUy does not argue that the dissolution of territorial governance is imminent or 
desirable. Instead he argues for the “plurahzation” of democratic spaces, the ahowance of new 
allegiances and identifications without regard to state institutions. Such aUegiances are indeed 
already taking place in terms of financial structures, social movements and media, to name a few. 
The point is not to identify or name the structures of fixture pohtical spaces — that would 
resemble the type of essentiahst project which would contradict the very democratic disturbances 
which fixel the changes in the first place. ConnoUy proposes a recognition of the (anachronistic) 
hmitations imposed by the state on democracy and a plurahstic response to the “democratic 
aspiration to have a hand in shaping corporate, strategic, distributive, ecological, and mihtary 
practices that enable, disciphne, and endanger our hves.”^^ ^
It is important to accept the fact that no single vantage point on the shape of plurahzed 
democracy can be gained. The new pohtical spaces can only be recognised and encouraged — 
they cannot be fiiUy preconceived lest they deteriorate into utopian iUusions or uncompromising 
irrelevancies. ConnoUy compares today’s development of plurahzed democratic spaces to the
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relationship between Italian city-states and the growth of state-territorial organisation in the
sixteenth century. It cannot be fully imagined:
It is protean, unformed, and unreahstic from the perspective of fixed identities 
and conventional boundaries. Epistemic reahsts will always find it difficult to 
participate in the activation of new energies if they demand the sohdification of 
future possibihties into fixed objects prior to the representation of them.^^^
Seeking sohdity will prioritise certainty over ambiguity and perpetuate sameness at the cost of
oppressing difference.
The big question which suggests itself upon consideration of the plurahzing ethos is to 
what extent can diversity be encouraged before fragmentation endangers the collective good? 
Connolly rephes that the question assumes a misunderstanding of the inter-relationship between 
identity and difference by identifying “extensive cultural diversification with the loss of cultural 
connections....To plurahze, therefore, is not to fragmentize. To dogmatize is to fragmentize.
To illustrate his point, Connolly examines the ever-present tree metaphor of society, with a 
deeply rooted base from which the Umbs of diversity may branch. He rejects this metaphor in 
favour of rhizomatic growth which depends upon the continual interconnection of both roots and 
shoots, and which spreads in many directions instead of the unidirectional tree.^^  ^ Within the 
rhizome metaphor, diversification indicates the flourishing strength of the plant, with multiple 
roots and shoots each connected with others by criss-crossing runners. The diversified 
plurahzed culture which grows from these rhizomatic connections is helped along by a 
relationship among participants which Connolly calls “agonistic respect” — it is a certain 
reciprocal “forbearance” and “generosity”^^ ’ in pressing and responding to claims which stems 
from widespread acknowledgement of the ambiguity of identity and the impossibihty of an 
objective standard of truth. The pohtics of agoni sm are to be understood in contrast to those of 
antagonism. Unhke antagonism, agonism recognises the necessity of the different other in the 
constitution of the self and therefore it concedes to the other a measure of respect. Like 
Schmitt’s fiiend-enemy distinction, agonists exist on level and equal terms — each necessary for 
the other to exist. An agonism of difference is one in which:
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each opposes the other (and the other’s presumptive behefs) while respecting 
the adversary at another level as one whose contingent orientations also rest on 
shaky epistemic grounds. An antagonism in which each aims initially at 
conquest or conversion of the other can now (given other supporting 
conditions) become an agonism in which each treats the other as crucial to itself 
in the strife and interdependence of identity\difiference. A “pathos of distance”
(to borrow a phrase from Nietzsche) begins to unfold whereby each maintains a 
certain respect for the adversary, partly because the relationship exposes 
contingency in the being of both.^^*
The relationship of agonistic respect thus smooths the way for connections among the many
identities in a plurahzed democracy and into the multi-bounded pohtical spaces beyond the state.
But agonism can also have profound meaning for international relations in both its inter-
national and iniQi-state senses. Showing agonistic (rather than antagonistic) respect for the
national aspirations of an opponent allows that opponent to feel recognised (not unhke the
international legal recognition which constitutes a state), and therefore removes the aspect of
zero-sum pohtics from the game. If the starting assumption is that the “other” identity not only
has a right to exist but is intrinsic to your own “self’ identity than the very definition of security
pohtics undergoes a deep transformation and the possibihty of communication and
understanding (even if unaccompanied by fiiendship) is greatly facihtated. Secessionist pohtics
would become increasingly irrelevant as states became less dominant as the sole vahdative fora
and the pohtics of plurahzing democracy expanded through the growing organic ties of the
rhizomatic structures.
//fconclusion
While the increasingly anachronistic relationship between state and territory would 
seem to pose a threat to democratic pohtics, it only points to the conditions of possibihty for the 
creation of new pohtical spaces and more authentic democratic practices. We can seek now to 
create different meanings for the conceptual signifiers politics, state, identity and democracy. 
The modernist territorial meanings for these terms that we struggle with today are becoming less 
and less relevant, but they contain the seeds of new ^ o^r-modemist meanings which can make 
better sense for the emerging patterns of the globahsed world. As stated above, friture pohtics 
cannot be made to conform to a pattern or model — this would be imposing one vision over 
another. It would be to advocate fragmenting dogma rather than plurahsing rhizomatic patterns
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of relations. Because we (can) have no model, we are scarcely able to recognise contra-
ontopological patterns. As Roland Bleiker points out,
Discourses live on and appear reasonable long after their premises have turned 
into anachronistic rehcs. More inclusive ways of theorizing and hving world(s) 
politics cannot surface overnight. There are no quick solutions, no new 
paradigms or miraculous pohtical settlements that one could hope for.
Changing the practice of IR is a long process, saturated with obstacles and 
contradictions . . .It is in our daily practices of speaking, of forgetting and 
remembering, that slow transformative potentials are hidden.^^^
We should be wary of elegant solutions as subversive of plurahstic and agonistic pohtics.
Pohtics is a messy, conflictual business; there is no quick fix. Nor, however, are there
permanent structural patterns which determine the way pohtics must be done. A historical
discourse of antagonism between nations need not dictate the precise course of the future.
Enemies have become friends and fiiends enemies. The nations of Western Europe, engaged in
total war a short half-century ago, now allow fi’ee passage across the borders internal to the
European Union. While there are stiU many modernist ontopological aspects to EU discourse,
with a constant tension between the whole entity and the particular states, the levelhng of
economic and legal practices hints at a new wilhngness to break away fi’om territorial pohtics.
The fact that EU pohtics proceeds with maddening slowness is due partially to member states
clinging to their shreds of power and partially also to the lack of a supreme plan or consensus.
European unification is a process which does not ask (and therefore cannot answer definitively)
“what is the nature of European unification?” Rather, the EU simply engages in a continual
questioning and re-estabhshing of the semantics of European and of Union. Continual
redeficnition, without recourse to the determination of a historical model, allows the EU to
venture beyond the famihar patterns of statehood in which regions and social movements have
options for transborder recognition and cooperation. I do not wish to represent the EU as a
model of contra-ontopology. The EU does maintain modernist conceptions of inside/outside
territoriahty, but the fact that the external borders are even somewhat negotiable, and that
internal relations occur across state borders, hints at a wilhngness to conceive of new forms of
pohtical space.
As mentioned above, it is the daily practices of speaking, forgetting and remembering 
that yield the fiiU transformative potentials of alternative theorising. Bleiker discusses forgetting 
in Nietzschean terms — that is, one must forget history in order to free the future from its grasp. 
It is a special kind of forgetting, which allows the remembering of historically constructed
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identities, but also the remembering of the contingency of those constructions and therefore the 
forgetting of the determination of history and the recognition of alternatives for the future. As 
Milan Kundera says, “Remembering is not the negative of forgetting. Remembering is a form of 
forgetting.”^® This is the kind of forgetting which allows the Blacks in America to remember 
slavery but forget the shame of bondage and re-estabhsh their identities as integral to the 
building of the country; it allows Whites to remember that they participated actively or tacitly in 
a system which condoned slavery, but to forget the hatred they felt for the Other and recognise 
that the White identity in America was constructed against the Black and therefore contains 
Blackness within it. This is the kind of forgetting which is going on currently in South Africa, 
Viet Nam and Chile, but it is a long, slow and painfiil process and there are always some who 
persist in remembering the narratives of exclusion. Their voices are a part of the ambiguity of 
agonistic pohtics, and they cannot be silenced. Secessionist narratives are a form of history 
which remembers without forgetting. They perform a pohtics which attempts to re-member the 
nation in terms of maintaining the identities (membership) of the mythical historical nation of the 
past. Secessionists are trying hard not to forget.
Examples from Western Liberal Democracies are in fact the “easy” cases. Conflictual 
and angry as relations between these groups remain, they are stiU relations under conditions of 
peace. What do we say to the groups caught in the cross-fire of the Balkans? They eat, drink 
and breath ontopological convictions. How do we practice our theory of forgetting in Serbia? 
Listening to the nationahst mythical historical narratives stemming from all sides of the various 
conflicts, one pattern repeats itself: “We can never hve with them after what they did to us.” It is 
tempting to use these stories as the basis for peace. The wars between these groups have been 
so horrible, the quickest option to stop the fighting is also the easiest. If they cannot hve with 
each other, then surely they should not have to. The solution most easily implemented always 
consists of boundaries, separation, autonomy — control over territory. But these are the 
solutions of history, and they are the “solutions” which made the current conflicts possible. The 
Dayton Agreement, with its blotchy birthmark patchwork of territorial entities held together by 
the thinnest threads of federal structure, is nothing if not a monument to modernist ontopological 
thinking. For the moment, there is peace in Bosnia, but it is very doubtful that there is any 
fo rge t t ing .C an  our theories about alternatives for the future be useftil in solving active
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conflicts? I suggest that they can, but they must be practiced first. Without the coercion and 
guidance of an ontopological teleology, the practice of forgetting and remembering is difficult. 
But when ethnic groups in conflict claim that their history prohibits them fi'om co-existence, it is 
time to forget. Nationahst performances based on the territorial exclusion of the other must not 
be credited as structural imperatives for the fixture. Any solution must involve the slow hard 
process of reconcihation and mutual recognition. The opponents need not be fiiends, they need 
only understand their mutual dependency. This requires the estabhshment of stable institutions 
which give voice and rights to ah perspectives regardless of national afifihation — in other 
words, a free press, independent judiciary and multi-party democracy. A new path for “war-torn 
societies” (Kosovo, or Northern Ireland, or Palestine) involves the refusal by peace brokers to 
countenance the exclusivist claims of historical nationahst identities. But more than that, groups 
caught in conflict must be given encouragement to engage with each other, to claim 
responsibihty for, but also to forget their histories by freeing up space (both pohtical and 
territorial) for different relations in the fixture. The relations wih take shape as needed and as 
performed on a daily basis, but they must be nurtured and protected against the fragmentizing 
dogmatic tendencies of the separatist imperative.
Thus new types of spatial pohtics will change our understanding of the national and the 
international — and International Relations Theory and Practice must change along with it. We 
caxinot continue to assume that identity stops at the state’s border — pohtics are constitutive of 
the self and the other. International pohtics occur wherever groups claim a national identity of 
the self, regardless of the institutional or spatio-temporal setting. Comprehending this dynamic 
is crucial for the fixture relevance of International Relations as a disciphne — and of course for 
theorists of secession. As we recognise the transcendence of state boundaries and the separatist 
pohtics they engender, so we come to recognise secession as an anachronism, and eventuahy as 
history.
recognises die need for Albanians and Serbs to forget Kosovo’s history. Nothing about this settlement indicates that 
relations between Serbs and Albanians will be “settled”. All the borders — territorial and political — remain intact.
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